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ABSTRACT 
  
 
 
The definitions of discrimination provided by equality legislation are a measure of how far a society is 
willing to challenge deep-seated assumptions, attitudes, and patterns of inequality. The judiciary has a 
major role in shaping these definitions. This is evident from the antecedent American cases and those of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, which worked with more aspirational than detailed legislative 
provisions. One might conclude that the legislation coming before the English courts was thus ‘ready-
made’, presenting the judiciary with few interpretive difficulties. But on many occasions this has proved 
not to be the case, with the senior English courts producing a number of highly contentious decisions. 
Commentators, heavily critical of many of these cases, tend to analyse them by reference to external 
understandings of concept, theory, or policy. This work offers a unique internal critique of the process 
producing the cases subject to such academic scrutiny. It makes a textual analysis of leading English 
judgments on the definitions of discrimination, and does so through the lens of statutory interpretation - the 
judge’s primary function. The scrutiny finds that these judgments are technically flawed in terms of the 
process of statutory interpretation and the definitions produced; it also finds them to be overcomplicated, 
excessively long, and often unduly restrictive. As such, the thesis is that these cases were better, and more 
easily, resolvable using conventional methods of interpretation, which would also shape the definitions 
better to reflect the policies underlying the legislation. Although highlighting inexpert reasoning, the textual 
scrutiny reveals other threads, particularly notable in the narrow interpretations. There is an adherence to 
the common law’s notion of binary litigation, envisaging just two individual litigants (e.g. a worker and 
employer) necessitating a harmed individual and fault-based liability; this is at odds with the societal and 
group-based purpose of the legislation. One can also detect a lingering historical negative or indifferent 
attitude to matters of equality, often realised nowadays with an assortment of personal predilections. 
Consequently, suggestions for reform are based around these findings. 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
‘[T]he right to criticise judges...may be one of the safeguards which helps to ensure their high standard of 
performance.’
1
 
 
 
Historically, notions of equality did not figure in the common law, and by extension, in the process of 
statutory interpretation. In the nineteenth century, women were denied the vote because the statutory 
instruction that ‘the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females’ was not enough to 
rebut the common law presumption against women’s suffrage.
2
 Non-Christian MP’s could be prosecuted 
under an antique and defunct statute requiring an oath to made, ‘upon the true faith of a Christian’.
3
 Into 
the 20th century, and as recently as 1986, a public kiss between two men led to their convictions of 
‘insulting’ behaviour.
4
 
 Thus, it was for Parliament to address inequality and discrimination, with the first dedicated 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation being introduced in the 1970s.
5
 The definitions of 
discrimination provided by this legislation (classified nowadays as ‘Key Concepts’ within the Equality Act 
2010) are a measure of how far society is willing to challenge deep-seated assumptions and attitudes 
(apparent in these historical cases), as well as patterns of inequality. Yet the interpretation of this dedicated 
legislation has shown that the judiciary has a major role in shaping these definitions.  
  
1. The key concepts, drafting, and judges today  
There are three major policy decisions to be made when drafting discrimination legislation. The first is the 
areas of civil activity chosen for regulation (such as employment, services, housing, education), the second 
is the protected characteristics identified for coverage, and the third is defining actionable discrimination, 
(the latter two being ‘Key Concepts’). Once chosen, defining the activities is a relatively straightforward 
task, and has proved comparatively uncontroversial from an interpretive standpoint.
6
 On the other hand, the 
definition of race has been subject to some interpretive disagreement; this has arisen when the definition 
has been tied to the meaning of discrimination itself,
7 
 over which there is much less consensus, with views 
typically ranging from a ‘results-based’ ambition (requiring quotas) on the one hand, to liability limited to 
                                                          
1
 Salmon LJ, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of Contempt as it affects Tribunals of 
Inquiry (Cmnd 4078, 1969) 15. 
2
 Chorlton v Lings (1868) LR 4 C P 374. 
3
 Miller v Salomons (1852) 7 Exchequer Reports (Welsby, Hurlstone and Gordon) 475; 155 ER 1036, 
affirmed, Salomons v Miller (1853) 8 Exchequer Reports (Welsby, Hurlstone and Gordon) 778; 155 ER 
1567. 
4
 Under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839: Masterson v Holden [1986] 1 WLR 1017 (QB). 
5
 Preceded by the relatively limited Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968.  
6
 See e.g. on  access to ‘private clubs’ under the Race Relations Act 1968, Charter v Race Relations Board [1973] AC 885 (HL) and 
Dockers Labour Club and Institute Ltd v Race Relations Board [1976] AC 285 (HL). The precise boundary of ‘employment’ under 
the EA 2010 has become controversial: Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] IRLR 827 (SC) [34], criticised by Baroness Hale in Bates van 
Winkelhof v Clyde & Co LLP [2014] 1 WLR 2047 (SC) [39]. 
7
 For ‘ethnic origins’ see Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA) reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL), and JFS 
[2010] 2 AC 728 (SC), discussed below respectively p 134 and 89. 
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blatant intentional discrimination, on the other.
8
 This is the most challenging aspect of drafting the law. It 
is law rooted in morality and seeks to define conduct, sometimes inadvertent or subconscious, which society 
considers ‘wrong’, or at least worthy of a legal cause of action and remedy. If the law is to do more than 
merely address one-to-one acts of bigotry, and tackle patterns of disadvantage not ordinarily noticeable in 
work-a-day ‘street level’ life, it becomes more controversial. It asks the question of society, which generally 
does not see itself as prejudiced, of how far it is willing to go in putting it hands up and admitting that its 
institutional, inadvertent, subconscious, and sometimes benign conduct causes (or perpetuates) these 
patterns. As such, discrimination law becomes a tool of social and economic change, a challenge for the 
English judiciary, not renowned for its judicial activism.
9
 
 It was fortunate for the drafters of Britain’s first comprehensive anti-discrimination statute - the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 - that the case law on the US Civil Rights Act 1964 had already given these 
matters some consideration and consequently mapped out two basic definitions of actionable discrimination 
to ensure that the legislation was effective. These were direct, and indirect, discrimination.
10
 Accordingly, 
these definitions were adopted in some detail.
11
 Similarly, by the mid-1990s, definitions of disability 
discrimination
12
 outlawed initially by the Rehabilitation Act 1973
13
 were well-developed by the American 
courts,
14
 providing another touchstone for those drafting the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. This is 
not to say that the statutory definitions produced were flawless; they were not entirely free of uncertainty 
nor prepared for every scenario. That is apparent from many of the cases studied in this work. But they did 
reproduce definitions fleshed out by the American judges and legislators with somewhat more experience 
in dealing with the challenge of securing effective protection against discrimination. By contrast to the 
drafters, the interpreters of these statutes - the English judiciary - largely ignored the American antecedents 
and the obvious intention of the drafters to reproduce them. 
 Instead, for the English judiciary in many cases, the legislation was a vehicle on which to produce 
an abundance of independent views, or personal predilections, on what this or that definition should actually 
mean.
15
 It is inevitable that at least some such opinions were technically flawed. It was also predictable that 
                                                          
8
 See Ch 2, p 50 et al. 
9
 Most notably perhaps, in the common law’s adherence to the notion of freedom of contract. Commenting 
on the 19th century, Chitty states that a contract’s ‘validity should not be challenged on the ground that its 
effect was unfair or socially undesirable’: Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet and Maxwell) 1.028. The 
allegiance to freedom of contract was maintained into to 21st century. See e.g. Photo Production Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 848 (Lord Diplock) and most recently, Cavendish Square Holding 
BV v Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 (SC) [33] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC). 
10
 Known in the US as disparate treatment and disparate impact. See, respectively, McDonnell Douglas 
Corp v Green 411 US 792 (Sup Ct, 1973); Griggs v Duke Power 401 US 424 (Sup Ct, 1971). 
11
 See Ch 6, and Lord Lester’s account of the transposition from US law of indirect discrimination, 
‘Discrimination: what can lawyers learn from history?’ [1994] PL 224, 227. 
12
 Notably disability-related discrimination (either by proxy or by disparate impact) and reasonable 
accommodation. See further Ch 7. 
13
 See now, the more comprehensive Americans with Disabilities Act 1990. 
14
 See e.g. McWright v Alexander 982 F 2d 222, 228, (7th Cir 1992) and the cases cited within. 
15
 Lord Neuberger once commented extra-judicially, that ‘virtually every’ appellate judge has been guilty 
of writing a ‘vanity’ judgment: ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture 2011, 16 
March 2011, para 24. < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131202164909/http://judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2011 
> accessed 1 May 2017 
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the same issues would return repeatedly to the appeal courts for the clarification they had failed to give 
hitherto. For instance, the House of Lords/Supreme Court alone has entertained eight cases over the issue 
of a benign motive ‘defence’,
16
 and four on proving the necessary disadvantage to get a claim of indirect 
discrimination off the ground.
17
 Although, as these numbers suggest, there may be little consensus on the 
detail, there is a general, but not overwhelming, theme of conservatism. Many of the decisions have been 
restrictive, or even retrograde, and certainly not purposive. Among these, there are a number of examples 
where statutory intervention was necessary to rescue the situation, using more detailed, precise language, 
which was less vulnerable to unduly narrow interpretations. The restrictive interpretations given by the 
Court of Appeal to two elements of indirect discrimination
18
 were redressed by legislation.
19
 A House of 
Lords decision on the definition of disability discrimination was effectively reversed by Parliament,
20
 whilst 
two upset long-standing and efficacious orthodoxy.
21
 At a lower level, several novel theories produced by 
the Court of Appeal had to be overturned on appeal.
22
 Meanwhile, some prominent judgments
23
 that could 
be characterised as purposive or progressive, or at least ‘neutral’, remain technically flawed and prolix.
24
  
 These ‘troublesome’ cases  suggest that, first, the judiciary has been important in not only fleshing 
out the statutory definitions of discrimination, but shaping them; second, it has been ignorant of, or turned 
a blind eye to, instructional antecedents; third, it has had a less than technical mastery of the statutory 
definitions; and fourth, given that the cases cited span a period of some 33 years (1983-2015), it would 
seem that the senior judiciary has learnt very little from the decades of experience. 
  
2. Existing commentary 
It is not surprising then, that there has been a host of critical academic commentary on the case law, as well 
as the wider notions of discrimination and equality. Although anti-discrimination legal definitions may be 
relatively recent, notions of equality are philosophically ancient,
25
 and there is an abundance of literature 
                                                          
16
 See further Chs 4 and 5. The cases are: R v Birmingham CC ex p EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156; James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751; 
Nagarajan v LRT [2000] 1 AC 501; Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] UKHL 48; Shamoon v Chief Constable of the 
RUC [2003] ICR 337; R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2005] 2 AC 
1 (HL); St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841; R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 278 (SC). In addition, the issues 
of knowledge of the protected characteristic, and (for two Law Lords) discriminatory intent, arose in Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 
1 AC 1399 (HL). See Ch 7, p 169, especially 176 et al. 
17
 See further, Ch 6. The cases are: Orphanos v QMC [1985] AC 761 (HL); R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-
Smith.(No. 2) [2000] ICR 244 (HL); Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No. 2) [2006] ICR 785 (HL); and Essop 
v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27. 
18
 ‘Requirement or condition’ within RRA 1976, s 1(1)(b): Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 
428 (CA) (discussed Ch 6, p 118); ‘Justifiable’, under RRA 1976, s 1(1)(b)(ii): Hampson v Department of 
Education [1989] ICR 179 (CA). 
19
 See now EA 2010, s 19. 
20
 Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL). See now EA 2010, ss 15 and 19 (with 6(3)). 
21
 Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No. 2) [2006] ICR 785 (HL). 
22
 See e.g. Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL); James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL); 
Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27. 
23
 See James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL) and R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 
(SC); St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (HL). 
24
 See e.g. R v Birmingham CC ex p EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156 (HL); James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 
(HL); St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (HL); R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 278 
(SC). 
25
 The notion that likes should be treated alike is traceable to Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 5, V 3. 
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exploring and developing theories and concepts of equality and discrimination. This has informed the case 
commentaries, which tend to operate by reference to external norms in any of three ways: conceptual, 
theoretical, or policy-based. A few instances will illustrate this. Sandra Fredman’s analysis of equal pay 
concepts and cases are normally made in the (policy) context of segregated (low paid) occupations, agency 
workers and collective bargaining.
26
 Her analysis of the controversial Lewisham v Malcolm
27
 case centres 
on aligning the two interpretations in play with the theories of social or medical models of disability 
discrimination law.
28
 Meanwhile, Aileen McColgan observed that Malcolm adopted the ‘similarly situated’ 
comparison associated with the comparator-driven concept of direct discrimination.
29
 Elsewhere, she 
observed that a Law Lord introduced an element of justifiability into the concept of direct discrimination, 
and suggested that this was for policy reasons (national security).
30
 Conor Gearty theorises a clutch of mid-
20th century common law cases
31
 indifferent to discriminatory aspects within the facts as illustrative of ‘a 
system of laws which prioritized ... interests in property and contract to the exclusion of other public 
interests’.
32
 Hugh Collins analyses a raft of cases, to find within them a unifying theory of social inclusion.
33
 
Christopher McCrudden analysed the JFS
34
 case as representing ‘post-multiculturalism’ and a shift towards 
an ‘ideals-based constitutionalism’.
35
 
 These are just a few of the many excellent and informative analyses of the case law. What these, 
and most other commentaries share, is a view that, by reference to concept, theory, or policy, the cases 
under their scrutiny produced unduly narrow interpretations of the legislation. (It is notable that the less 
restrictive judgments
36
 have rarely been subjected to criticism.) Moreover, the commentaries also share an 
omission: a detailed appraisal of the judges’ role in the decisions. At best, there is the occasional resort to 
the literal/purposive or framer’s intent/living instrument dichotomies.
37
 Moreover, there is no textual 
scrutiny of this body of case law on the key definitions through the lens of statutory interpretation, an 
                                                          
26
 See e.g. S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd Edn, OUP, 2011) 156-166. 
27
 Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL). 
28
 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn OUP 2011) 172-173. 
29
 A McColgan Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 2014) 205. 
30
 ibid 166, commenting on R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307 (HL) 
(presumably [43]-[47] (Lord Hope)). The case centred on stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act 
2000. 
31
 Re Lysaght [1966] Ch 191 (Ch); Scala Ballroom v Ratcliffe [1958] 3 All ER 220 (CA); Schlegel v 
Corcoran (1942) IR 19 (Ir HC).  
32
 C Gearty, ‘The internal and external “other” in the Union legal order: racism, religious intolerance and 
xenophobia in Europe’, in P Alston, M Bustelo, and J Heenan (eds) The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999) 
327, 341. 
33
 H Collins, 'Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR16.  
34
 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 278 (SC). 
35
 C McCrudden, ‘Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the British Constitution: The JFS 
Case Considered’ (2011) 9 Int'l J Const L 200. 
36
 e.g. R v Birmingham CC ex p EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156 (HL); James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL); 
St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (HL); R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 278 (SC). 
37
 For two of the better examples, see P Roberts, ‘Caring for the disabled? New boundaries in disability discrimination’ (2009) 72(4) 
MLR 635, providing an overview of the Malcolm decision in the context of ECJ practice, and the literal/purposive dichotomy; RN 
Graham, ‘A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ (2002) 23 Stat LR 91, noting the ‘dynamic’ (living instrument) interpretation 
of the Civil Rights Act 1964 to mandate positive action in United Steelworkers of America v Weber 443 US 193 (US Sup Ct, 1979). 
Of the 123 articles and notes mentioning Lewisham v Malcolm, a search for ‘interpretation’ returned 19, and a search for ‘statutory 
interpretation’ returned just 4. 
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‘internal norm’. As an example of the paucity of material, a search string of detached terms, ‘discrimination, 
mischief, golden, literal, interpretation’ produced just six articles from the archives of Statute Law Review 
(‘SLR’), a journal in which one would suppose it was most likely to find articles on the matter. Five of 
these were articles on statutory interpretation in general which happened to include a discrimination case,
38
 
while the sixth concerned one provision within an amendment to the Ugandan Penal Code.
39
 None were 
dedicated to the statutory interpretation of discrimination legislation. A similar search of what might be 
labelled for this project at least, the counterpart journal to the SLR, the International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law, produced zero results, with the single term ‘statutory interpretation’, producing 
just one article.
40
 
 Given the prominent role taken by the judges in shaping this law, this is a striking omission. And 
given that it is a primary function of the senior judiciary to interpret legislation, and that the text of their 
judgments is law (be it binding or persuasive), it is contended that the first task of the analyst should be to 
test the decisions, and the language deployed in making them, against the basic tenets of statutory 
interpretation. As such, this project is an attempt to help fill the gap between the decisions and the existing 
literature. 
  
3. The thesis 
The multiplicity of ‘troublesome’ cases revisiting a single issue coupled with the numerous reversals 
(outlined above) raise a suspicion that something is wrong with the judges’ interpretation of the 
discrimination legislation on the key definitions. McColgan suggests that the unsatisfactory decision in 
Malcolm was the result of ‘judges not intimately acquainted with the statutory discrimination provisions.’
41
 
It would be easy to conclude that this excuse could be projected onto many of these judgments, or at the 
least, those given by the Law Lords who presided in Malcolm.  
 This thesis agrees that the problem in Malcolm (and other cases) lays with the judiciary, but argues 
the cause is much deeper than a mere unacquaintance with the relevant legislation. The proposition is that 
these judgments, creating so much bad law, are at their heart technically flawed, as well as overlong and 
overcomplicated. It argues that they were relatively easy cases to decide correctly with the use of the basic 
tools of statutory interpretation, a feature noticeably absent in the judgments. This is not to say that all 
discrimination judgments are poor; there are cases correctly decided upon concise, clear, and technically 
sound reasoning.
42
 But the cases under review were in the senior courts on key definitions of discrimination, 
                                                          
38
 RN Graham, ‘A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation’ (2002) 23 Stat LR 91; G Carney, ‘Comparative Approaches to 
Statutory Interpretation in Civil Law and Common Law’ (2015) 36 Stat LR 46; The Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG, ‘Towards 
a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts’ (2003) 24 Stat LR 95; T Rensen, ‘British Statutory Interpretation 
in the Light of Community and Other International Obligations’ (1993) 14 Stat LR 186; A Samuals JP, ‘The Interpretation of Statutes’ 
1980 1 Stat LR 86 
39
 Nanima Robert Doya, ‘The Drafting History of the Uganda Penal Code (Amendment) Act and Challenges 
to Its Implementation’ (2016) 37 Stat LR 1. 
40
 M Connolly, ‘Discriminatory Motive and the But For Test: The Proper Approach to Direct Discrimination 
in Britain and the United States (2007) 9 IJDL 3. 
41
 A McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 2014) 166. 
42
 Notable judgments were those of Morison J, clarifying the law in the early days of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995: Goodwin v The Patent Office [1999] ICR 302, 307 (EAT); Vicary v BT [1999] 
IRLR 680, 682 (EAT); Ridout v TC Group [1998] IRLR 628 (EAT). See also, Baroness Hale’s on clarifying 
indirect discrimination and age in Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2012] ICR 704 (SC) on 
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disseminating mixed signals about the law’s commitment to addressing patterns of inequality, as well as 
deep-seated discriminatory assumptions and attitudes. They thus encumber the development of this law, 
whilst their prolixity is of little use to those interested parties trying to understand it, ranging from the 
litigants concerned, legal advisors, prospective claimants, and even the citizen who wishes to understand 
the law, a requirement of the Rule of Law.
43
  
 The purpose of this work is to establish the technical shortcomings and offer some context, so to 
explain this slippage, to a degree at least. The study highlights a number of relevant factors, such as a 
cavalier approach to the rules of statutory interpretation, an apparent lack of expertise in the legislation’s 
technical definitions and novel purpose of societal advancement,
44
 and the judges’ ‘binary’ mind-set 
requiring an at-fault tortfeasor causing harm to an individual victim. As already noted, other features are 
apparent, such as personal ideological predilections and a lingering historical judicial negative attitude 
towards matters of equality. 
 
4. Methodology and layout 
The key research question is why are these leading judgments on key concepts so poor? This is, of course, 
a leading question. And so, it is necessary to establish that the judgments are indeed ‘poor’, by which it is 
meant that they are technically flawed and prolix. The ‘technical’ question especially, requires an 
understanding of the concepts represented by the definitions, which should be expressed in a way to ensure 
their integrity and efficacy.  
 The requirement of integrity requires that statutory provisions are interpreted in a way that that 
does not jar with other elements of any particular definition, or the particular instrument under 
consideration, or indeed other legislation forming part of the same ‘code’, or scheme (statutes in pari 
materia  or ‘in the same matter’).
45
 Thus, without good reason, identical words or phrases in the same 
statute or legislative scheme ought to be given the same meaning. In the same vein, legislation should not 
be interpreted to render other parts of the instrument meaningless. For instance, where an Act provides that 
‘racial group’, means ‘colour, race nationality or ethnic or national origins....’, it would damage the 
provision’s integrity to reduce the term ‘ethnic origins’ to a biological test, effectively assimilating the term 
with ‘race’ and thus rendering the phrase ‘ethnic origins’ otiose.
46
 
 ‘Efficacy’ requires that a definition is interpreted to fulfil its purpose, informed by the statutory 
language deployed, as well as the generally agreed purpose, set out in precedent, legislative history, or even 
scholarly literature. Thus, the word ‘premises’ in a ‘safety Act’ was interpreted to include a cave used for 
                                                          
defining direct discrimination in R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport [2005] 2 AC 1 (HL) and on indirect discrimination in Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27. 
43
 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591 (HL) 638 
(Lord Diplock). See further below, p 25, text to n 85. More recently, Lord Neuberger avowed that judgments 
should be ‘clear and easily interpretable by lawyers...and non-lawyers’: ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial 
Studies Board Annual Lecture 2011, 16 March 2011, para 5. < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131202164909/http://judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2011 
> accessed 1 May 2017. 
44
 See Ch 2, especially pp 66-68. 
45
 See below, p 26. 
46
 See Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA) interpreting RRA 1976, s 3(1) (see now EA 2010, s 9). 
Discussed below, p 134 et al.* 
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storing flammable material.
47
 These notions of integrity and efficacy form the ‘technical’ benchmark by 
which the judgments are appraised. 
The ‘prolixity’ question is addressed by asking if a case under review could have been resolved 
more easily. This is tested by identifying with acuity and clarity the actual issues in question. In order to 
identify these issues, an understanding of the legislation is required (thus the first two questions are 
inevitably connected). From there, the relevant legislative provisions, and their interpretation, are identified. 
If this can produce a shorter, less complicated, and technically sound judgment, then this aspect of the thesis 
is met. 
One may sense at this stage that the first two questions carry a flavour of statutory interpretation: 
the two examples above represent the ‘otiose’ and ‘mischief’ rules
48
 (the latter being deployed in the ‘safety 
Act’ case), Such a sense would be correct, as both of these questions are integrated into the major appraisal 
in this work, which is to test each judgment by the standard, or ‘habitual’, tools of statutory interpretation. 
The point of this approach, unlike those mentioned in the existing commentary (noted above), is that it 
examines the judiciary’s primary function in these cases, which is statutory interpretation. As such, it gets 
closer to the root of any technical shortcomings and as well as providing answers to the objections set out 
in the existing commentary. This third test utilises the judiciary’s principal, well-known, and established, 
tools of statutory interpretation. The test is met if this approach would produce a technically sound 
judgment, at the least. The result is enhanced if it would also produce a shorter and less complicated 
judgment. Reference points for all theee sub-questions will include ‘external’ sources such as precedent 
(including antecedent US authorities and EU case law), legislative history, and well-established theories, 
concepts and aims of discrimination law. 
 This being an essentially doctrinal project means that the principal literature under review 
comprises the judgments and the legislation on which they are based. It does not analyse critically the key 
definitions provided by the legislation, with, say a view for reform. As noted above,
49
 it assumes these are 
largely satisfactory. The critical focus is on the judgments. Being strongly doctrinal, this work’s qualitative 
credentials are limited. This is deliberate and beneficial. It aids clarity, and achieving clarity (or avoiding 
prolixity) is one of the main features of the thesis. Hence, there is no attempt to discover, for instance, the 
job pressures, peer-pressures, emotional input,
50
 or social or political ideology,
51
 of any decision-maker 
studied here. The judges’ thought processes are analysed, but only by their judicial language and legalistic 
references. 
 
                                                          
47
 See Gardiner v Sevenoaks RDC [1950] 2 All ER 84 (KB). The Long Title to the Celluloid and 
Cinematograph Film Act 1922 read, ‘An Act to make better provision for the prevention of fire in premises 
where raw celluloid or cinematograph film is stored or used.’ 
48
 See below, respectively p 23 ‘Other words and sections of the instrument’, and p 20. 
49
 See p 1, ‘The key concepts, drafting, Discrimination law and judges today’. 
50
 See e.g. D Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); 
RJ Cahill-O’Callaghan, ‘The Influence of Personal Values on Legal Judgments’ (2013) 40(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 596. 
51
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Case selection 
The judgments selected for attention were leading cases on the key definitions of discrimination provided 
by this legislation (nowadays, the Equality Act 2010, which labels these definitions, ‘Key Concepts’). The 
selection was upon the following criteria: (1) their importance to the meaning of discrimination, (2) they 
were written by the senior judiciary of England and Wales, (3) there is a range spanning a period from the 
early days of the domestic legislation to the present day, and (4) that they appear to be exceptionally 
troublesome.  
 On the first criterion, as noted above,
52
 these key definitions are a measure of how far society is 
willing to challenge deep-seated assumptions and attitudes, as well as patterns of inequality, and thus 
represent the central philosophy of anti-discrimination law. As such, litigation over their meaning presents 
the judiciary with a significant interpretive duty. 
 On the second and third, these judgments were handed down by the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords/Supreme Court, where one would expect to find the senior (and it must be presumed, superior) 
judges. Judgments of this status not only provide guidance for the lower courts and tribunals (which preside 
over the vast majority of claims), they signal more generally, to the legal world, interested parties, and the 
public, the standards and ambition expected by these key concepts. The cases span some four decades, 
ranging from 1983 to 2016 and present a ‘mini-history’ of the judiciary and modern discrimination law. 
This facilitates an analysis of any evolutionary features of these cases. Some of the judgments were 
reversed, overruled, or in the minority, but the purpose of this study is to examine how the senior judiciary 
have approached the matter of interpreting and defining these key concepts of discrimination law.  
 Fourth, from the cases that could meet the criteria thus far, there is a smaller cohort that, as 
suggested above,
53
 appear troublesome. These were identified by their simple ‘outward’ characteristics of 
recurring issues,
54
 persistent dissents,
55
 reversals,
56
 and the upsetting of established efficacious 
definitions.
57
 No reading nor analysis of a judgment beyond a headnote (at most) was necessary to identify 
these characteristics and raise a suspicion of a difficulty worthy of investigation. It is of course arguable 
that other cases match these criteria, but none could be said to be more important in terms of establishing 
the key definitions and the precedential status, or more useful in providing a historical perspective. 
 
                                                          
52
 See pp 1-2. 
53
 Above, p 2-3. 
54
 James v Eastleigh [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL); JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC); Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 
v Khan [2001] UKHL 48; St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (HL). 
55
 ibid. 
56
 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA) reversed [2017] UKSC 27; Naeem v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2016] ICR 289 (CA) overruled [2017] UKSC 27; Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 
(HL) reversed, EA 2010, ss 15 and 19; Perera v Civil Service Commission (no. 2) [1983] ICR 428 (CA) 
and Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399 (CA), reversed, RRA 1976, s 1(1A)); Mandla v Dowell 
Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA), reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL) 
57
 Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No. 2) [2006] ICR 785 (HL); Lewisham LBC v 
Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL). 
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Excluded cases 
Those are the reasons (and limitations of space) that other possible candidate cases were not prioritised for 
review. Some are considered below, by the definitions included in this work, and then by those definitions 
not included. 
 
Direct discrimination and victimisation 
The other leading significant House of Lords’ cases on the benign motive, or but for, question are 
Nagarajan v LRT
58
 and Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC,
59
 Both of these are subsumed into the 
discussion within.
60
 In the Court of Appeal, Owens & Briggs v James
61
 (on mixed ground cases) likewise 
has been subsumed into the discussion. The uncomfortable ‘benign motive’ decision in Simon v Brinham 
Associates
62
 may well have been conveniently forgotten and/or impliedly reversed.
63
 But it has not been 
expressly addressed by the senior courts. 
On the comparison for direct discrimination, the Court of Appeal in Smith v Safeway
64
 arguably 
produced an inefficacious and unsymmetrical interpretation (on dress codes for men and women in 
employment), but the decision did not upset any established orthodoxy,
65
 has not been revisited, nor 
reversed or overturned. In Madden v Preferred Technical Group Cha Ltd the Court made the rather obvious 
point that proof of less favourable treatment of a foreign national is not definitive proof of discrimination; 
the ‘because’ element must still be satisfied.
66
 Gill v El Vino
67
 established the standard required for the 
treatment to be ‘less’ favourable, and has been widely accepted. And although the House of Lords in R 
(European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport
68
 reversed the Court of Appeal 
below on the matter of stereotyping (Roma air passengers), the case was particularly fact sensitive and the 
decision did not upset the orthodoxy that stereotyping could amount to less favourable treatment.
69
 
 In relatively recent times, the issue of motive and victimisation arose in the Court of Appeal. In 
Bird v Sylvester,
70
 the Court merely applied either of two arguably contradictory House of Lords precedents, 
coming to the same result. Controversial it may be, but its roots lay in those House of Lords’ judgments, 
which are incuded for review,
71
 leaving no reason to include this case. 
                                                          
58
 [2000] 1 AC 501. 
59
 [2003] ICR 337. 
60
 See ch 4, especially ‘The importunate dissenters’, p 87. 
61
 [1982] ICR 618 (CA). 
62
 Simon v Brinham Associates [1987] ICR 596 (CA) (asking all candidates if they were Jewish was not less 
favourable treatment as a Middle East client would not employ Jews). 
63
 See EA 2010, Explanatory Note (63) and Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-5187 (announcing ‘I will not 
employ immigrants’ could amount to direct discrimination). 
64
 [1996] ICR 868. 
65
 Of the little precedent that existed, see Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd [1978] ICR 85 (EAT) and Cootes v John Lewis plc (EAT, 
27 February 2001) EAT/1414/00. 
66
 [2005] IRLR 46 (CA), especially [84]-[91]. 
67
 [1983] QB 425 (CA). 
68
 [2005] 2 AC 1 (HL). 
69
 See e.g. Alexander v Home Office [1988] ICR 685 (CA). 
70
 [2007] EWCA Civ 1052. 
71
  See Ch 5, p 106 et al. 
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Problems with indirect discrimination 
In Coker v Lord Chancellor, the Court of Appeal ruled that selecting from a group of friends (or family) 
would not necessarily amount to (prima facie) indirect discrimination. Whatever the merits of that ruling, 
it did not upset any precedent nor has the matter been addressed by the Supreme Court or Parliament.
72
 The 
Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence
 73
 explained how direct 
and indirect discrimination were mutually exclusive. Whatever the integrity of that analysis, it upset no 
orthodoxy and has been well received in the Supreme Court
74
 and left untouched by Parliament. 
 Requiring a referral to the ECJ, R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith
75
 
provided important House of Lords’ judgments (with dissents) on statistical proof required for a prima facie 
case. The eventual majority decision has not been expressly overruled, although the assumption made of 
the pool for the comparison may stand as an orthodoxy subsequently upset. As such, the case is subsumed 
into the discussion on the required comparison.
76
 
The justification defence to indirect discrimination, originating in the Court of Appeal
77
 and 
arguably out of step with EU law, has had its formula approved by the House of Lords/Supreme Court,
78
 
and has been left untouched by subsequent domestic legislation. The matter is noted in Chapter 1.
79
  
There have been several cases in the senior courts on the matter of indirect discrimination and 
group identity. In CRE v Dutton
80
 the Court of Appeal confirmed (what has now become) the orthodoxy 
that protected status identify (such as race) is not based on immutability, and so there was no warrant to 
include it for specific review. In Orphanos v QMC,
81
 the House of Lords identified claimants by who they 
were not, a point overlooked by the Supreme Court in JFS,
82
 and by the Court of Appeal in Tejani v 
Superintendent Registrar for the District of Peterborough.
83
 Orphanos and Tejani are subsumed into the 
analysis of JFS.
84
 
The definitions not specifically considered include equal pay, some aspects of disability 
discrimination, and sexual harassment, sexual orientation and pregnancy discrimination. 
                                                          
72
 The Court’s wider comment regarding word of mouth hiring amounting to indirect discrimination was 
relied on in Jivraj v Hashwani [2010] EWCA Civ 712 [24] (selection from the Ismaili community) but 
reversed on other grounds: [2011] IRLR 827 (SC). 
73
 [2006] 1 WLR 3213 (CA) [114] and [119] (Mummery LJ). 
74
 See e.g. JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC) [56]-[57] (Baroness Hale), [214] (Lord Hope), [236] (Lord Walker); Patmalniece v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11, [69] (Lord Walker). 
75
 [1997] ICR 371 (HL); Case C-167/97 Seymour-Smith [1999] ICR 447, applied (No. 2) [2000] ICR 244 
(HL). 
76
 See below, ‘THE COMPARISON REQUIRED’, p 137. 
77
 See e.g. Hampson v Department of Education [1989] ICR 179 (CA),  
78
 See e.g. Webb v EMO Cargo [1993] 1 WLR 49 (HL) 56; Ministry of Justice v O’Brien [2013] UKSC 6; 
Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2012] UKSC 15 [23] (Baroness Hale). 
79
 See ‘Proportionality’, p 35 below.  
80
 [1989] QB 783 (CA), 803. 
81
 [1985] AC 761 (HL). 
82
 [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC). 
83
  [1986] IRLR 502 (CA). See also Dhatt v McDonalds Hamburgers Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 527 (CA), taking a similar approach. 
84
 See below, respectively, p 94, n 96; and p 92, n 91. 
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 Equal Pay 
It is arguable that the key definitions of discrimination do not include the equal pay provisions, which 
nowadays do not appear as key concepts in the Equality Act 2010, although they are alluded to in the 
relevant provisions.
85
 The case law provides a history of courts struggling to manage scenarios of direct 
and indirect discrimination with legislation that did not expressly recognise either.
86
 It may well be that this 
body of case law is worthy of a dedicated thesis in itself, but given the parameters for this work, notably on 
key concepts, save where they are subsumed into the key concepts,
87
 the interpretations of the equal pay 
provisions per se have been excluded.  
 
Disability discrimination 
The case law on direct disability discrimination is relatively new and uncontroversial,
88
 while the senior 
courts have entertained no cases on the meaning of indirect disability discrimination. The leading House of 
Lords case on the reasonable adjustments duty, Archibald v Fife Council,
89
 reversed plurality opinions 
below, with one of its own. But the decision has fared well, with no revisits or legislative reversals. Given 
this, and that the case originated in Scotland, so not involving the (English) Court of Appeal, this case is 
excluded. 
 
Sexual harassment, sexual orientation and pregnancy discrimination 
There is a group of cases which could be loosely tagged ‘piggy-back’ claims, where the claim stumbles 
upon the symmetrical definition of direct sex discrimination.
90
 These relate to sexual harassment,
91
 sexual 
orientation,
92
 and pregnancy.
93
 They predated respective dedicated legisation, hence the ‘piggy back’ 
description. Legislation resolved (rather than reversed) the first two of these issues with additional 
dedicated causes of action,
94
 leaving the key concepts (and their interpretation) undisturbed. As such, these 
cases do not qualify for inclusion. The resolution of the pregnancy cases was more complex. The ECJ 
effectively overruled the EAT
95
 (the matter had gone no higher domestically) on the issue of pregnancy 
                                                          
85
 The ‘Key Concepts’ are set out in EA 2010, Part 1, while Equal Pay is provided for in Part 5, Ch 3. 
86
 The concepts are now recognised. See e.g. EA 2010, ss 69 and 71. 
87
 See e.g. the consideration of Enderby v Frenchay HA [1991] ICR 382 (EAT), effectively reversed Case 
C-127/92, [1994] ICR 112, discussed, Ch 1, p 36 et al and the lengthy appraisal of equal pay cases in Ch 6, 
‘The Equal Pay precedents’ p 157. 
88
 See e.g. Stockton on Tees BC v Aylott [2010] ICR 1278 (CA). In Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law 
[1998] 3 CMLR 27 the ECJ ruled that domestic legislation (DDA 1995, ss 3A and 3B) which read literally 
would exclude associative discrimination should be read to cover it. The reference was made by the EAT 
and neither the Court of Appeal not House of Lords were involved. 
89
 [2004] UKHL 32, reversing [2004] IRLR 197 (CSIH) and (EAT Scotland, 12 December 2002). 
90
 See Ch 2, ‘1. Formal Equality’, p 52. 
91
 Macdonald v Advocate General for Scotland; Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield Secondary School 
[2003] UKHL 34. 
92
 ibid. 
93
 e.g. Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s Club and Institute [1985] ICR 703 (EAT). 
94
 See now respectively EA 2010, s 27 and s 4. 
95
 Hayes v Malleable Working Men’s Club and Institute [1985] ICR 703; Case C-177/88 Dekker v Stichting 
Vormingscentrum voor Jonge Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-3941. 
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discrimination, although the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords did come to the matter somewhat later 
to rule (wrongly under EU law) that firing a maternity-cover replacement for pregnancy was not sex 
discrimination.
96
 Even here, the House of Lords was content to defer to the ECJ, making a referral it 
subsequently implemented.
97
 The interpretive dispute here was between the domestic and EU courts. There 
was no disagreement among domestic courts over the symmetrical formula not encompassing pregnancy 
discrimination per se. In fact, the legislation was readily readable that way,
98
 and the matter was resolved 
in domestic law, again, with a new dedicated cause of action for pregnancy and maternity discrimination,
99
 
again leaving the key concepts undisturbed. Thus, no orthodoxy was upset here. And given the single 
effective reversal, and Parliament’s response in respecting the symmetrical logic of the domestic decisions, 
these cases are not the most compelling of those considered to warrant inclusion. 
 
Limitations of the methodology 
  The limitations of this methodology are that it does not seek to question, challenge, or advance the 
key concepts as they are set out by the legislation or generally understood. Thus, it does not promote a new 
or particular theory or concept of discrimination law. It takes the legislative definitions and widely received 
concepts as fixed points of reference. By coincidence, the textual analysis of the judgments may identify 
shortcomings in the statutory drafting. But this methodology can only test whether the judgment identifies 
the drafting error, and if so, how well the judgment handles it. 
 As noted above, being doctrinal, the thesis makes no attempt to personalise the matter by endowing 
any particular judge with a particular trait, be it for instance, political, ideological, technical, or even 
ascribing to one a particular interpretive characteristic. In this regard, it does no more than treat each 
judgment as a free-standing speech by a member of the court in question. This does not prevent the analysis 
detecting, say, personal predilections in any particular speech, notably when this appears at the expense of 
an orthodox approach to statutory interpretation or an understanding of the legislation’s technical aspects. 
Neither does it exclude the identification of inconsistences by the same judge in different cases, but only 
for the purpose of analysing the speech, and not the judge. 
 A further limitation is that the mini-history embraced here is not held out as a definitive 
representation of any evolutionary characteristics of the judiciary and the key definitions of equality law, 
or more generally. Any conclusions here are supplementary to the main thesis. That said, this history can 
provide some insight into the thought processes behind a particular judgment. For instance, a judgment 
disregarding a progressive precedent to regress the law suggests that it may be driven more by some external 
ideological predilection, rather than an appreciation of the law’s purpose. Also, depending on the results, it 
can present an additional useful observation on the law’s progress (or otherwise), and perhaps a starting 
point for a more quantitative study. 
                                                          
96
 Webb v EMO Cargo Ltd [1992] ICR 445 (CA), [1993] ICR 175 (HL), effectively reversed, Case C-32/93, 
[1994] ECR I-3567. 
97
 ibid [1995] ICR 1021 (HL). 
98
 As found by the US Supreme Court, General Electric v Gilbert 429 US 125 (1976), 134-135), remedied 
by the (non-symmetrical) Pregnancy Discrimination Act 1978 (codified, USC § 2000e(k)). 
99
 Originally, SDA 1975, s 3A. See now EA 2010, s 4, 13(6), 17, 18. 
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 Similarly, there is no express attempt in this work to project the findings onto other areas of the 
discrimination legislation, or indeed further afield (although given the results here, testing any case by this 
methodology that the reader finds troublesome may well prove enlightening). But, as noted above, these 
cases are central to the law’s committment to challenge deep-seated assumptions, attitudes, and patterns of 
inequality. It also cannot be denied that that a measure of the ability of the senior judiciary to interpret the 
key definitions can serve as a suggestion, at the least, that any shortcomings in the understanding of these 
definitions may well indicate a lack of necessary expertise in discrimination law more generally. In any 
case, the reforms proposed (equality law education and a statutory command on interpretation),
100
 can only 
have a beneficial (or at its lowest, neutral) effect more generally. 
 
The layout 
 The work sets the scene in Chapter 1 with an overview of the developed rules of statutory 
interpretation, by the common law and relevant European institutions. This shows the fluidity of the 
process, its vulnerability to ideological predilections, and hints at the relationship with the political climate 
and arrangements of the day. All the same, it remains possible to map out a framework of interpretative 
rules, to which the judiciary owes some fidelity. 
 Chapter 2 offers a brief overview of the commonly held theories, concepts, and aims of 
discrimination law. From this, a (broadly received) statutory purpose is distilled, providing another 
reference by which the decisions may be analysed and tested. Chapter 3 provides an illuminating history 
tracking the common law’s negative and sometimes hostile attitude to matters of equality, pervading well 
into the 20th century. This provides further dimension to the judiciary’s approach to the modern equality 
legislation. 
 The main body of the work draws on these chapters with a detailed study of the speeches in cases 
covering some principal definitions of discrimination law; these are direct and indirect discrimination, 
victimisation, and disability discrimination. The purpose of these chapters is to expose the judgments as 
technically flawed, prolix, and more easily resolved using standard methods of statutory interpretation. 
 The first of these is Chapter 4, exploring the to and fro of judicial attitudes, notably in the House 
of Lords and Supreme Court, to notions of a benign motive ‘defence’ to direct discrimination, a concept 
appearing nowhere in the legislation. The main scrutiny in this chapter falls upon James v Eastleigh BC
101
 
and JFS.
102
 Chapter 5 highlights the problems caused by the House of Lords’ decision in the victimisation 
case, Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan
103
 (again, suggesting without foundation a benign motive 
‘defence’), and details the Lords’ excruciating attempts to escape from this just five years later in St Helens 
MBC v Derbyshire.
104
 Chapter 6 explores numerous problems with the more complicated and challenging 
indirect discrimination provisions. It raises perhaps, the most serious issues of expertise, in relation to 
establishing group and individual disadvantage, with the cases of Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade 
                                                          
100
 See below ‘PROPOSALS’, p 193. 
101
 [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL). 
102
 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC). 
103
 [2001] UKHL 48. 
104
 [2007] ICR 841 (HL). 
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and Industry (No. 2)
105
 in the House of Lords, and a pair of Court of Appeal decisions, Essop v Home Office 
and Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice.
106
 It also scrutinises the unduly narrow interpretation given in 
Perera v Civil Service Commission,
107
 eventually resolved by legislation. Finally, Chapter 7 explores the 
text of the controversial case of Lewisham LBC v Malcolm,
108
 which effectively reduced the statutory 
definition of disability-related discrimination to something less than direct discrimination, rendering the 
provision largely otiose. Again, this was effectively (and predictably) reversed by legislation. 
 Having established that these leading judgments were technically flawed and prolix, the 
Conclusion identifies some prevalent themes underlying this slippage. The most obvious was the absence 
of the basic tools of statutory interpretation, notably the purposive and literal rules. There was also a 
gravitation towards a fault-based binary approach (at odds with the societal and group-based purpose of 
equality legislation), and some judicial ideological predilections (in lieu of established definitions). These 
two features have the flavour of the historical negativity towards matters of equality. As such, the 
Conclusion considers these themes in its Proposals. 
 On 23 June 2016, by a referendum, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. At 
the time of writing, Britain’s exit was due by 28 March 2019.
109
 The British Government vowed to ‘convert 
the “acquis” – the body of existing EU law – into domestic law’, thus protecting workers’ rights, and at the 
same time, ‘end the jurisdiction’ of the Court of Justice.
110
 The findings of this thesis demonstrate that this 
mechanism would not be sufficient to maintain equality rights on a par with those of the EU. This is because 
the differing approaches to statutory interpretation of each jurisdiction would lead to a gradual divergence 
in these rights. The Proposals in the Conclusion would have the benefit of lessening this divergence. In the 
meantime, the United Kingdom continues to be a member of the European Union, and so subject to its laws 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice. The cases under review in this work were decided before the 
referendum.
111
 Consequently, the analysis of those cases is made on the basis of continuing membership, 
although where appropriate, post-referendum comment will be made. The law is stated as correct on 1 May 
2017. 
 
                                                          
105
 [2006] ICR 785 (HL). 
106
 Respectively [2015] ICR 1063 (CA); [2016] ICR 289 (CA), respectively reversed and overruled, [2017] 
UKSCT 27. 
107
 [1983] ICR 428 (CA). 
108
 [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL). 
109
 The secession process was triggered on 29 March 2017. TEU, Article 50(3) dictates that this should take 
no more than 2 years. 
110
 See e.g. ‘The Lancaster House Speech.’ < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-
exiting-the-eu-pm-speech > accessed 25 April 2017; HC Deb 29 March 2017, vol 624, cols 252-253; HM Government The United 
Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union (White Paper, Cm 9417, 2017) pp 9 (‘acquis’) 31-33 (workers’ 
rights) 13 (jurisdiction). 
111
 Two connected cases were overruled since the referendum: see Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27. 
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1 COMMON TOOLS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
  
INTRODUCTION 
  
This project is premised, in part at least, on the notion that indeed there are rules of statutory interpretation. 
The notion is supported by the basic truths that a judge must read, understand, and apply the text of a statute. 
Even if legislation were unambiguous and uncontroversial, this task, like all reading, requires some rules 
of language, otherwise all text would be meaningless. Once a text is ambiguous or controversial, the task 
of interpretation is elevated to an art, if only for the sake of consistency. Thus, it is inevitable that practices, 
or rules, will be developed, either by the legislature, or, as is largely the case in England and Wales, by the 
judges. This chapter is an attempt to map out a code, or points of reference, required by English law, by 
which any interpretation should be made, and thus by which the cases can be scrutinised. 
 
Finding the rules 
One might assume that the Interpretation Act 1978 would be the starting point for any discourse on statutory 
interpretation. However, the Act contains no general principles, just some very specific rules, such as that 
‘words importing the masculine gender include the feminine’ and vice versa,
1
 and a ‘glossary of terms’, 
providing a fixed meaning for, say, ‘Secretary of State’, ‘Court of Appeal’, ‘month’ and so on.
2
  
 Thus, the starting point is case law, and the rules it has developed, espoused, or inadvertently 
engaged when interpreting and applying legislation. Generally, although there is precedent on the meaning 
of a particular enactment, provision, clause, or just one word, there is a less formal structure of precedent 
on the rules of interpretation. There have been two growing erosions into this statement. These stem from 
the obligations to follow the case law and interpretive approaches of the European Court of Human Rights 
and Court of Justice of the European Union (the latter of which may fall away following secession). These, 
and their influence on English law, are considered presently. 
 The next point to make is that just as divining the ratio decidendi of a judgment can be an inexact 
science, or even an art form, so is understanding any particular rule employed in a decision on the meaning 
of a piece of legislation. Judges are rarely explicit in their reasoning or terminology to explain their 
decisions, especially for the benefit of the academic observer, let alone a layperson. Further, once the 
observer can decide on a rule or approach employed in a particular decision, it is just as difficult to discern 
the reason for that choice. The high-minded suggest that a particular rule is chosen as the best means to 
identify the intention of Parliament,
3
 while others suggest it is to arrive at a ‘balanced conclusion’,
4
 or do 
justice in the particular case,
5
 or, more basically, ‘to ensure that the meritorious triumph and the dirty dogs 
                                                          
1
 Interpretation Act 1978, s 6 (unless the contrary intention appears). 
2
 ibid Sch 1, (unless the contrary intention appears: (s 5)). 
3
 Cusack v London Borough of Harrow [2013] UKSC 40, [58] (Lord Neuberger JSC, with whom Lords 
Sumption and Hughes JJSC agreed). 
4
 O Jones, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th edn LexisNexis 2013) Div 3, Pt XI, s 193. 
5
 See e.g. Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 (HL) 391 (Lord Simon) espousing the golden rule. 
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lick their wounds’.
6
 Student textbooks in common-law jurisdictions tend to expound three basic ‘rules of 
statutory interpretation’: the literal, golden, and mischief (or purposive) rules. Francis Bennion asserts that 
statutory interpretation is massively more complicated than that: 
 
The court does not ‘select’ any one of the many guides, and then apply it to the exclusion of the 
others. What the court does (or should do) is to take an overall view, weigh all the relative 
interpretative factors.
7
 
 
Some are not merely suspicious of reducing interpretation to just three rules; they are cynical about the 
whole process as a subject for study. Lord Wilberforce once dubbed statutory interpretation ‘a non-
subject’.
8
 Rupert Cross was only slightly less cynical when observing that the principles of statutory 
interpretation are ‘incapable of arrangement’,
9
 and while there is no hierarchy of rules, ‘some are, in 
general, less compelling than others’.
10
 
 Thus, the art, science, or ‘non-subject’ of statutory interpretation is seen by a body of scholarship 
as a rather ethereal matter. Nonetheless, there exist numerous ways of classifying and organising the ‘rules’. 
Some scholars have dedicated much time and thought to this, with Bennion rejecting the habitual 
‘literal/golden/mischief’ approach as a ‘mistake’.
11
 Instead, at one time, he alluded to ‘six common law 
rules, a varying number of rules laid down by statute, eight principles derived from legal policy, ten 
presumptions as to legislative intention, and a collection of linguistic canons of construction...’
12
 
Meanwhile, Cross, also discontented with the habitual approach, provides three ‘basic rules’ (Context, 
Evidence, Different Kinds of Meaning), a number of internal and external aids, and a number of 
presumptions.
13
 That said, the habitual three-rule approach still prevails in more general textbooks, learned 
articles, many judgments, and indeed the last Law Commission to consider the matter (led by a Law Lord).
14
 
Moreover, in cases within the purview of EU law (as most equality cases are), there is an obligation to 
adopt a purposive approach, whilst a looser set of obligatory interpretive practices apply under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Thus, the habitual rules, including the European influences, will be the point of reference 
in the outline that follows, and indeed throughout this work. 
 
                                                          
6
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in B Markesinis (ed) The Impact of the Human Rights Act on English Law 
(OUP, 1998) 22. 
7
 O Jones, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th edn LexisNexis 2013) Div 3, Pt XI, s 193. 
8
 HL Deb 16 November 1966, vol 277, col 1294.  
9
 Bell, Engle, Cross Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn, LexisNexis, 2005) 39. 
10
 ibid p 41. 
11
 O Jones, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th edn LexisNexis 2013) Div 3, Pt XI, s 193, tracing this ‘mistake’ to a 1938 article 
by J Willis. ‘Statutory interpretation in a nutshell (1938) 16 Canadian Bar Review 1, 16. 
12
 F Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn, Longman, 1997) 104-105. See now, O Jones, ibid 
Introduction to Pt XI. 
13
 Bell, Engle, Cross Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn, LexisNexis, 2005) 50. 
14
 The Interpretation of Statutes (Law Com No. 21, Scot Law Com No. 11, 1969) chaired by Lord Scarman. The Law Commission 
has since advised the purposive approach should be preferred the literal one where words in different language versions are 
inconsistent ‘Form and Accessibility of the Law Applicable to Wales’ (Law Com No. 366, 30 June 2015). < 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/the-form-and-accessibility-of-the-law-applicable-in-wales > accessed 1 May 2017. 
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AN OUTLINE OF THE HABITUAL RULES 
  
1. The Literal Rule
15
 
The distinction between the literal and other rules is easily made. The literal rule will take the primary 
meaning of the words, whereas the others will allocate to them a secondary meaning (where possible), or 
modify them, add to them, or at times, ‘disapply’ them. The starting point is that the literal rule supposes 
that the intention of Parliament is expressed by the words it employs in its statutes. This places Parliament’s 
actual intention one step back from the process. As Lord Reid once observed: ‘We often say that we are 
looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the 
words which Parliament used.’
16
 
 Although its roots lay in the Bill of Rights 1688,
17
 the literal rule emerged to its full prominence 
during 1800s. The reference point for most aficionados today is The Sussex Peerage claim of 1844,
18
 which 
coincided with the rise of Parliamentary sovereignty.19 The literal approach assumes that statutes are drafted 
with perfect precision and foresight, which of course, is not always the case; thus, the literal rule can 
produce unforeseen and perhaps undesirable results. There are numerous reported examples; two prominent 
ones illustrate the difficulties. In Whiteley v Chappell
20
 it was an offence to ‘impersonate a person entitled 
to vote’ at an election.
21
 The defendant was acquitted because although he impersonated an elector, at the 
time of the election, that elector had died, and thus no longer a ‘person entitled to vote’. In Fisher v Bell,
22
 
a shopkeeper who displayed a flick knife with a price tag attached was found not guilty of ‘offering for 
sale’ an offensive weapon, contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. At first, Lord Parker 
CJ admitted that such a decision was ‘just nonsense’.
23
 But he went on to hold that Parliament must be 
taken to know the law of the land, and that that the phrase ‘offer for sale’ is confined (in contract law) to 
an offer that can be accepted to form a contract. Merely exposing goods for sale invites offers, but does not 
constitute an offer. 
  
Casus Omissus and the rule in Inco Europe 
A particular consequence of the literal approach was the casus omissus rule.24 The practical effect of this 
historical rule was that even where the omission is patently the result of a drafting error, the court will 
                                                          
15
 Confusingly, sometimes the literal rule is referred to as the golden rule: e.g. ‘Hence the so-called canons 
of construction, some of which are of relatively general application, such as the so-called golden rule (that 
words are prima facie to be given their ordinary meaning)...’ (Lord Neuberger in Cusack v Harrow LBC 
[2013] UKSC 40, [60]. 
16
 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591 (HL) 613. 
17
 Article 9 of which provided: ‘...the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any court or place out of Parlyament.’ 
18
 (1844) XI Clark & Finnelly 85, 143; 8 ER 1034, 1057. 
19 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (McMillan 9th edn 1939) 39-40. 
20
 (1868-69) LR 4 QB 147. 
21
 Poor Law Amendment Act 1851 (14 & 15 Vict c 105) s 3. 
22
 [1961] 1 QB 394 (DC). 
23
 ibid 399. 
24 Jones v Smart (1785) 1 Term Reports 44, 52; 99 ER 963, 967 (Buller J); Gladstone v Bower [1960] 2 QB 384 (CA) 395-396 (Devlin 
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nonetheless persist in the fiction that it was intended. It took until the year 2000 for the House of Lords to 
address the matter, by effectively providing a new rule of interpretation, which in turn detached the casus 
omissus doctrine from the literal rule. The case was Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution.
25
 Giving 
judgment for the House, Lord Nicholls said: ‘[T]he role of the courts in construing legislation is not 
confined to resolving ambiguities in statutory language. The court must be able to correct obvious drafting 
errors’.
26
 Mindful of the constitutional aspect of this pronouncement, he added: 
 
This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. The courts are ever mindful that their 
constitutional role in this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course which might 
have the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and 
enacted by the legislature. So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting 
or substituting words.
27
 
  
Lord Nicholls thus produced the following formula to be followed. Before exercising this power, a court 
had to be ‘abundantly sure’ of three matters: 
 
(i) The intended purpose of the relevant provision; 
(ii) through inadvertence, the draftsman had failed to give effect to the intended purpose of that 
provision; and  
(iii) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the 
precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed.
28
  
 
The third requirement, he stressed was ‘of crucial importance’ because here lies the danger of judicial 
legislating. And even if these pre-requisites were met: 
 
Sometimes, ... the court may find itself inhibited ...The alteration in language may be too far-
reaching. … Or the subject matter may call for a strict interpretation of the statutory language, as 
in penal legislation.
29
 
 
 An example in the context of equality law arose in Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey.
30
 The provision in 
question was section 108 of the Equality Act 2010, headed ‘Relationships that have ended’. Sub-section 
(1) expressly outlaws discrimination that ‘arises out of and is closely connected to a relationship that used 
to exist between them...’ Sub-section (2) repeats this formula for harassment. The section concludes with 
sub-section (7): ‘But conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to 
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victimisation...’. On the face of the Act, the matter is quite plain. The Act covers post-employment 
discrimination and harassment, but not post-employment victimisation. But put into context, it becomes 
obvious this is a drafting error. 
 The context begins with the ‘first generation’ of discrimination statutes,
31
 which provided that an 
employer must not discriminate against a person ‘employed by him’.
32
 This appeared to exclude ex-
employees from protection, until the ECJ, in Coote v Granada, ruled that such a position was incompatible 
with EU law.
33
 The House of Lords responded by holding that ‘employed by him’ was less about an existing 
employment status, and more about an employment connection.
34
 This purposive approach extended the 
legislation to cover post-employment victimisation (at the time, a species of discrimination), and reconciled 
domestic law with Granada. 
 As a result of Granada, the equality Directives specified that judicial and/or administrative 
procedures should be available to those complaining of discrimination even after the relationship in which 
the alleged discrimination occurred has ended.
35
 Strictly speaking, this did not cover victimisation, which 
although outlawed by the Directives, is not expressed as a form of discrimination (unlike the domestic law 
at the time). Nonetheless, Granada remains good law (until UK secession, at least). Gradually, the domestic 
statutes were amended to comply with Granada. But when they were consolidated into the Equality Act 
2010, victimisation was no longer defined as a form of discrimination, and there was no longer a provision 
for the victimisation of former employees, nor indeed for any ‘post-relationship’ victimisation, such as that 
of former (housing) tenants, (school) pupils, service users, and so on. 
 The context convinced the Court of Appeal that this was the result of a drafting error. Several 
explanations were advanced. First, until the Equality Act 2010, victimisation was designated as a form of 
discrimination, and would not need a dedicated sub-section; on this basis, section 108(1) would suffice. It 
might be that the drafter overlooked the redefining of victimisation, which uncoupled it from 
discrimination. But this does not explain the inclusion of section 108(7). The Explanatory Note to this stated 
that Victimisation ‘will be dealt with under the victimisation provisions and not under this section’,
36
 which 
suggests the drafter contemplated providing for post-relationship victimisation elsewhere. (This more 
accurately reflects the structure of the equality Directives.) But no reason could be fathomed in support of 
this theory. 
 Undeterred by the absence of a definite explanation for the error (‘this beats me’ bemoaned 
Underhill LJ
37
), the Court of Appeal added a ‘section 108A’, replicating the section 108(1) formula, but for 
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victimisation. This bold step was taken under the cover of complying with EU law, and the Ghaidan 
approach.
38
 As an alternative, the Court was able to achieve the same result using the Inco Europe 
guidelines. Given the context, the Court could be sure of the Parliamentary intent, its error, and the solution 
should the drafter have become aware of the error.
39
 
  
2.  The Golden Rule 
The golden rule was heavily promoted in the Victorian era, most notably by Lord Wensleydale.
40
 Well into 
the 20th century, Lords Simon and Scarman, in Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton),
41
 offered a refined version. In 
combination, they suggested a departure from the literal approach was legitimate where the primary 
meaning produces some absurdity or anomaly not envisaged by the drafter and/or the result of a drafting 
error. But there is no definitive golden rule. At best, it is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of 
anomalies and absurdities.
42
 Bennion observed that, 
 
[T]he courts give a wide meaning to the concept of ‘absurdity’, using to it to include virtually any 
result which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or 
pointless, artificial, or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief.
43
 
 
 If an absurdity has been identified, the next step is the remedy. Lord Simon cautioned that the 
language must be ‘susceptible’ to any modification.
44
 But this is no definitive rule, nor part of a pattern of 
development. Older cases can be found espousing an even more limited view,
45
 whilst some modern ones 
respect Lord Simon’s caution;
46
 others ignore it, cite more convenient cases, and ‘if driven to it’ would omit 
statutory words.
47
 
  
3. The Mischief Rule 
The mischief rule was set out in 1584 in Heydon’s Case.
48
 A more up to date rehearsal of the necessary 
conditions was provided by Lord Diplock in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates:
49
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First, it was possible to determine from... the Act... what the mischief was... to remedy; secondly, 
it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked... an eventuality 
that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was 
possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by 
the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before 
the Bill passed into law.
50
  
  
This third condition also governs the bounds of the court’s power to rectify the statute: 
 
Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in 
the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction.... Such an attempt crosses the boundary 
between construction and legislation. It becomes a usurpation of a function which under the 
constitution of this country is vested in the legislature to the exclusion of the courts.
51
 
 
 The flavour contrasts with Heydon’s case, which was expressed more as a mandatory duty to cure 
the problem, and with no 20th century deference to parliamentary sovereignty, offered a seemingly limitless 
power to ‘modify’ the statute.
52
 Another aspect of the old formula was updated for modern times. The 
common law is much less prevalent than in 1584, and so often there is little to be learnt by asking ‘what 
was the common the law before Act?’, as required by the original formula.
53
 Judges nowadays may well 
trace the previous state of affairs through a succession of statutes (be they codifying or not),
54
 or consider 
the ‘mischief’ in wider terms than those merely governed by the common law.
55
 
  
4. The Purposive Approach 
The purposive approach resembles the mischief rule,
56
 and at times overlaps with the golden rule. Indeed, 
the language of both often is used interchangeably.
57
 The purposive rule arguably is wider in scope, for, as 
Lord Renton put it: 
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[I]n modern times many statutes are intended to do much more than merely correct defects in the 
common law as in Coke’s day. Parliament now legislates for us from the cradle to the grave.
58
 
 
 Nowadays, much of legislation is not necessarily restricted to resolving a ‘mischief’, but enacted 
for the advancement of matters, such as providing for public services, the improvement of workers’ rights, 
providing confidence in the consumer market, or harmonising the law across the EU. Hence, this approach 
may be called upon more frequently than the mischief rule. In these cases, the starting point was generally 
tolerated, and any mischief addressed was less relevant than the goal to be achieved. Discrimination law 
may stand out as exceptional, straddling both ends of the spectrum. It assumes the status quo was 
intolerable, but sees its goal, which could be loosely put as equality of opportunity,
59
 as something 
aspirational, rather than achievable overnight.  
 There are no precise limits to the rule. It is often expressed more in spirit than with a precise 
formula. In R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health, Lord Steyn adopted a famous American 
exposition of the purposive approach:  
 
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily 
the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or 
anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to 
make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or 
object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their 
meaning.
60
 
 
Lord Steyn concluded: ‘The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the 
context, e.g. social welfare legislation and tax statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently.’
61
 
 This suggests that judges have a freer hand to realise a societal ambition. One reason for this may 
be because societal ambitions are more difficult to express in legalistic language than ‘black letter’ 
legislation, such as a tax statute. That may be so, but in modern times, judges have also been encouraged, 
if not compelled, to take a purposive approach by EU membership and the Human Rights Act 1998.
62
 The 
Law Commission once proposed63 that the rule become universal by statutory command. This has not 
occurred, but as will be seen in the cases under review, its use is far from universal, even in the ‘social 
welfare’ category of discrimination law.  
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5.  Context 
Whatever approach is taken, the words in question must be considered in context. This is the case even for 
the literal rule: the progenitor of which, The Sussex Peerage, involved the court using other parts of the 
statute to confirm its opinion.
64
 House of Lords authority has for a long time considered context in a broad 
sense. In Attorney General v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover,
65
 Viscount Simonds said: 
 
[W]ords, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are 
derived from their context. So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every 
word of a statute in its context, and I use ‘context’ in its widest sense, ... as including not only 
other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other 
statutes in pari materia,[
66
] and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, 
discern the statute was intended to remedy.
67
 
 
This points to a number sources as aids to interpretation. These can be categorised for convenience as 
intrinsic and extrinsic aids. 
  
6. Intrinsic Aids to Construction 
Preamble and long title 
Although enacting parts of the statute, these serve different purposes and have, it seems, a varying status. 
The long title describes the Act. Preambles are rare in British legislation (in contrast to EU Directives), but 
when used, they set out the facts and assumptions on which the Act is based,
68
 but cannot necessarily alter 
the meaning of plain enacted words.
69
 
 
Other words and sections of the instrument 
It is a ‘cardinal rule’
70
 that a statute ought not to be interpreted in a way that renders otiose any of its 
words.
71
 As Viscount Simon said, in Hill v William Hill (Park Lane) Ltd:
72
 
 
When the legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying 
something which has not been said immediately before. The rule that a meaning should, if possible, 
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be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the 
words add something which would not be there if the words were left out.
73
 
 
More generally, there is a presumption, it seems, not to construe a word inconsistently with other parts of 
the statute.
74
  
  
Marginal notes and headings 
Unlike the long title, marginal notes (sometimes referred to as ‘sidenotes’), and headings, are not debated 
in Parliament, but added by the government department processing the bill. All the same, they are fixed 
before royal assent and ‘can be fairly regarded as representing the intention of Parliament’.
75
 
 There has been highly conflicting authority over the status of marginal notes, probably explainable 
by the policy adopted in individual cases. In Chandler v DPP,
76
 the House of Lords held that they could 
not be used to aid construction, and in doing so confirmed the conviction of anti-nuclear weapon protesters 
for the statutory offence of being in or near a ‘prohibited place’, which was accompanied by the sidenote, 
‘Penalties for spying’.
77
 On the other hand, just seven years later, the House of Lords took a different view. 
Here, a sidenote entitled, ‘Offences antecedent to or in course of Winding Up’ saved a company director 
from a conviction for fraud,
78
 simply because at the time, his company had not been wound up.
79
 Thus, the 
presumption is somewhat selective, or at least subservient to policy. 
 More recently, the House of Lords took a more pragmatic view, which probably represents the 
current position: 
 
Account must, of course, be taken of the fact that these components were included in the Bill not 
for debate but for ease of reference. This indicates that less weight can be attached to them.... But 
it is another matter to be required by a rule of law to disregard them altogether.... Subject, of 
course, to the fact that they are unamendable, they ought to be open to consideration as part of the 
enactment when it reaches the statute book.
80
 
  
Explanatory Notes 
In 2007, the Office of Public Sector Information described Explanatory Notes thus: 
 
The text of the Explanatory Notes is produced by the Government Department responsible for the 
subject matter of the Act. The purpose of these Explanatory Notes is to make the Act of Parliament 
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accessible to readers who are not legally qualified and who have no specialised knowledge of the 
matters dealt with. They are intended to allow the reader to grasp what the Act sets out to achieve 
and place its effect in context.
81
 
 
 In R (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service,
82
 Lord Steyn provided 
guidance as to their use. First, the text of an Act did not have to be ambiguous before a court could take 
into account explanatory notes in order to understand its ‘contextual scene’. Second, they are always 
admissible in so far as they ‘can cast light on the objective setting or contextual scene of the statute, and 
the mischief at which it is aimed’. Third, having a closer connection to the ‘shape of the proposed 
legislation’, they will be sometimes be ‘more informative and valuable’ than pre-parliamentary texts, such 
as Law Commission reports, Green and White Papers. Fourth, constitutional reservations on the use of 
Hansard
83
 are not engaged. And finally, any meaning put forward by the executive in an Explanatory Note 
may be used against it, should it place a contrary meaning before a court. But, the aims of the Government 
revealed by Explanatory Notes cannot be attributed to Parliament: ‘The object is to see what is the intention 
expressed by the words enacted.’ This last point endows Explanatory Notes with a subtle dual identity. On 
the one hand, they are the expressed will of the Government of the day, and not of Parliament. On the other, 
they can provide meaning to words enacted by Parliament. 
 All this suggests that resort to Explanatory Notes will be common, which indeed it is, especially 
when establishing the meanings in recent statutes, or hitherto uncontested provisions. The Supreme Court 
went further in X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau,
84
 and relied on a Government Explanatory Booklet, 
which accompanied a statutory instrument, to find that the instrument was not intended to apply to volunteer 
workers. 
 
  
7. Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
A general caution about the use of extraneous sources to interpret a statute was expressed by Lord 
Diplock: 
 
The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before 
committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal 
consequences that will flow from it. Where those consequences are regulated by a statute the 
source of that knowledge is what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to 
what the words of the statute would be reasonably understood to mean by those whose conduct it 
regulates.
85
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 Given that few areas of law are consolidated, and even fewer codified, and the complexity of the 
drafting of some statutes, Lord Diplock’s caution is based on rather idealistic grounds. Nonetheless, there 
are good reasons to stay within the instrument itself, not least because one should be able to trust the drafting 
of Parliament, which is well resourced nowadays. Further, if not the common man, his lawyer at least would 
have a better chance of understanding a particular statute, rather having to trawl through a raft of extrinsic 
materials. That said, extrinsic aids are used occasionally. Three of the most prominent practices are 
highlighted below. 
  
Statutes in pari materia (‘in the same matter’) 
The phrase in pari materia is used when courts give statutes on the same matter the same interpretation. 
The phrase has a loose meaning. It can relate to a statutes expressly stated to be read together, enabling the 
export of a qualification in one statute to a provision of another.
86
 It can also be relevant to statutes forming 
part of a scheme, even if not expressed as such. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations 
Act 1976 had many obviously parallel provisions, which at times were similarly interpreted.
87
 Likewise, 
the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 have been treated at times as a ‘single 
comprehensive code’.
88
 This harmony can break down where only one of the statutes, or parallel provisions, 
falls under EU law inviting a different interpretation.
89
 
 When it comes to consolidating statutes, the courts have been more tentative. A consolidating act’s 
predecessors should not be used to aid construction unless there is an ambiguity. As Lord Simon once 
observed, ‘The docked tail must not be allowed to wag the dog.’
90
  This would suggest that reviewing 
previous enactments would be unhelpful, if not misleading, especially in the case of the Equality Act 2010, 
which is an example of consolidation, modification, refinement, codification,
91
 and reversal.
92
 But it would 
be an unduly obstinate judge who ignored a body of case law built up around a provision which has simply 
been re-enacted. The Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 expressly refer to the meaning afforded 
to terms used in its predecessors.
93
 And, as noted above, in Rowstock v Jessemey,
94
 a trawl through the 
legislative history was required to confirm a drafting error.  
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Official reports, White Papers etc. 
The history of the admissibility of official reports, such as Government commissioned reports, Law 
Commission Reports and White Papers is not one of certainty. In Pepper v Hart, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
traced a bar to their use back to 1848.
95
 By 1898, a commission report was relied upon, citing the mischief 
rule and Heydon’s Case
96
 as justification.
97
 By the 1970s (if not earlier) it seems the practice was 
commonplace, and made without any discussion of the principle or any precedent for justification.
98
 In 
Shields v Coomes (Holdings) Ltd, for instance, Bridge LJ cited the White Paper Equality for Women
99
 as 
an aid to interpreting the Equal Pay Act 1970 to exclude hypothetical job responsibilities when making 
comparisons for an equal pay claim.
100
  
 The use of such reports must be heavily distinguished from the use parliamentary debates, reported 
in Hansard, which is a more carefully controlled matter. 
  
Using Hansard 
The reasons given for excluding extraneous materials
101
 apply with all the more force towards 
parliamentary materials. At the root of this is the settlement of 1688. Save for the occasional 
indulgence,
102
 the exclusionary rule was been applied rigidly until 1993, when the House of Lords broke 
this abstinence. In Pepper v Hart
103
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s majority speech set the parameters for 
resort to parliamentary materials, which have since been both qualified and embellished. As things stand 
now: If the legislation (a) was ambiguous or obscure, or led to an absurdity, or (b) did not appear 
compatible with, or properly to implement, EU law
104
 or rights under the European Convention on 
Human Rights,
105
 then (c) resort may be made to one or more statements by a minister or other promoter 
of the Bill together, if necessary, with such other parliamentary material as might be necessary to 
understand such statements and their effect, if (d) the effect of such statements was clear. In addition, no 
materials subsequent to the introduction of the legislation to Parliament may be relied upon,
106
 unless (it 
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 U v W (Attorney General Intervening) (No.1) [1997] Fam Law 403 (Fam). 
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seems) it is a matter of EU law and the matter in question arose during the passage of the bill.
107
 
 Several Law Lords subsequently have sounded warnings against an overly liberal use of Hansard, 
stating that the conditions should be complied with strictly.
108
 Indeed, writing extra-judicially, Lord Steyn 
considered that the doctrine raised conceptual and constitutional difficulties, in that it assumes the fiction 
of group (parliamentary) intention,
109
 and that the Government and not Parliament makes the law.
110
 This 
was in addition to the practical problems and expense of legal advisors having to study Hansard for every 
case, per chance something indicative could be found. In this sense Pepper v Hart was an ‘expensive 
luxury’.
111
 Maxwell adds that there is a danger that during debates, members might try to influence a 
statute’s interpretation by expressing particular views on its purpose, even though they remain unexpressed 
in the bill itself.
112
 Lord Steyn’s conclusion was that the ratio of Pepper v Hart could be confined ‘to be 
used only against the executive when it seems to go back on an assurance given to Parliament.’
113
 
 But this was not supported by the evidence. Not long after Pepper v Hart, the House of Lords 
(including Lord Browne-Wilkinson) invoked Hansard in support of the Government’s case (and against a 
vulnerable individual vis-à-vis the state).
114
 It was also used by the Court of Appeal in a discrimination case 
when not strictly necessary.
115
 Even after Lord Steyn’s caution, examples can be found of the use of 
parliamentary materials when Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s conditions are met.
116
 In one instance, the EAT 
readily referred to Hansard without even reference to Pepper v Hart or its criteria.
117
  
 
 
These are the tools traditionally invoked by the common law, although the influence of the European 
institutions is already apparent. So it is now necessary to consider their principles and role in the 
interpretative process. 
 
                                                          
In R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 
AC 349 (HL), Lord Bingham said (393): ‘It is one thing to rely on a statement by a responsible minister or 
promoter as to the meaning or effect of a provision in a bill thereafter accepted without amendment. It is 
quite another to rely on a statement made by anyone else, or even by a minister or promoter in the course 
of what may be lengthy and contentious parliamentary exchanges...’ 
107
 U v W (No.1) [1997] Fam Law 403 (Fam) following Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 2) [1996] 2 All ER 363 (QB) 366 
(Clarke J). See also, Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2) [2004] 1 AC 816 (HL) [118] (Lord Hope). 
108
 See e.g. Melluish (Inspector of Taxes) Appellant v BMI (No. 3) [1996] AC 454 (HL), 481-482 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, for the 
House); R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349 (HL), 393 
(Lord Bingham) 399-400 (Lord Nicholls) 408 (Lord Hope) and 414-415 (Lord Hutton); R v A (No. 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 (HL) 79 (Lord 
Hope). 
109
 ‘Pepper v Hart; A Re-examination’ ((2001) 21 OJLS 59, 64. 
110
 ibid 68. 
111
 ibid, 63. See also Lord MacKay’s dissent, Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) 614-615, and Beswick v 
Beswick [1968] AC 58 (HL) 73-74 (Lord Reid). 
112
 P Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edn Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) 51. 
113
 (2001) 21 OJLS 59, 70.  
114
 Chief Adjudication Officer v Foster [1993] AC 754 (HL). (Regulations (SI 1987/1967) redefining ‘severe disability’ by factoring 
in ‘non-dependant’ cohabitants were intra virus, even though this did not relate to the claimant’s disability.) 
115
 See Clark v Novacold [1999] ICR 951, 964, discussed p 173 et al. 
116
 See e.g. Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL) (discussed, Ch 7); Morgan v Fletcher [2009] UKUT 186 (LC); R (on 
the application of Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust) v Oxfordshire CC [2010] EWHC 530 
(Admin). 
117
 Usdaw v Ethel Austin [2013] ICR 1300 (EAT) effectively reversed, Case C-80/14 [2015] ICR 675. 
 1 Common Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
30 
 
  
THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURTS 
Any vulnerability to ideological predilections noted in the Introduction may be checked somewhat by the 
two external influences on interpretation, the Court of Justice of the European Union (previously ‘ECJ’), 
and the European Court of Human Rights (‘Strasbourg’). The effect of the European Communities Act 
1972 is that domestic law falling within EU jurisdiction must be interpreted according to the approach taken 
by the Court of Justice. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, domestic courts have a less well defined (and 
more debated) obligation to follow the approach of the Strasbourg Court on matters falling within the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The approaches to interpretation by these European Courts is 
markedly different to their English counterparts. 
 The Court of Justice has concrete goals, notably an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’, and with it a collection of complementary and relatively harmonious principles and rules; chief 
among these is the teleological approach. Strasbourg does not have a singular constitutional target, but 
rather an approach centred on the singular theme of human rights. In doing so, it uses the teleological, 
‘living instrument’, and proportionality, principles of interpretation, offset by the more pragmatic ‘margin 
of appreciation’ afforded to state defendants. Each Court will be taken in turn. 
 
  
THE APPROACH OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE 
Most of Britain’s discrimination law derives from, or is subservient to, EU law. Thus, the interpretation 
afforded to this legislation by the Court of Justice is vital to the meaning of domestic law. Of course, it is 
not enough to know the meaning attributed to this or that directive. In order to interpret domestic legislation 
falling within the ambit of EU legislation, domestic tribunals must understand the Court of Justice’s 
approach to statutory interpretation, which is quite different from the traditional English methods. The 
approach of the Court of Justice encompasses three principal canons of interpretation: literal, schematic, 
and teleological. However, there is more to it than just a different arrangement of canons. The Court is 
under the influence of the continental civil law system, and tasked to oversee a unique project set out by 
the Treaties of the Union. The rules must be appreciated in this context to be understood. 
  
1. Context 
From the inception of the European Economic Community in 1957, the Court has taken upon itself a 
mission to play its part in fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty of Rome and its successors. These objectives 
are: an increase in integration, an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’
118
 and economic and 
social progress, by the elimination of barriers to the movement of capital, workers, goods, and the right to 
establish and receive services.
119
 These political and economic objectives inform many legal principles 
upon which the Court relies when interpreting EU legislation. Thus, it is necessary to consider some of the 
                                                          
118
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relevant principles before mapping out the basic rules of interpretation. The principles considered below 
are: supremacy of EU law, direct effect of EU law, and the ‘general principles’ of equality, proportionality, 
and subsidiarity.  
  
Supremacy 
From the earliest days of the EEC, the Court, in Van Gend en Loos,
120
 asserted that the Community was not 
merely an international treaty between nation states; it has a constitutional nature, with member states 
ceding sovereignty to the Union. The Court is an integral part of this constitution. This means that general 
rules of interpretation associated with public international law do not necessarily hold here. Most notably, 
the Court has no hesitation in encroaching upon the sovereignty of a member state, should it be necessary 
in deference to the Treaties. In the extreme, the Court will declare domestic legislation invalid as far as it 
offends EU law.
121
 
 This principle of supremacy also applies to judgments of the Court of Justice, and in particular, its 
approach to statutory interpretation. In R v Henn and Darby,
122
 the House of Lords reminded domestic 
courts that: 
 
Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 expressly provides that the meaning or effect 
of any of the Treaties ‘shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European 
Court, be for determination as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant 
decision of the European Court).
123
 
 
Section 3 has since been modified to include all EU instruments, including directives.
124
 This calls for a 
brief account of the relevant principles laid down by the Court of Justice.  
  
2. Enforcement in Member States 
Principles of direct applicability, direct effect, and indirect effect, relate to the enforceability of EU law. 
Directly applicable laws are ones that become part of the internal domestic legal system. Section 2(1) of 
the European Communities Act 1972 confirms that all Community law is directly applicable in the United 
Kingdom. This does not necessarily make it enforceable by individuals (direct effect), or against private 
parties (horizontal direct effect). At this stage, a member state can only be called to account by the 
Commission or other member states.
125
 Thus, the precise ‘effect’ within domestic law of any particular EU 
provision can be critical to individual enforceability. 
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 In addition to supremacy, Van Gend en Loos established a pillar of enforceability: that individuals 
should be able – as a far as possible – to enforce Union law. The Court’s enthusiasm for individual 
enforcement is based on two notions. First: ‘The vigilance of individuals interested in protecting their rights 
creates an effective control additional to that entrusted ... to the diligence of the Commission and the 
member-States.’
126
 Second, as noted above, the European Union is more than an international treaty 
between states – it is expressed to be for the benefit of its citizens: ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, 
its values, and the well-being of its peoples’.
127
 As will be seen below, this enthusiasm has led to a number 
of enforcement methods, which are not particularly easy for the individual to comprehend. 
  
The Direct Effect of Treaties 
To be directly effective, a treaty provision must be clear, unconditional, non-discretionary, and final. Mere 
enabling provisions of the Treaties are not directly effective. Thus, article 19, TFEU, is not directly effective 
under this test. It provides that,  
 
the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
 
Clearly, this is not unconditional nor final. By contrast, the two principal forms of discrimination addressed 
in the treaties - nationality
128
 and equal pay
129
 - have been held to be directly effective, and thus enforceable 
by individuals against either private or state parties.
130
 
  
The Direct Effect of Directives 
Directives are quite different in nature from treaty articles and other secondary legislation, such as 
Regulations (directly applicable) and Decisions (binding on the addressee):
131
  
 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it 
is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
132
 
 
 On the face of it, directives bind only member states, ‘as to the result to be achieved’ and provide 
individuals with no cause of action. However, in line with its ‘vigilance’ philosophy, the Court has extended 
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somewhat their enforceability. The opportunity arises when a member state fails to implement a directive 
within its time limit, or fails to implement it properly. Here, the Court reasons, the culpable member state 
cannot rely on such a failure to evade its obligation to implement the directive and the broader treaty 
objectives. Hence, in such a case, the Court strives to permit individuals to enforce their rights under the 
directive in question, at the least against the culpable member state.
133
 It thus operates as a form of estoppel. 
The principle holds even where the enabling treaty article is not directly effective.
134
 This is relevant to 
domestic equality law, as some dedicated discrimination directives have been made under (what is now) 
article 19, TFEU (not itself directly effective). It means that conflicting domestic law must defer even to 
these directives.
135
 
 There are some limits to this doctrine, however. First, the directive provision must impose an 
obligation on the member state that is ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’.
136
 Second, the estoppel 
nature of this reasoning means that it is only the state that can be sued. Private parties, not being culpable 
for the failure to implement, cannot be ‘estopped’ from relying on any non-compliance. This limit means 
that directives have vertical, but not horizontal, direct effect. In the context of discrimination law, the most 
common situation affected by this arises where a worker is calling on directive rights. Here, the identity of 
the employer becomes crucial. If it is an emanation of the state, such as a local authority or the NHS, the 
employer is bound by the directive. Otherwise, it is not.
137
  
  
3. Circumventing Direct Effect 
These logical limits to the direct effect doctrine have not prevented the Court devising ways of 
circumventing this limit on horizontal direct effect. There are three principal devices: incidental direct 
effect, indirect effect, and a Francovich action. In addition, the Court has, on occasion, bypassed the whole 
issue by adopting a ‘general principle’ of equality, discussed in the next section. 
 The first, commonly referred to as incidental direct effect, arises where domestic legislation 
conflicts with a directive. If the private defendant is relying on the domestic measure, then a court is obliged 
to disregard the measure in favour of the directive.
138
 The second method of circumvention is indirect effect. 
This doctrine requires domestic courts to interpret domestic legislation as far as possible to accord with a 
directive; this applies whether or not the domestic law in question was enacted before or after the directive.
139
 
The third method of circumventing the limit to direct effect has become known as the Francovich principle, 
                                                          
133
 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, para 22. See also Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 
1337, paras 9-15, where the Court rejected an argument that the choice of a directive over a regulation meant that it was never intended 
to be directly applicable. 
134 Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Case 8/81 Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53. See also Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] 
ECR 1629, para 23. 
137
 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and SW Hants AHA [1986] ECR 723. See also Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl 
[1994] ECR I-3325. 
138
 Case C-129/94 Criminal Proceedings against Bernaldez [1996] ECR I-1829. Spanish legislation absolving motor insurers for 
damage caused by drink-driving contradicted the Motor Insurance Directive 72/166/EEC; see now Directive 2009/103/EC. See also 
Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA [1996] ECR I-2201. 
139
 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación [1990] ECR I-4135. See e.g. Litster v Forth Dry Dock & 
Engineering [1990] 1 AC 546 (HL). 
 1 Common Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
34 
 
named after the case
140
 which held it possible for a private individual to sue its government in circumstances 
where the government’s failure to implement a directive caused that individual loss.  
  
4. Some General Principles of Interpretation 
The Court also has adopted a number of general principles of law, which it will use to interpret legislation. 
The most relevant to this project are equality, proportionality, subsidiarity, and uniformity. 
 
The principle of equality 
The equality principle applies, it seems, to all activities within EU competence, and to all legislation within 
the Court’s domain, embracing activities well beyond the traditional human rights areas commonly 
associated with equality law.
141
 But for a successful justification defence, the Court was prepared to strike 
down two directives for indirectly discriminating on the ground of sex, contrary to a ‘fundamental right’ 
forming a general principle of EU law.
142
 This right was expressed in a Treaty.
143
 It cannot be assumed 
from this that the Court would address discrimination on any personal characteristics in a vacuum, that is 
in a scenario absent of any dedicated discrimination legislation,
144
 although the general principle can be 
used to extend existing equality legislation beyond its defined procedural boundaries. In Mangold v Helm, 
citing the general principal of equality, the Court held that the Framework Directive applied before its date 
for implementation was due.
145
  
 This suggests that in the field of discrimination and personal characteristics, the general principle 
of equality extends no further than those characteristics already expressed in dedicated EU legislation.
146
 It 
may be that the introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights leads the Court, at least when reviewing 
EU or domestic law, to incorporate a broader range of personal characteristics into its general principle of 
equality. The Charter became binding with the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, and Article 21 extends 
the grounds of discrimination to those: 
 
...such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth disability, age or 
sexual orientation. 
 
 The jurisprudence on the Charter is developing in a slow, piecemeal, fashion. What we do know 
is that it has the same legal status as the Treaties,
147
 expresses existing rights and principles, making them 
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‘more visible’, but does not create new ones,
148
 and cannot be relied upon on matters beyond EU law.
149
 It 
is worth noting in this context, contrary to the Advocate General’s Opinion, that the Court refused to 
recognise ‘combined discrimination’ (sexual orientation and age) as this was not provided in the Framework 
Directive.
150
 No reference was made to the Charter, but this could be read to mean that the Court assumed 
the Charter could not supplement the Directive to broaden its definition of discrimination. The Court has 
invoked the Charter when building on Mangold to extend the procedural reach of existing legislation. In 
Kücükdeveci v Swedex, the Court cited Article 21 when disapplying conflicting domestic law and giving 
the Framework Directive ‘horizontal effect’ in an age discrimination case between private parties.
151
 And 
in Chez, the Court cited the Charter ‘in support’ of its holding that a non-Roma person affected by the 
challenged measure could sue for discrimination against a Roma community.
152
  
 The inclusion of the grounds of ‘political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, or birth’, goes beyond the dedicated discrimination Directives, whilst the introductory phrase 
‘such as’ suggests that Article 21 is not confined to those grounds listed. Indeed, the Court has held that 
Article 21 was engaged against a state employer in a case of discrimination on the ground of employment 
status (civil service).
153
 The case was unusual. Employees with a disability, save for civil servants, were 
afforded extra protection against dismissal. As the extra protection amounted to positive action, it came 
within the Framework Directive,
154
 enabling the Court, apparently, to invoke the Charter ‘within the 
implementation of EU law’.
155
 
 Article 47 of the Charter could prove equally important to discrimination issues. It provides a right 
to a fair trial and effective remedy (in the same terms as ECHR, Article 6). The general principle of effective 
remedy underpinned the ECJ decision in Coote v Granada, extending the reach of the victimisation 
provisions in sex discrimination legislation to protect former employees.
156
 Moreover it has been used to 
provide access to race discrimination legislation. In Benkharbouche v Embassy of Sudan,
157
 the English 
Court of Appeal (via the EC Act 1972) gave Article 47 horizontal effect to disapply the State Immunity Act 
1978, allowing workers to sue their otherwise immune employers under the Working Time and Race 
Directives.
158
 In some cases, it may be that where offending domestic legislation cannot be read down to 
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comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (via the Human Rights Act 1998), the Charter 
may prove a more effective vehicle of enforcement. 
 Thus far, it seems that the general principle of equality can be used to inform the interpretation of 
any dedicated equality legislation and, especially in the light of the Charter, extend the procedural reach of 
such legislation beyond any defined boundaries. It remains to be seen how the case law progresses in the 
Court of Justice, and of course, how the UK’s secession affects the status in the UK of the general principle 
of equality and the Charter.
159
 
  
Proportionality 
Proportionality is the principle by which derogations from EU law are scrutinised by the Court of Justice.
160
 
It is the rough equivalent to ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’
161
 used traditionally by English courts in cases 
of judicial review, although proportionality tends to be a stricter test.  
 Its importance to discrimination law cannot be overstated. It is the touchstone for any justification 
defence to a prima facie case of discrimination. In Bilka,
162
 the Court provided a systematic objective 
justification defence, tailored for indirect (sex) discrimination. Fusing the defence with the principle of 
proportionality, it produced the three part ‘Bilka test’. Any challenged practice may be justified only if ‘the 
means chosen to attain this objective meet a genuine need of the enterprise, are suitable for attaining the 
objective in question and are necessary for that purpose.’
163
 In Johnston v RUC the Court went on the hold 
that the proportionality principle applies to any derogation, including from direct discrimination.
164
 
 Where a defence is based on social policy, the Bilka test is modified. Defendants must still show 
that the practice reflects a necessary aim of its social policy and is suitable and necessary for achieving that 
aim, but at the same time, they are afforded a broad margin of discretion in choosing the appropriate means 
to achieve that policy. But the margin of discretion is not so broad to have the effect of frustrating the 
implementation of the fundamental principle of equal treatment. Mere generalisations will not suffice.
165
  
 The difference between the Bilka test and the traditional English ‘reasonableness’ scrutiny became 
starkly apparent in the field of discrimination law. The original defence to indirect discrimination in the 
British legislation provided that it must be ‘justifiable irrespective of sex [or race]’.
166
 The English courts’ 
interpretation of this was heavily laden with the concept of reasonableness. In 1982, the Court of Appeal in 
Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission
167
 contrasted ‘necessity’ with the statutory word ‘justifiable’. 
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Kerr LJ stated that ‘justifiable ... clearly applies a lower standard than ... necessary’.
168
 Eveleigh LJ 
considered it to mean ‘something...acceptable to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable.’
169
 Following 
this, Balcombe LJ, in Hampson v Department of Education,
170
 created the ‘Hampson (balancing) test,’ 
which weighs the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice against the reasonable needs of the 
defendant.
171
 
 The difference was illustrated in Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority,
172
 which also provides a 
foretaste of the cases to come in this work. Here, the defendant Health Authority was trying to justify a 40 
per cent difference in pay between speech therapists (98 per cent female) and pharmacists (63 per cent 
female). As women were over-represented in the lower paid group, the Health Authority was obliged to 
justify the difference. It argued that market forces caused the difference. But the evidence was that only an 
extra ten per cent pay was needed to recruit a sufficient number of pharmacists. Thus, there existed a less 
discriminatory alternative of paying the pharmacists a ten per cent premium. In the UK, the EAT
173
 applied 
the Hampson test and weighed the 40 per cent difference in pay against the need for sufficient pharmacists. 
Given that stark choice, the EAT held that the difference in pay was justified. In other words, the leeway 
provided by the less strict Hampson approach meant that employers were not bound to use the least 
discriminatory practice available. The ECJ held that the pay difference could only be justified to the 
proportion that market forces required (ten per cent). The existence of the less discriminatory alternative 
meant that the practice (a 40 per cent pay difference) could not be justified. For the ECJ, proportionality 
meant no more than necessary. Bilka had been in the books for some six years when the EAT came to 
decide Enderby. Yet, not only did it fail to implement the statutory purpose of equal pay legislation, it failed 
to appreciate its obligation to do so, a theme that will become increasingly apparent during this work.
   
  
Subsidiarity 
In a formal sense, this doctrine defines the boundary between EU and Member State competence to 
legislate. It operates as a companion to proportionality, to control EU competence. Subsidiarity is now 
enshrined in TEU, Article 5. Less formally though, the Court operates the principle regularly. One of the 
most common phrases to found in European Court Reports is ‘It is for the national court to decide ...’. It 
may, for instance, defer to a national court in the interpretation and/or application of national legislation, 
within the bounds of EU law, of course. In Feryn,
174
 an employer announced he would not employ 
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immigrants. On the assumption (under the Race Directive 2000/43/EC) that this could amount to direct 
discrimination where there was no identifiable complainant, a secondary issue was whether an interested 
third party could bring proceedings against this employer. It was held that although the Directive did not 
demand this, it did not prohibit national legislation establishing such bodies. And then the boundary is 
drawn: ‘It is, however, solely for the national court to assess whether national legislation allows such a 
possibility.’
175
 
 
Uniformity 
Under the principle of uniformity, EU law must apply to all member states uniformly. This is necessary if 
the treaties’ objectives are to be fulfilled, and is a particular aim of Article 267 TFEU,
176
 which provides 
the Court jurisdiction to make preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU legislation.
177
 
 
  
5. The Rules of Interpretation 
It is clear from the ‘context’
178
 that the ultimate goal for the Court is to fulfil the objectives of the Treaties. 
It will become apparent from the rules themselves that the literal, schematic, and teleological rules are in 
ascending order of importance, and used to identify the purpose of a provision, which itself must fulfil the 
Treaties’ objectives. 
 The literal approach is of limited value in a system of many languages, where any instrument may 
contain nuanced, but important, differences in wording. Nonetheless, in rare cases, where a common 
meaning can be divined without contradicting other principles, the Court has adopted a literal approach.
179
 
As all secondary legislation must be made under the authority of the Treaties, recourse to the ‘parent’ treaty 
provision is often made. Indeed, all directives will refer in the preamble to the enabling treaty provision. 
However, this does no more than refer up the legislative hierarchy for guidance. The schematic approach 
operates in multi-layered and multi-dimensional ways, looking at, for instance, other provisions in the act 
under question, parallel (perhaps complimentary) legislation, as well as treaty provisions.
180
 
 The word teleological is little different from purposive, ‘teleo’ deriving from the Greek for design 
or purpose. That said, the Court’s mission reflects its somewhat grander dictionary definition: ‘relating to 
ends or final causes; dealing with design or purpose, esp. in natural phenomena’.
181
 This chimes with the 
Court’s schematic practice and frequent references to treaty objectives. 
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 The classic example of the difference between this and the traditional English approach arose in 
the early days of Britain’s membership of the Community. In R v Henn and Darby,
182
 the Court of Appeal 
was asked to hold that a statutory prohibition of importing obscene materials could not be enforced because 
Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome barred ‘quantitative restrictions’ on imports from other member states. 
Providing a classic specimen of blinkered literal interpretation, Lord Widgery LJ (for the Court) held:  
 
[Article 30] is a provision striking at restrictions on imports of the kind which warrant the adjective 
‘quantitative’. Here... the prohibition is total; the prohibition is on all obscene goods, not merely 
measured by quantity. At first blush, and subject to the authorities which follow, we would, I think, 
be inclined to say that Article 30 did not apply to this case because the restriction was not related 
to a quantitative measure.
183
  
 
 The case progressed to the Court of Justice, where the Commission argued: ‘If quantitative 
restrictions do not include total prohibitions this would seriously undermine the principle of free movement 
of goods which is one of the foundations of the Community.’
184
 The Court endorsed this deference to a 
Treaty objective, with the simple logic that a ban ‘is the most extreme form of restriction.’
185
 Upon return 
to the House of Lords, Lord Diplock warned that Lord Widgery’s interpretation ‘shows the danger of an 
English court applying English canons of statutory construction to the interpretation of the Treaty or, for 
that matter, of Regulations or Directives.’
186
 More generally, he observed: 
 
The European court, in contrast to English courts, applies teleological rather than historical 
methods to the interpretation of the Treaties and other Community legislation. It seeks to give 
effect to what it conceives to be the spirit rather than the letter of the Treaties; sometimes, indeed, 
to an English judge, it may seem to the exclusion of the letter. It views the Communities as living 
and expanding organisms and the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaties as changing to 
match their growth. For these reasons the European Court does not apply the doctrine of precedent 
to its own decisions as rigidly as does an English court.
187
 
 
 This exposes in more mechanical terms how even the English purposive approach cannot duplicate 
the European teleological one. Treaty objectives, by their nature, are aspirational, typified by the ambition 
for an ‘ever closer union’ between member states. In the context of discrimination law, a more detailed set 
of goals is provided by the Race and Framework Directives. These aspired to a wide range of objectives, 
comprising, a ‘high level’ of employment and social protection; the raising of the standard of living and 
quality of life; economic and social cohesion and solidarity; developing the EU as an area of freedom, 
security and justice, with democratic and tolerant societies which allow the participation of all persons; and 
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the free movement of persons.
188
 For the Court of Justice these objectives are likely to precede legislative 
history and precedent. 
  
6. Summary 
Even with deference to any literal/schematic/teleological ‘hierarchy’, sub-dividing these principles and 
canons of interpretation over-simplifies the process, as the principles and canons overlap and intertwine. 
Thus, for instance, where the Court affords a member state a margin of discretion, it is also deferring to the 
principle of subsidiarity. It is notable as well that they are complimentary. Principles of equality, 
proportionality, and subsidiarity, tend not to jar against each other. They are all tools to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties. 
 
7. EU Law in the English Courts 
This brief account shows that where domestic legislation falls under the purview of EU law, courts feel 
obliged to give it a purposive interpretation.
189
 A more concrete rule is that where it is directly applicable, 
or has direct effect, EU law must prevail over any conflicting domestic legislation, which must be 
‘disapplied’.
190
 Where the EU law does not have direct effect, the doctrine of indirect effect requires 
domestic courts to interpret domestic legislation as far as possible to accord with a directive whether the 
domestic law in question was enacted before or after the directive.
191
 In recent times, domestic courts have 
achieved this by adopting the ‘Ghaidan approach’.
192
 This assimilation of the domestic approaches to both 
ECHR and EU law was encapsulated by Sir Andrew Morritt C in a Chancery tax case, Vodafone 2 v 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners.
193
 It has met with little resistance,
194
 and without much ado, found 
its way into the vocabulary of many a judicial speech.
195
 
 The ‘obligation’ was ‘broad and far-reaching’, and the judge summarised it thus: 
 
(a) It is not constrained by conventional rules of construction. 
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(b) It does not require ambiguity in the legislative language.  
(c) It is not an exercise in semantics or linguistics. 
(d) It permits departure from the strict and literal application of the words which the 
legislature has elected to use. 
(e) It permits the implication of words necessary to comply with Community law 
obligations. 
(f) The precise form of the words to be implied does not matter. 
 
The only constraints on the broad and far-reaching nature of the interpretative obligation were that:  
(a) the meaning should ‘go with the grain of the legislation’ and be ‘compatible with the 
underlying thrust of the legislation being construed’ and  
(b) the exercise of the interpretative obligation cannot require the courts to make decisions 
for which they are not equipped or give rise to important practical repercussions which the 
court is not equipped to evaluate.
196
 
 
 This is an ambitious move, notably because it is not mandated by the Court of Justice’s 
requirements under indirect effect, which is to interpret legislation only as far as is possible to comply with 
EU law. As such, this principle is likely to be more vulnerable than most under the UK’s secession negotiations. 
That said, as will be seen in the following chapters, for discrimination cases, with the notable exception of 
Rowstock v Jessemey,
197
 the ‘Ghaidan approach’ largely has been ignored. 
  
 
 
  
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STRASBOURG COURT 
  
The European Court of Human Rights (‘Strasbourg’) employs several principles when interpreting and 
applying the Convention. In the main, these comprise, teleological, ‘living instrument’, proportionality, and 
the margin of appreciation. 
 The scope for a teleological approach can be seen in the non-exhaustive range of grounds 
recognised in discrimination claims. Article 14 of the Convention provides: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
                                                          
196
 [2010] Ch 77 (CA) [38]. 
197
 [2014] 1 WLR 3615 (CA). See above, p 18. 
 1 Common Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
42 
 
 Not only are the specific examples far wider than current domestic or EU discrimination 
legislation, the use of the phrases such as, and or other status (a fortiori the French version toute autre 
situation
198
), opens Article 14 to more grounds than those listed. In the spirit of this, the Court has heard 
discrimination cases on grounds wide and varied, preferring to control the outcome under the objective 
justification defence and the margin of appreciation (see below).
199
 Hence, the Court has entertained Article 
14 claims from groups as wide-ranging as owners of non-residential buildings (distinct from residential), 
owners of pit bull terriers (distinct from other breeds of dog), small landowners (distinct from large 
landowners), coastal (distinct from open sea) fishermen, foreign residence, and previous employment by 
the KGB.
200
 More conventionally, the Court has recognised sexual orientation, marital status, illegitimacy, 
trade union status, military rank, and conscientious objection,
201
 as falling within this residual category. 
In order to establish discrimination under Article 14, the applicant has to show treatment different 
to another person in an analogous situation, or a failure ‘to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different’.
202
 These two phrases correspond to direct and indirect discrimination. Although the 
Court was slow to recognise indirect discrimination,
203
 once it did so, it rapidly adopted a widely established 
model, which recognised a prima facie case based upon statistics.
204
 In doing so, it cited numerous EU 
sources,
205
 as well as UK and US case law.
206
 
 The ‘living instrument’, or ‘living tree’,
207
 school of interpretation holds that legislation of a 
constitutional nature should be read according to the values of the present day, as opposed to the time it 
was enacted, or the ‘framer’s intent’. The modern approach has become entrenched in the 
Strasbourg Court’s reasoning: 
 
The Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions and that the increasingly high standard being required in the area 
of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably 
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requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic 
societies.
208
 
 
A marked example of this is apparent in the Court’s evolving approach to transsexualism. As late as 1998, 
it found a state’s failure to recognise gender reassignment was objectively justified and within the margin 
of appreciation.
209
 But by 2002, it reversed this view, noting ‘an increase in the social acceptance of the 
phenomenon of transsexualism and a growing recognition of the problems with which transsexuals are 
confronted’.
210
 Accordingly, 
 
‘[the] Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and within 
Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the 
standards to be achieved.’
211
 
 
 The non-exhaustive range of recognisable grounds of discrimination means that most cases are 
decided under the element of justification. In line with indirect discrimination jurisprudence,
212
 the Court 
directs that under Article 14, the (State) defendant has the burden to justify the challenged discriminatory 
measure. But then there are some notable differences. The contrast with most conventional discrimination 
theories is that direct discrimination is potentially justifiable. The justification process divides, loosely, into 
two stages. First, the general policy must pursue a legitimate aim, and second, it must have reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
213
 It is on 
this principle of proportionality that the Court gives itself room for manoeuvre with the interpretation and 
application of Convention rights. 
 In some cases, the Court subjects the defence to ‘intensive’ scrutiny, demanding ‘very weighty 
reasons’ to justify discrimination. There is no hard and fast rule as to when this should occur, but one 
emerging theme is that these cases can be distinguished by the ground of the discrimination. The Court has 
demanded ‘very weighty reasons’ in cases of discrimination on grounds of sex, sexual orientation, birth out 
of wedlock (including different treatment of unmarried parents), marital status, and nationality.
214
 Without 
saying as much, the Court appears to be dividing cases into ‘suspect’ and ‘non-suspect’ classes, loosely 
corresponding to the classifications made by the US Supreme Court.
215
 This certainly is the view of some 
                                                          
208
 Őcalan v Turkey (App No. 46221/99) (2005) 41 EHRR 45, [163]. 
209
 Sheffield & Horsham v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 163. 
210
 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR18, [92]. 
211
 ibid [74]. See also [75] & [90]. 
212
 Notably Griggs v Duke Power 401 US 424 (Sup Ct, 1971), cited in DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 
EHRR 3 [107]. 
213
 Belgian Linguistic Case (A/6) (1979-1980) 1 EHRR 252, [I B 10]; Karner v Austria (2003) 2 FLR 623, [37]. 
214
 Respectively Ünal Tekeli v Turkey [2005] 1 FCR 663, [53]; Karner v Austria (2003) 2 FLR 623, [37]; Sahin v Germany [2003] 2 
FLR 671, [94] (Zaunegger v Germany (App No. 22028/04) (2010) 50 EHRR 38, [51]); Wessels-Bergervoet v The Netherlands (2004) 
38 EHRR 793, [49]; and Koua Poirrez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 34, [46].  
215
 See e.g. City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center 473 US 432, 446 (Sup Ct, 1985). See also, O De Schutter, ‘The 
prohibition of Discrimination under European human rights law: Relevance for the EU’ (2005, European Commission). ISBN 92-
894-9171-X (EN) 14-15 < 
http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/41.ProhibitionofDiscriminationunderHumanRtsLaw_EN_02.05.pdf > accessed 1 May 
2017. 
 1 Common Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
44 
 
senior British judges.
216
 The ‘living instrument’ principle can inhabit and inform the Court’s proportionality 
debate. For instance, in Zaunegger v Germany,
217
 a father challenged the inferior parental rights afforded 
to unmarried parents (among others). In finding a violation of Article 14, the Court took into consideration 
the ‘evolving European context in this sphere and the growing number of unmarried parents’.
218
 
 The ‘margin of appreciation’ varies according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its 
background.
219
 It cuts through any suspect/non-suspect dichotomy, and so, for instance, a wide margin may 
be afforded even in a case of sex discrimination, a so-called suspect ground.
220 
As such, any certainty 
created by the suspect/non-suspect dichotomy is somewhat undermined by this doctrine. But the case law 
provides some guiding principles. A wide margin may be given to general measures of social and economic 
policy.
221
 And it seems that where there is no common value or practice across Contracting States, it is 
more likely that the Court will afford a defendant State a wide margin of appreciation. For instance, in 
Petrovic v Austria,
222
 the Austrian Government was afforded a wide margin of appreciation when paying 
only women parental leave allowances, because, at the time, there was no common standard in this field: 
the majority of the Contracting States did not provide parental leave allowances. Likewise, in Schalk v 
Austria,
223
 the Court noted the absence of a consensus among Contracting States towards legal recognition 
of same-sex couples (another ‘suspect’ category), and so ‘States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation 
in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes’.
224
 On the other hand, the Court has observed, 
 
an emerging international consensus amongst the contracting states ... recognising the special 
needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle, not only for 
the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural 
diversity of value to the whole community.
225
 
 
The recognition of these common values meant a State could not justify practices that resulted in the 
majority of Roma children being placed in special schools for those with learning disabilities.
226
 
 This sketch of the definitions and principles reveals a good deal of flexibility, which is driven by 
the Court’s willingness to incorporate changing external ‘conditions’ and its equally dynamic aspiration to 
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an ‘increasingly high standard’ of protection. This, of course, presents a particular challenge for a common 
law court steeped in the doctrine of precedent. As can be seen next, the English courts have a less than solid 
record when interpreting the Convention, or human rights more broadly, which does not bode well for their 
treatment of the domestic discrimination law. 
 
The Convention in the English Courts  
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) into domestic law, coming into force on 2 October 2000.
227
 Section 3(1) of the Act provides: ‘So 
far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect 
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’. Failing this, by section 4, a court must issue a 
declaration of incompatibility.
228
 
 This makes it possible for parties to call upon Convention rights in a private dispute which is 
governed by legislation. It also raises the question of how far a court should distort statutory language to 
comply with the Convention. An early indicator came in 2004 with Godin-Mendoza v Ghaidan.
229
 Here, 
Mr Mendoza and Mr Walwyn-Jones lived together in a same-sex relationship in Mr Walwyn-Jones’ rented 
flat. When Mr Walwyn-Jones died, Mr Mendoza claimed from the landlord a right to succeed the statutory 
tenancy under the Rent Act 1977, which provided that the surviving spouse of the original tenant shall 
succeed the tenancy.
230
 It defined ‘spouse’ as ‘a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her 
wife or husband’. The Court of Appeal held that ‘as his or her wife or husband’ should read to mean ‘as if 
they were his wife or husband’.
231
 The House of Lords upheld that decision, but it is notable that Lord 
Nicholls reasoned: ‘The precise form of words read in for this purpose is of no significance. It is their 
substantive effect which matters.’
232
 This tells us that courts should not be fettered by an impossibility of a 
grammatical solution and that section 3 goes further merely than resolving ambiguities in legislation. 
However, the interpretation should ‘go with the grain of the legislation’
233
 and not be against a fundamental 
feature of it or amount to a decision better suited for Parliament, for instance, where recognising a male-to-
female transsexual as female under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 ‘would have had exceedingly wide 
ramifications’.
234
 As seen above, this ‘Ghaidan approach’ now has a life of its own in the sphere of EU 
law.
235
 
 Meanwhile, HRA 1998, section 2(1) declares that courts and tribunals ‘must take into account’ 
any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, or 
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opinions and decisions of the Commission (of Human Rights). This suggests that domestic courts should 
not only follow existing Strasbourg decisions, but also adopt Strasbourg’s somewhat different approach to 
interpretation, which, most notably, treats the Convention as a ‘living instrument’, rather than something 
confined to the intent of the original drafters.
236
 Indeed, without saying as much, the House of Lords in 
Ghaidan adopted this approach to a statute whose drafters, just 16 years previously,
237
 did not envisage that 
it would encompass a same-sex relationship. 
 The White Paper introducing the Human Rights Bill took this view: 
 
The Convention is often described as a ‘living instrument’ because it is interpreted by the European 
court in the light of present day conditions and therefore reflects changing social attitudes and the 
changes in the circumstances of society. In future our judges will be able to contribute to this 
dynamic and evolving interpretation of the Convention.
238
 
 
Accordingly, Judicial Studies Board instituted a programme of training on the Hunan Rights Act 1998 for 
every judge in the country from the House of Lords to District Judges, although how far that went beyond 
the basic mechanics of the Act into interpretive training remains unclear.
239
 
 As it happened, some of England’s judges already had experience of interpreting human rights 
documents. In the Privy Council, for several decades preceding the 1998 Act, senior British judges presided 
over cases from the Commonwealth, some of which concern the interpretation a country’s particular human 
rights legislation. As long ago as 1930, in Edwards v Attorney General of Canada, Lord Sankey, speaking for 
the Board, held that the British Constitutional Act 1867, which granted Canada a constitution, had ‘planted in 
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’.
240
 In a rare, if not unique, 
departure from the English common law presumption that women were not entitled to hold public office,
241
 
the Board held that the word ‘persons’ in the Act applied to both men and women, thus entitling women to 
sit in the Senate. This prototype for the living instrument approach received only occasional endorsements, 
with Lord Bingham cautioning that ‘those limits will often call for very careful consideration’.
242
 
 On the more general matter of the literal/purposive dichotomy, three Privy Council cases present a 
similarly mixed picture. In Attorney General for Gambia v Momodou Jobe,
243
 Lord Diplock said ‘A 
constitution...which protects fundamental human rights...is to be given a generous and purposive 
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interpretation.’
244
 However, in Robinson v The Queen,
245
 the defendant’s trial for murder - a capital offence - 
was adjourned nineteen times. On the twentieth, his lawyer resigned, apparently because his fees were unpaid. 
The trial judge was keen not to lose a key witness and so persisted with the trial; the unrepresented defendant 
was convicted and sentenced to death. He appealed to the Privy Council under the Jamaican Bill of Rights 
which provided that every person on trial for a capital offence shall be permitted to be represented by a lawyer. 
Lord Roskill examined the statutory word permitted and concluded that it did not give an absolute right to a 
defence lawyer. He held that the trial accorded with the Bill of Rights and sent Mr Robinson to his death 
following a trial without legal representation.
246
 Lords Keith and Templeman concurred. Lords Scarman and 
Edmund-Davies dissented, preferring a ‘generous and purposive’ construction of the Bill of Rights.
247
 And as 
late February 1998, with the Human Rights Act on the horizon, the Privy Council cautioned:  
 
What the interpretation of commercial documents and constitutions have in common is that in 
each case the court is concerned with the meaning of the language which has been used: .... ‘If the 
language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to “values” the result is not 
interpretation but divination.’
248
 
 
 Ghaidan signalled that post-Human Rights Act cases can take a liberal approach to statutory 
language to protect a Convention Right. But there remains caution around the ‘living instrument’ notion 
when it comes to advancing human rights. In general, domestic courts have not acted on the prompt given 
by the White Paper, instead adopting a more limited role of taking account of Strasbourg decisions.
249
 The 
general rubric was set out by Lord Bingham, in R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator: ‘The duty of national 
courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no 
less.’
250
 The reason for this, it seemed, was that, ‘the meaning of the Convention should be uniform 
throughout the states party to it’.
251
 In short, courts should follow but not develop. There have been 
substantial variations on this theme.
252
 In Clift v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
253
 the House 
of Lords adopted the narrowest interpretation of the grounds of discrimination covered by Article 14,
254
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ignoring more recent case law suggesting a broader approach. (The decision was upset by the Strasbourg 
Court.)
255
 On the other hand, in Re G, a majority of the House seemed content to extend Strasbourg 
jurisprudence beyond a homosexual individual’s right to adopt,
256
 to afford that right to same-sex 
couples,
257
 with two judges citing the White Paper’s enunciation to that effect.
258
 More recently, the 
interpretive duties under the Human Rights Act 1998 have come under increasing scrutiny, with an array 
of extra-judicial
259
 and political pronouncements
260
 that Parliament should be Sovereign and the Supreme 
Court the ultimate decision-maker on Convention Rights in the UK. 
  
  
CONCLUSION 
From this collection of seemingly unrelated practices, some principles and rules can be found. The starting 
point is the literal approach. The words employed by the legislature must be taken at face value, unless 
there is a reason to depart from them. Reasons have included avoiding an absurdity, correcting a drafting 
error, addressing the mischief at which the provision was aimed, achieving the purpose of the provision 
(this is more likely if it is a societal purpose), or complying with EU or ECHR law.  
 The courts’ willingness to interfere with statutory wording ranges from only where the language 
would bear it, to omitting words, reading words in, or even adding (or disregarding) whole sections. Some 
explanation for the extent of this willingness can be drawn from the broad theme of the political 
arrangements or climate of the day, ranging from Coke’s CJ famous defiance of Parliament in Dr Bonham’s 
Case,261 through to the Bill of Rights 1688 and the Diceyan deference to Parliament rising in the Victorian 
age, and the increasing disrespect for statutory wording in recent years, commonly under the cover of the 
EC Act 1972 and/or the HRA 1998. Otherwise, the choice of approach may appear more capricious. It 
could be the mischief, or purpose of a provision, or perhaps, a mere slap on the wrist for the drafter.
262
 
Where there is no evidence underpinning the chosen approach, the matter can appear subjective, which can 
bring even further uncertainty. For instance, it appeared that the courts took it on themselves to depart from 
the literal rule to presume against anti-nuclear weapon protesters (ignoring contrary sidenotes and headings) 
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and in favour of a fraudulent company director (encompassing favourable sidenotes and headings).
263
 Such 
‘pick and mix’ inconsistencies expose the vulnerability of the rules of English statutory interpretation to 
unevidenced and unannounced policy decisions; and as will become apparent in the cases under review, it 
is the same vulnerability that is exploited by personal predilections in the field of equality law. 
 But these criticisms could only be made by reference to a set of rules and principles, which, as this 
chapter shows, clearly exist. And if a decision is to accord with the rule of law and be ‘reasonably 
understood... by those whose conduct it regulates’,
264
 or by lawyers and non-lawyers alike,
265
 then it is not 
being particularly fanciful to assume some form of framework exists with an expectation that judgments 
refer to it. Moreover, such capriciousness ought not to apply to equality law, for which more obligatory 
approaches have emerged, most notably under EU law. There are also duties under the HRA 1998, and 
even Lord Steyn’s ‘purposive’ direction for social welfare legislation and the like.
266
 Given this, it would 
not be overly ambitious or onerous to summarise the process of the interpretation of equality law as follows. 
 
1. The primary goal is give effect to the intention of Parliament, although in certain cases this may 
be found from external European instruments and cases via the EC Act 1972 or HRA 1998. In the 
case of equality law, given that most definitions have their roots in the generally more experienced 
US jurisprudence, where relevant, this source may inform the intention as well. 
 
2. Given this primary goal, the purpose should always be considered. To this end, courts should 
observe the advice adopted by the House of Lords that this may require a ‘sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery’.
267
 
 
3. The statutory words should be given their literal meaning unless there is a reason for not doing 
so. 
 
4. A reason would be that it would not fulfil the purpose. Other reasons could be that the words 
are ambiguous, there is an obvious drafting error, or the interpretation would cause an absurdity.  
 
5. In such cases, courts have a number of ‘alternative’ tools to resolve the problem. The main ones 
are context, the golden, mischief, purposive, and ‘Inco Europe’ ‘rules’; and the ‘constitutional’ 
deference to the HRA 1998 and EC Act 1972 (which may provide more latitude to distort, interfere 
with, or ignore statutory language). Bearing in mind the greater ‘degree of liberality permitted’ 
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with a ‘social welfare’ statute (as opposed to a tax statute),
268
 in any of these cases, the courts will 
sometimes attempt to assign statutory words a secondary meaning, or render them subservient to 
other words, or redraft the provision accordingly. But in others, notably (but not exclusively) under 
the ‘Ghaidan approach’, they will simply make a decision without attempting a redraft. 
  
6. In all cases, the judgment should state which rule is being deployed, and why. If no recognised 
rule is being used, the judgment again should state why. In particular, any deviation from the 
statutory language should be explained to show at least some respect for Lord Diplock’s plea that 
interested parties ought to be able to take a statute at face value.
269
 
 
 This should help to produce a technically correct judgment. In itself, this approach should aid 
certainty and understanding of the decisions; it should help reduce prolixity and vulnerability to personal 
predilections. Of course, these virtues are intertwined and interdependent. A judge committed to a clear, 
concise decision is more likely to reference that decision to a method of interpretation. Similarly, a judge 
committed to an interpretation consistent with the statutory purpose will do so with an appreciation of the 
basic principles and goals of anti-discrimination law. This strand is sketched out in the next chapter.
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2 AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES AND AIMS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 
  
As noted above, an appreciation of the basic principles and aims underpinning the statutory definitions will 
aid a sound understanding of the statutory purpose, which in turn will inform the statutory interpretation. 
These can be gleaned from the antecedent case law and preparatory materials, as well as the wider (largely 
academic) literature exploring the theories of discrimination law. Of course, the theoretical views will vary 
widely, which is of little use when trying to divine a statutory purpose. But often these are more exploratory 
than advisory, while other more advocatory or critical views call for a change in the legislative definitions 
to implement a preferred theory or aim. As such, this recognises the characteristics of the existing provision 
in question. Thus, despite the variety of theories available, there is a general consensus as to the underlying 
theory, policy, and aims of the existing definitions. This ought to prevent the danger of random theories 
entering the law at the interpretive stage, via a judge’s personal predilection, by-passing the legislative 
process altogether. That would be quite different from an understanding of the theories and aims as an aid 
to appreciate the statutory purpose. 
 
 
 
THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATION 
  
For the general public, an easily received legal definition of discrimination is different treatment motivated 
by prejudice or hostility.
1
 For practitioners of discrimination law, this is too simplistic. The specialist 
lawyer, familiar with practices and patterns, as well as principles gleaned from the case law, knows that 
discrimination must include, at the least, behaviour that has an unintended adverse effect on a protected 
group, say, a customary length of residence requirement to work in local services, or an uninterrupted 
employment record to attain certain work benefits. Meanwhile the judiciary, aware of this professional 
opinion, are conscious of the public’s perception when defining discrimination. Lord Woolf MR once 
opined that liability for unintended discrimination (either consciously or unconsciously) ‘is hardly likely to 
assist the objective of promoting harmonious racial relations.’
2
 Similarly, a dissenting Lord Browne-
Wilkinson asserted that finding liability for ‘unconscious’ racial discrimination ‘is unlikely to recommend the 
legislation to the public as being fair and proper protection for the minorities that they are seeking to protect’.
3
 
The use of public understanding as an interpretive tool is clearly controversial, but for some, public 
understanding is ‘crucial in a democracy .... and necessary for the enactment and enforcement of civil rights 
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law’.
4
 This, of course, is somewhat different from Lord Diplock’s plea for a public understanding of statutes;
5
 
here, the onus is on the interpreter not to deviate from the plain words of a statute, save it mislead and 
disadvantage those laypersons who had gone to the trouble of locating and reading a statutory provision. All 
the same, these judicial comments mean that the public’s opinion cannot be ignored in the following discussion. 
 Even as a simplistic notion of prejudice, discrimination can be attributed with several meanings. 
Sunstein considers that it encompasses three types of mistake.
6
 The first is an incorrect view that people in 
certain groups possess characteristics.
7
 The second is a belief that many members of a group have certain 
characteristics when in fact only a few of them do. Here the error is an extremely over-broad generalisation. 
The third mistake is a reliance on fairly accurate group-based generalisations when more accurate (and not 
especially costly) classifying devices are available. Thus, even where a group predominantly possesses a 
particular characteristic, it is possible to identify the relevant individuals, rather than treat the group as a 
whole. An example arose in Bohon-Mitchell v Common Professional Examination Board,
8
 where those 
with degrees from outside the British Isles were presumed to be unfamiliar with the British way of life.  
 A new more subtle and challenging definition of racial discrimination was brought into the 
public’s consciousness in 1999 by the Macpherson Report (the inquiry into the police response to the 
murder of the black teenager, Stephen Lawrence). The Report drew together many explanations of the 
phrase institutional racism to produce a widely received definition, which ought to inform the legal 
definition of discrimination. After making the point that overt racism was not at issue in the inquiry, it 
identified ‘unwitting’, and ‘unconscious’, racism. The Report then noted the effect of actions and police 
culture as areas for attention: the problem lies not with individual officers, but with the organisation. The 
Macpherson Report defined institutional racism as: 
 
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to 
people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, 
attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.
9
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 Discrimination can also be characterised under principles of either harm or unfairness.
10
 The harm 
principle rests on a strong connection between the stigma which leads to different treatment and denied 
group opportunity, and social historical factors, such as the forms of second-class citizenship experienced 
typically (but not exclusively) by some racial groups and women. The stigma, degradation and humiliation 
of slavery (and the more recent racial segregation), is revived with every modern-day act of racial 
discrimination. Well into the 20th century, women were legal second-class citizens. They were inferior in 
marriage, where their legal existence was suspended, domestic violence was condoned, and rape lawful. 
They were denied the vote, and suffered inferior job opportunities, prospects and pay.
11
 Consequently, 
every act of sex discrimination may be seen and felt as an act championing the old arrangements.  
 The fairness principle relies on a much weaker link between social history and discriminatory 
practices. History informs us that decision-making based on irrational factors such as race and sex is 
inherently unfair. This view is easier to reconcile with the law of indirect discrimination, as less, or no, 
blame need be attached to the discriminator. It also makes it easier to explain the inclusion of other grounds 
(such as age) within the anti-discrimination legal framework. Its weakness is that it risks treating ‘all non-
meritocratic preferences as being on all fours with slavery’
12
 and ‘opens up the possibility of white male 
legal actions which exploit the vulnerability of any legal recognition of race or gender difference ...’.
13
  
 The fairness principle is also harder to reconcile with positive action programmes, which 
inherently discriminate against a dominant but protected group, typically white males. Preferences for 
women or minority racial groups repeat the same wrong that caused their subjugation in the first place. 
Positive action is easier to reconcile with the harm principle because here the ‘wrongs’ are not comparable. 
One is to subjugate a class of persons, while the other is to redress subjugation. Assuming that various 
forms of discrimination can be characterised as harmful or unfair (or both), institutional or solely hostile, 
or a form of ‘mistake’, the next question is what should be the aim of legal intervention. 
  
  
THE AIMS OF THE LAW 
The single aspiration upon which all interested parties appear to agree is the achievement of ‘equality’. This 
word appears in discrimination legislation and human rights instruments (as well as political discourses) 
the world over. But it is not free of debate. First, after examination, one learns that its most distinctive 
feature is its ‘shifting meaning’.
14
 Rather like a politician seeking a broad mandate, it reflects whatever 
meaning the observer wishes it to have. The second problem is that although equality is a ‘virtue word’
15
 
and as such difficult to criticise, once it is given a firm meaning it becomes clear that equality is not 
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necessarily a good thing. There are various models and ideals of equality within discrimination law, ranging 
from formal to substantive equality, and including human dignity, pluralism, and compassion. 
  
1. Formal Equality 
Equality has been the underpinning principle of modern anti-discrimination law, beginning in the United 
States with the Civil Rights Act 1964. The primary goal of that Act was redressing the historic inequalities 
suffered by the United States’ African-American population. The Act made it unlawful to ‘discriminate’ 
because of such individual’s race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.
16
 From this, the US Supreme 
Court developed the disparate treatment (or direct discrimination) model.
17
 The logical consequence is that 
those obligated by the Act must practice same - or equal - treatment. Britain adopted this model, with, for 
example, the Race Relations Act 1976, providing that direct discrimination was treating someone ‘less 
favourably’ on racial grounds, with the obvious and intended meaning that, on racial grounds, persons 
should be treated equally. 
 This model of equality is symmetrical, meaning that the law protects whites as well as blacks, men 
as well as women, and so on and so forth. In its simplest form, this model represents formal equality, that 
like should be treated as like.
18
 (The notable exceptions here are disability and pregnancy/maternity 
discrimination laws, which commonly insist upon different treatment.
19
)
 
There are a number of problems 
associated with formal equality. 
 The first problem is that equal treatment is not necessarily virtuous. At its most general equal 
treatment is a consequence of the rule of law, by which laws must be enforced equally. But this does not 
prevent discriminatory laws, such as apartheid, being enacted and enforced equally.
20
 A law of equal 
treatment is a step removed from unequal laws, but its enforcement can have counter-productive or unequal 
results. In his comment on the French law of vagrancy and theft, Anatole France mocked: ‘The law, in its 
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to 
steal bread.’
21
 On this theme, Westen notes the equal treatment handed out in Hitler’s concentration 
camps.
22
 
 Thus, equal treatment can amount to equally bad treatment. In one infamous US case, after a court 
ordered the city of Jackson, Mississippi, to abandon its racial segregation policy for its swimming pools 
(four white-only, one black-only), the city administration responded by closing down all its pools. This act 
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did not offend the US constitutional right to equality.
23
 In the context of sex discrimination law, employers 
have defended claims by arguing (successfully) that they treated the claimant and her comparator equally 
badly. This has arisen in the field of sexual harassment, where homophobic abuse of a lesbian was not 
actionable because a male homosexual would have been equally abused.
24
 Similarly, men and women in a 
factory were to held to have been treated equally by the display of pornographic pictures of women.
25
 In 
the field of pregnancy, British courts have compared the pregnant woman with a ‘sick man’, allowing 
employers to prevail if they can show that they would dismiss any worker who took a certain amount of 
time off work for illness.
26
 The irony here is that the worse that the comparator is treated, the more likely 
it is that the employer would be believed. Some industries employing predominantly female or minority 
workers may pay poverty wages. In all these cases, the solution has been asymmetrical law, requiring no 
comparator, such as free-standing laws against sexual harassment and pregnancy discrimination, or even 
laws outside of the discrimination sphere, such as the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. 
 Workers also may be ‘equally’ victimised for bringing discrimination claims, so long as all 
workers are treated that way, whatever the nature of their claim. Under this meaning of equality, such 
workers can be denied a reference,
27
 a transfer, or a grievance hearing.
28
 
 The second problem of the equal treatment model is the need for a comparator. For instance, a 
woman cannot insist that she has been treated unequally until she produces a man who was, or would have, 
been treated more favourably. There are technical and philosophical problems associated with the 
comparator-driven approach. Technical problems arise because this model does not allow for differences 
between the protected characteristics. This most notable case here is pregnancy discrimination. A claimant 
cannot produce a pregnant male comparator. Similarly, in cases involving religion, claimants will often be 
seeking different, rather than equal treatment. For instance, there is no obviously suitable comparator for a 
Muslim worker requesting Friday afternoons off work to attend a Mosque. This problem has been 
recognised overtly in the United States. In EEOC v Ithaca Industries
29
 the employer was obliged to 
accommodate a worker’s refusal to work on a Sunday for a religious reason, by enquiring if fellow workers 
would cover that shift. This was because, for cases of religious discrimination, the legislation’s equality 
theory is not disparate treatment or disparate impact, but ‘reasonable accommodation’.
30
 This theory was 
reconciled with a notion of equality: 
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We are convinced that [the legislation] ... has the primary secular effect of preserving the equal 
employment opportunities of those employees whose moral scruples conflict with work rules ...
31
 
 
 The philosophical objection to the need for a comparator is that the comparator, when found, ‘is 
clothed with the attributes of the dominant gender, culture, religion, ethnicity or sexuality’.
32
 In the context 
of sex discrimination, this approach provides only ‘equality in terms of a norm set by men’ leaving women 
with the right only to aspire to be the same as men.
33
 Similarly, Townsend-Smith feared that the law could 
be used to reinforce male-based values, such as an ability to work longer hours, have unbroken and long 
service, aggression or dynamism: 
 
[I]t is important to see how deep-rooted is the notion of merit in our society, and that merit has 
historically been determined in male terms. The danger is that the law will accept male definitions 
of what is meritorious in employment, and that this will not correspond with the desires or best 
interests of many or most women.
34
 
 
Likewise, equipment and machinery in the workplace can have gender connotations: ‘In a training 
workshop ... it is impossible to get a teenage lad to wipe the floor with a mop, though he may be persuaded 
to sweep it with a broom.’
35
 
 Lacey argues that, for women, formal equality does not go far enough as ‘it has little bite in view 
of the disadvantages which women suffer in private areas such as family life, untouched by the sex 
discrimination legislation’.
36
 The problem, she argues, is formal equality conceptualises the problem as sex 
discrimination rather than discrimination against women, rendering ‘invisible the real social problem’. This 
objection applies to other characteristics as well as gender. A benign quality, such as being socially 
reserved, can be used as a reason not to hire, even though this quality is characteristic of Indian Hindus of 
the Brahmin caste.
37
 
 The third issue with the equal treatment model is that in principle, equal treatment prevents more 
favourable treatment, and so prevents positive action. It is naive to believe that positive action is not 
necessary to redress the effects of past discrimination, which is a major reason for the legislation in the first 
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place. Yet it clashes with the basic notion of equal treatment, especially in the mind of the public. Positive 
action plans are only permissible as an exception to the equal treatment model. 
 The fourth feature of the equal treatment model is that it suggests that everyone is entitled to it, 
rather than just those groups specified in dedicated legislation. On the face of it, this should not be a 
problem. But dedicated legislation confining equal treatment to just some groups can ferment discontent 
and resentment by those not formally protected. And many other groups, whose political power is not so 
strong, are as likely to be in need of equal treatment as many of those covered by the legislation. Further, it 
is difficult to construct arguments to deny equal treatment to any individual, whether idiosyncratic or 
conventional. There is ample evidence that anyone feeling aggrieved will feel entitled to equal treatment. 
Men,
38
 atheists,
39
 whites
40
 and racists,
41
 readily have used the symmetry of the equal treatment model to 
redress their own grievances. In Britain, before the introduction of dedicated religious discrimination 
legislation, religious groups argued that they, by coincidence, were also racial groups, and so fell within 
the protection of the Race Relations Act 1976.
42
 Many disgruntled with their pay have tried obtaining a 
‘fair’ wage using equal pay law.
43
 
 In a relatively short time, the world has progressed from a ‘norm’ of identifying race and sex as 
grounds for anti-discrimination law, to specifying religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender 
reassignment, and age, as deserving of equal treatment. People generally may feel entitled to equal 
treatment because there is little evidence of any single fundamental principle dictating which groups should 
be singled out for particular protection. And although each of these grounds may be defensible on its own 
terms, the roots of their inclusion appear to be as capricious as they were principled. 
 One explanation is that these groups operated successful political campaigns. President Kennedy 
was moved by Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech to promote the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
44
 In 
Britain, the daughter of the Minister for Disabled People drew huge public support by leading a campaign 
that embarrassed a reluctant government to introduce the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
45
 But not all 
groups obtained protection principally through their own political campaigns. The EU’s Race Directive was 
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partly, at least, the result of the politicians’ fear of Europe’s far-right exploiting the enlargement from 15 
to 25 nations.
46
 The EUs equal pay law was enshrined in the original Treaty of Rome at the insistence of 
French business: as France was the only country with an equal pay law at the time, French employers (not 
workers or feminist groups) campaigned for its inclusion in the Treaty to avoid unfair competition from 
other member states.
47
 Gender was introduced into the US Civil Rights Act 1964 as a wrecking amendment, 
the proposer believing that Congress would never vote for it.
48
 
 Thus, the reasons why particular groups have been singled out for dedicated anti-discrimination 
legislation are many and varied. By contrast, a sense of a principle can be detected from attempts to apply 
the ‘equality’ rubric contained in human rights or constitutional instruments. The Supreme Court of Canada 
once centred its approach on ‘human dignity.’
49
 The US Supreme Court identifies ‘suspect’, ‘quasi-
suspect’, and ‘residual’ classes of persons.
50
 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is 
less developed, with tentative notions of discrimination on some grounds requiring ‘very weighty reasons’ 
for justification, but offering little theory to explain this.
51
 
 A fifth objection to the equal treatment model is its characteristic of ‘equality as consistency’. Its 
like-for-like nature is too rigid to address to all forms of inequality.
52
 The equal treatment model starts from 
the position that the claimant and comparator are in the same position, say a woman and man doing work 
of equal value. Of course, they are not like-for-like when the woman is doing work of less value. Yet, 
theoretically at least, the formal equality model dictates that she may be paid 30 per cent less even though 
her work is only 20 per cent less value. Conversely, a woman doing work of more value is only entitled to 
the same pay. She cannot claim proportionally more money than him.
53
 But this problem is less to do with 
principle and more to do with the restriction in the equal pay legislation that allows only a real (i.e. not 
hypothetical) comparator. Once this restriction is disregarded, claims like this can succeed under the equal 
treatment principle.
54
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 The last objection is that formal equality can be used as a facade for bigotry. In 1896, in Plessy v 
Ferguson,
55
 the US Supreme Court held that ‘separate but equal’ segregation in streetcars did not breach 
the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Its brutal opinion was that once formal equality had 
been achieved, how people felt about the result was their problem: 
 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the 
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be 
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to 
put that construction upon it.
56
 
  
2.  Substantive Equality
57
 
These limitations of formal equality have led to moves towards substantive equality. Perhaps the most 
dramatic shift occurred with the US Supreme Court’s change of heart towards the racial segregation policies 
of the southern States. Some 60 years after Plessy v Ferguson (above), the US Supreme Court in Brown v 
Board of Education
58
 ruled that segregation in education was inherently unequal and unconstitutional.
59
 
And so substantive equality demands that social justice and equality is meaningful and real to disadvantaged 
groups. The shift has been recognised expressly by the Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Beverly 
McLachlin: 
 
It is the belief that if equality is to be realized, we must move beyond formal legalism to measures 
that will make a practical difference in the lives of members of groups that have been traditionally 
subject to the tactics of subordination .... The use of the law to promote substantive equality, the 
phase we presently find ourselves in, takes two forms. The first is legislated programs whereby 
government, social and economic institutions are encouraged or, in some cases, required, to 
include people of under-represented groups. The second is the judicial concept of substantive 
equality, developed by the courts ...
60
 
 
Substantive equality suggests that responsibility for discrimination rests not just with the wrongdoer in 
court, but the dominant group as a whole that has benefited from society’s structuring on racial, gender, 
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and other grounds. This means that the dominant group should bear the cost of change.
61
 It arises for 
example, when ‘innocent’ whites and males lose out to apparently lesser-qualified minorities or women in 
positive action programmes in employment, education, or housing. Substantive equality also suggests that 
the State has a role. If it does nothing, it is condoning discrimination, which will perpetuate. Thus, it has a 
positive duty to intervene.
62
 
 Two particular theories are aligned with substantive equality: equality of opportunity and equality 
of results. Lustgarten described these two notions in this way:  
 
In its purest or most extreme form the first accepts that discrimination has been abolished when 
all formal and deliberate barriers against blacks have been dismantled. Its concern stops with 
determining whether the factor of race has caused an individual to suffer adverse treatment. At the 
furthest point at the other end of the spectrum the unalloyed fair-share approach is concerned only 
with equality of result, measured in terms of proportionality. Its inherent logic leads to the adoption 
of quotas as a remedy once a finding of discrimination is made.
63
 
 
The shift from formal equality to equality of opportunity was articulated by Wasserstrom, who suggested 
that that in a sea of inequalities, it seems pointless, philosophically and practically, to redress just one. As 
formal equality seeks to reward individual merit (rather than group status), it is the most qualified who 
deserve the most benefits. Yet, the distribution of these qualifications is dictated by factors beyond the 
control of the individual, such as the home environment, socio-economic class of parents, and the quality 
of the schools attended. 
 
Since individuals do not deserve having had any of these things vis-à-vis other individuals, they 
do not, for the most part, deserve their qualifications. And since they do not deserve their abilities 
they do not in any strong sense deserve to be admitted because of their abilities ...
64
  
 
Thus, there can only be true equality if the competitors in a race begin from the same starting point.
65
 
Lacey’s criticism of formal equality
66
 can be just as relevant here. If the race is one designed by white men, 
and is one in which they naturally prevail, even an equality of opportunity model fails to address the true 
problem.
67
 Regardless of the merits of that opinion, it is undeniable that equality of opportunity cannot 
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guarantee that society’s benefits will be evenly distributed. The equality of results approach rests on the 
patent injustice of unevenly distributed benefits. At the least, this a measure by which the equality of 
opportunity model can be tested.  
 Some recognition of these broader inequalities can be detected in a practice of the US Supreme 
Court, pointing to another theory, which centres on identifying the ‘underdog’, or those in a state of 
inferiority or subjection. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments of the US 
Constitution provides a constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
68
 The Court has identified 
three classes of protected groups under the Clause: suspect class; quasi-suspect class; and a residual, 
‘normal’, class. Measures discriminating against these classes are given, respectively, strict scrutiny, 
‘heightened’ scrutiny, or ‘normal’ or ‘rational’ scrutiny.
69
 
 In deciding if a group qualifies as a suspect class, a court will normally consider three factors. The 
first is a history of purposeful discrimination.
70
 Secondly, the discrimination embodies such a gross 
unfairness to be ‘invidious.’ Considerations here could be a class trait that bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society, or that the class has been saddled with unique disabilities because of 
prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes, or that the trait defining the class is immutable. Third, the group lacks 
the political power necessary to obtain redress from the political branches of government.
71
 
 This third factor points to a degree of social inclusion in the reckoning. Hence, the range of 
legislation on disability discrimination helped to disqualify ‘disability’ from the suspect class.
72
 Similarly, 
it was once noted in this context that ‘homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to 
and do “attract the attention of the lawmakers”’.
73
 
 Hugh Collins considers a notion of social inclusion that goes beyond perhaps mere political power, 
and sees it as a unifying explanation of discrimination law.
74
 The difficulty with this as a comprehensive 
explanation is that it does not account for all equality claims, despite them being considered meritorious by 
most discrimination lawyers, indeed, the public as a whole. Notable here would be six-figure equal pay 
claims by female City workers.
75
  
 The conspicuous shortfall of all of these theories is that they do not directly address social 
economic inequalities: 
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[A]s one might have suspected from its American antecedents the fair-share approach is in no way 
compatible with great inequalities of income, wealth and social resources: it merely requires that 
blacks fit into the existing patterns of inequality in the same proportions as whites.
76
  
 
 The pragmatic view of this is that the undefined slogan equal opportunities was able to unite 
diverse political groups to support anti-discrimination legislation. They were unlikely to support substantive 
inroads into social-economic inequality, nor more radical steps: 
 
How many liberal supporters of the current legislation, for example, would have been content to 
reflect on the implications of a thorough-going commitment to equality of opportunity in terms of 
socialisation of childrearing or even genetic engineering?
77
 
  
3.  Human Dignity and Equality 
A different, apparently more restrictive, approach is to centre recognition of equality rights on the principle 
of human dignity.
78
 This principle can be detected in most human rights discourses and is expressed in the 
dedicated discrimination legislation.
79
 
 In South Africa, dignity is a cornerstone of the (Final) Constitution and a principal right,
80
 although 
rarely used as such.
81
 However, the notion of dignity is used more commonly to decide if there has been 
unlawful discrimination.
82
 For instance, under the Black Administration Act (and regulations made under 
it), the estate of an intestate person would be administered by a Master of the High Court, or if the person 
was black, by a magistrate. Despite magistrates being more conveniently located and inexpensive, this law 
was struck down as unconstitutional because, 
  
even if there are practical advantages for many people in the system, it is rooted in racial 
discrimination which severely assails the dignity of those concerned and undermines attempts to 
establish a fair and equitable system of public administration.
83
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 Similarly, ‘separate but equal’ segregated education was ruled constitutionally unequal by the US 
Supreme Court, because inter alia, it generated ‘a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone’,
84
 a sentiment rooted in human 
dignity, although not expressed as such. As these examples show, dignity can resolve issues in 
discrimination law.
85
 But as a unifying theory underpinning all discrimination law, the notion of dignity is 
problematic. 
 Its utility in resolving apparently symmetrical separate-but-equal scenarios also betrays an uneasy 
relationship with the symmetrical nature of the equal treatment model, the first problem. In one sense, the 
notion of dignity is inadequate to explain the groups covered by the dedicated legislation. This is because 
the symmetrical nature of equal treatment model is available to men as well as women, whites as well as 
blacks, and so on. These groups, of course, are not the intended principal beneficiaries of the legislation, 
and are hardly – as groups - suffering a lack of dignity. On the contrary, in historical terms these groups 
are the respective oppressors of the intended beneficiaries. In a broader sense though, the strict equal 
treatment model has the benefit of not patronising the principal protected beneficiaries, and thus preserving 
some dignity. As such, it is difficult even for the most conservative critic of discrimination law to argue 
that equal treatment is special treatment undermining the dignity of the principal beneficiaries. This 
neutralises their criticism somewhat, but at best, merely shows that the equal treatment model could be 
consistent with dignity. It does not show it is dependent upon it. 
 The second problem, which has been examined by Rory O’Connell, is that dignity is too vague a 
concept to underpin a legal principle. He illustrates this by reference to South African and Canadian 
Constitutional judgments centred on dignity, with a common feature that the courts were fiercely divided. 
Hence: ‘The competing interpretations of dignity, in particular, allow for unarticulated value judgments to 
determine their decisions.’
86
 But strong dissents and divided courts are not confined to cases involving 
dignity. If a concept under discussion were abandoned simply because of a divided court, most of Britain’s 
anti-discrimination legislation would have been repealed by now.
87
 That said, dignity as a basis for equality 
law is particularly capricious. Take for example, Britain’s approach to dignity and justifying compulsory 
retirement. In 2009, the High Court rejected the notion that compulsory retirement preserved a worker’s 
dignity.
88
 A year later, in a different case, the Court of Appeal thought that compulsory retirement allowed 
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R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 278 (SC) (5-8) James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL) (6-3); Archibald v Fife 
Council [2004] UKHL 32 (4-5); Matthews v Kent & Medway Towns Fire Authority [2006] ICR 365 (HL) (11-3!). 
88
 R (on the application of Age UK) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2009] IRLR 
1017, [108], [122]. 
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workers ‘to retire with dignity.’
89
 In 2011, the Government suggested that compulsory retirement (in the 
absence of performance management) could cause a ‘loss of dignity’.
90
 The uncertainty surrounding its 
definition prompted the Canadian Supreme Court to abandon it as a mainstay of applying its Charter of 
Rights, because it was, 
 
an abstract and subjective notion that [can be] confusing and difficult to apply ... [and] an 
additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was 
intended to be.
91
 
 
This confusing picture is better understood perhaps by sub-dividing some various notions of ‘dignity’. Its 
meaning may turn on whether we consider the dignity of an individual, a group, or the human race. 
 Individual dignity itself has been afforded three aspects (at least). It starts with personal autonomy. 
In general, the autonomy begins with the notion that as humans can make moral choices, they have 
‘unconditioned and incomparable worth’, or dignity.
92
 As such, humans ought to be treated as ends in 
themselves, never merely as means to an end.
93
 This lends itself to a notion of human autonomy: equality 
law protects an individual’s freedom of choice (e.g. choosing to practise a certain religion).
94
 Of course, 
excessive deference to individual autonomy tolerating excessive behaviour - such as bigamy, unrestricted 
abortion, and incitement to racial hatred - would necessitate the repeal of laws that restrict behaviour, 
including anti-discrimination laws. So, personal autonomy, in itself, cannot be a goal of equality law, as it 
could permit all manner of discriminatory conduct. 
 Personal autonomy can be connected to a notion of how an individual feels within a society: a 
person’s self-respect.
95
 Objections to this subjective approach are two-fold. First, the practical problem 
would be placing in the hands of judges an evaluation of a claimant’s feelings, leading to wildly different 
decisions depending on the judge’s empathy with the claimant. At a domestic level, judges have overcome 
                                                          
89
 Seldon v Clarkson, Wright & Jakes [2010] EWCA Civ 899, [22]-[24] affirmed with caution [2012] UKSC 16, 
[61]. 
90
 ‘Age Positive: Workforce management without a fixed retirement age’ (2011) page 12. < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130703133823/http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/workforce-mgt-without-fixed-retirement-
age.pdf > accessed 1 May 2017. Contrast the ECJ, which accepted that compulsory retirement of public prosecutors could ‘improve 
personnel management and thereby to prevent possible disputes concerning employees’ fitness to work beyond a certain age’: Case 
C-159/10 Fuchs v Land Hessen [2011] Pens. LR 335, [5], [53]. 
91
 R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483 (SCC) [19]-[24]. 
92
 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), (Hutchinson 1948) 434 – 440, especially 436. 
93
 See this ideal cited to hold that sentencing should not be based solely on a deterrent principle, bearing no 
proportion to the defendant’s culpability: in R v Dodo (2001) (5) BCLR 423; (2001) (3) SA 382 (South 
African Constitutional Ct) [38]. 
94
 See J Gardner, ‘On the Grounds of her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 OJLS 167, 169-174, who argues that 
Wintemute’s dual explanation for protected grounds, especially sexual orientation – immutability and 
fundamental choices (equating to sexual attraction and sexual activity) – has a common foundation of 
autonomy: ‘the ideal of a life substantially lived through the successive valuable choices of the person who 
lives it, where valuable choices are choices from among an adequate range of valuable options.’ (170). 
Wintemute’s theory can be found in R Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights. The United 
States Constitution, the European Convention, and the Canadian Charter (Clarendon Press 1997). 
95
 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford Univ. Press 1972) 62, 178, 440. See also Law v Canada [1999] 1 
SCR 497 (SCC) [53]. 
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this problem, but only by introducing an objective dimension. To the slightly different question of whether 
a claimant has suffered less favourable treatment for the purposes of direct discrimination, British judges 
ask if the claimant perceived the treatment as less favourable and was not unreasonable in doing so. In other 
words, it is not necessary that every reasonable person in the shoes of the claimant would have perceived 
that the treatment was unfavourable. Thus, in Gill v El Vino,
96
 it was reasonable for a woman to consider 
that bar service for men and waited table-service for women to be less favourable, because she was denied 
a choice, even though some women may have preferred that arrangement. In Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire v Khan
97
 it was reasonable for a job candidate to expect his current employer to provide a 
reference, even though it would have been negative and reduced his chances, and that most people in his 
position would have preferred that the reference was not provided. 
  Similarly, in the United States, courts have understood that even ‘an inadvertent racial slight 
unnoticed either by its white speaker or white bystanders will reverberate in the memory of its black victim’. 
Accordingly, the trier of fact must ‘walk a mile in the victim’s shoes’ to understand the effects.
98
 This 
subjective/objective approach was incorporated into Britain’s statutory definition of harassment,
99
 which 
applies to the question of whether or not the defendant’s conduct had the purpose or effect of ‘violating’ 
the claimant’s ‘dignity’.
100
 
 Even if the first objection can be met, albeit with a compromise, there remains a second objection, 
which is less easily overcome. Much of equality law is about ambition. It seeks to challenge and alter 
ingrained, outdated and/or pernicious values. The Civil Rights Act 1964 sought to address the de facto 
racial segregation and discrimination in many walks of life in the United States. Britain’s Equal Pay Act of 
1970 was an expression of changing values: women were no longer to be regarded as secondary earners in 
a nuclear family. More recently, legislation enacts the notion that childbirth and child-rearing is no longer 
sole responsibility of the mother; employers, fathers, and the state, all had a role to play.
101
 These statutes 
challenged the status quo, which was accepted by many of those they were passed to protect, or liberate. 
At the time, and in diminishing numbers since, some women would have no expectation to anything better, 
and thus had not perceived their dignity as undermined by inferior pay or the one-sided parental 
responsibilities. There are countless examples of members of groups who suffer discrimination actually 
resisting a change to their circumstances: women campaigned against having the vote,
102
 and led anti-
                                                          
96
 [1983] QB 425 (CA). 
97
 [2001] UKHL 48 (a case on victimisation under the RRA 1976). Discussed below, p 107. 
98
 Harris v International Paper 765 F Supp 1509, 1515-1516 (vacated on other grounds 765 F Supp 1529) 
(1991), citing in support: Lawrence, ‘The id, the ego, and equal protection: reckoning with unconscious 
racism’ 39 Stan L Rev 317 (1987); Matsuda, ‘Public response to racist speech: considering the victim’s 
story’ 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2326-35 (1989); Williams, ‘Alchemical notes: reconstructing ideals from 
deconstructed rights’ 22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 401, 406-13 (1987) (explaining why black and white 
apartment-seekers assume different perspectives on the formalities of renting an apartment). 
99
 Equality Act 2010, s 26(4) although there is leeway here over the precise meaning afforded to the 
objective element. See M Connolly, Discrimination Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 134-138. 
100
 See e.g. Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal (2009) ICR 724 (EAT) [15]. Decided under RRA 1976, s 3A. 
101
 See e.g. Recast Directive 2006/54/EC, Recitals 11, 26, and art 16; Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1055. 
102
 See e.g. Helen Kendrick Johnson, Women and the Republic (Bibliobazaar 2006, orig 1897). A referendum, held in 1895 in 
Massachusetts asking women to vote for suffrage, polled only 22,204 (under 4 per cent) out of an estimated 575,000 women in the 
state: Molly Elliot Seawell, ‘Two Suffrage Mistakes’ North American Review (1914) vol 199, No. 700, March, 366-382, 380. 
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abortion campaigns,
103
 whilst South Africa’s Black Consciousness movement had black dignity as its 
principal goal, above the abolition of apartheid.
104
 If dignity is the basis of equality law, it follows that these 
dissenters (and perhaps the apathetic) were incapable of holding a sense of self-worth.
105
 Of course, quite 
the opposite is true. The dissenters saw the equality law as paternalistic, and something diminishing, or 
threatening, or secondary to, their personal sense of dignity. 
 Thus, a subjective notion of dignity does not account for the ambition of equality law to challenge 
and change existing values, no matter how ingrained in some they may be. How any particular individual 
feels about this ambition is less important than a societal goal to achieve a change in values and liberate 
people from their own expectations. 
 This leads to a consideration of group dignity, or even the dignity of the human race, which in the 
examples above, appear to trump a (dissenting) individual’s dignity, even though the individual belongs to 
the group. More extreme, paternalistic, examples would be banning a willing, well-paid and well-protected, 
dwarf from participating in ‘dwarf-throwing’,
106
 or forcing a blood transfusion upon a Jehovah’s Witness.
107
 
Here dignity of the human race would appear to trump individual, or even group, dignity. 
 Once placed in the legal arena, the notions of dignity of the individual, the group, and the human 
race, to some degree, are in conflict. Hence, although notions of dignity have a part to play in understanding 
discrimination law, they cannot operate as a unifying theory for equality law. Of course, individual or group 
indignity can trigger society’s compassion to address the matter as one of inequality, which is discussed 
next. 
   
4.  Equality, Pluralism, and Compassion 
Wasserstrom
108
 has presented three alternative goals of ‘equality’ law. The first is the assimilationist model. 
Here, in a non-racist society, a person’s race is the ‘functional equivalent’ of their eye colour. This is less 
easy to present in respect to sex, disability and religion, where there are accepted differences that 
                                                          
103
 For instance, Minnesota Congresswoman and presidential nominee, Michele Bachmann, is a leading 
‘pro-life’ campaigner and denigrates Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973) the seminal Supreme Court ‘pro-
choice’ decision on abortion. See < http://bachmann.house.gov/Biography/ > accessed 16 April 2014; 
Bachmann has since left Congress, see now M Bachmann, Core of Conviction (Senitel 2011) pp 2-4, 47, 
58, 127 and < http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/10411#bibliography > accessed 1 May 2017. 
104
 S Biko, I Write What I Like (Heinemann 1987) 22, urging (metaphorically) blacks to reject invitations by white liberals to ‘come 
round for tea at home’. See also JL Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid (Russell Sage Foundation Publications 2006) 79-82, considering 
a survey where one half of whites and one third of blacks considered that in principle apartheid was a good idea. Of course, most 
disfavoured its implementation in South Africa, and notions of racial hierarchy. 
105
 Feldman envisages only a narrow class unable to cultivate their sense of dignity, such as very young 
children and people in a persistent vegetative state: D Feldman, ‘Human dignity as a legal value’ Part I 
[1999] PL 682, 686. 
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 Ban upheld by the Conseil d'Eta: CE, ass, 27 October 1995, Cne de Morsang-sur-Orge , Dalloz Jur. 
1995, p 257; CE, ass, 27 Oct. 1995, Ville d’Aix-en-Provence, Rec. CE, p 372; Dalloz Jur., 1996, p 177, with 
annotation by G Leberton. Cited by Feldman, ibid 701. 
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 The case of Mme X in Cour administrative d'appel de Paris, where it was argued that the dignity of humanity prevailed over the 
autonomy of the individual, although dignity was not mentioned in the judgment upholding the transfusion: CAA Paris, form. plén., 
9 juin 1998 (Mme X … ) Dalloz Jurisprudence, 1999, p 277, note by Dr Gilles Pellissier at 281, citing, inter alios, B Edelman, ‘La 
dignité humaine, un concept nouveau’, Dalloz Chron., 1997, p 185. Cited by Feldman, [1999] PL 682 701. 
108
 R Wasserstrom, ‘Racism, sexism and preferential treatment: an approach to the topics’ (1977) 24 UCLA 
L Rev 581, 585–589. 
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characterise these groups. The second is diversity. Here genuine differences, say between religions, are a 
‘positive good’. It would be a worse society if everyone were a member of one religion. The third is 
tolerance. Here, there is nothing intrinsically positive about diversity, but tolerance outweighs the evils of 
achieving homogeneity. 
 The second and third of these goals align with current policy in North America and the European 
Union, with a celebration and tolerance of multiculturalism. It is true that in recent years, some European 
leaders have criticised ‘state multiculturalism’,
109
 but there is yet to be a formalised alternative. Moreover, 
at the same time, the discrimination legislation has extended its reach to the recognition of more mutable 
characteristics, such as religion or belief, and manifestations related to religion, as well as transsexualism 
and sexual orientation,
110
 thus celebrating and tolerating an individual’s choice of culture, and with it, even 
more diversity. 
 But slogans commonly used by governments in search of these goals, such as different but equal 
and equality and diversity
111
 appear paradoxical, giving the law the delicate task of achieving both equality 
and diversity. Wasserstrom suggests that this may be achieved with celebration or tolerance. Of course, in 
reality a dose of both is required. It suggests that the key is psychological, or emotional, rather than formal. 
Human rights law - including anti-discrimination rubrics - originates, partly at least, from human 
compassion, or the milk of human kindness. People generally have a sense of compassion, especially for 
the underdog. This appears at odds with the resistance by ordinary (so presumably decent) people to much 
discrimination law, especially positive action programmes
112
 and the truism that anti-discrimination laws 
are enacted to combat prejudices in mainstream society. The comments by Lords Woolf and Browne-
Wilkinson at the beginning of this chapter reveal that the general public’s perception is important in 
defining the law. But in complex societies where so much disadvantage is invisible to an uninformed public, 
this is no more useful than asking for a jury’s opinion after providing it with newspapers instead of the 
evidence. The notion falls well short of an ideal. This implies that there is a duty on politicians and the 
judiciary to educate the public in the real disadvantages that exist in their society, so triggering their innate 
human compassion. The neglect of this duty is perhaps most sadly apparent with immigration and asylum. 
Mainstream politicians commonly and quite comfortably inform the public of problems associated with 
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 See e.g. David Cameron’s Munich Speech: 
 < http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130109092234/http://number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-
conference/ >; M Weaver ‘Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has “utterly 
failed”’ The Guardian (London, 17 October 2010) < http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=UKG76HF24_k&feature=related > Each accessed, 1 May 2017. 
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 Respectively, e.g. wearing of religious symbols, ‘presenting’, and same-sex relationships. 
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 Government consultation documents on discrimination law have employed this phrase, e.g. DTI, Equality 
and Diversity: Coming of Age (July 2005, DTI/Pub 7851/3k/07/05/NP. URN 05/1171); Women and 
Equality Unit, DTI, Equality and Diversity: Updating the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (March 2005); 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the Employment and 
Race Directives (Dec 2001); Government Equalities Office ‘Closing the Gender Pay Gap. Government 
Consultation’ (February 2016) 43 (‘diversity and equality’) < 
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 In the 2004 general election, in a core Labour constituency, Peter Law resigned from the Labour Party in protest at the selection of 
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with a majority of 9,000: The Times (London, 6 April 2004). In 2006 the Labour Party issued an apology to the electorate ‘for getting 
it wrong’ (The Independent (London, 8 May 2006). 
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asylum seekers
113
 but rarely explain a traumatic story behind any plea for sanctuary. Similarly, politicians 
shamelessly express ‘populist’ but pernicious opinions on minority groups such as Romanies and 
Travellers.
114
 This breeds cynicism rather than compassion, which in turn feeds into the legal 
interpretations, as Lords Woolf and Browne-Wilkinson have confirmed. 
 The judiciary can take a lead as well. For the law to be structured around human compassion is 
not as fanciful as it first seems. As noted above, the Canadian Supreme Court at one time developed its 
human rights jurisprudence around the theme of ‘human dignity’, as does the South African Constitution. 
Also noted above is the US Supreme Court’s practice of identifying the ‘underdog’ for constitutional 
protection against discrimination. These observations about the state of groups in society are as loaded with 
compassion as they are with intellectual rigour. This attempt at defining legally the underdog shows that 
positive human emotions can be identified and realised in law. 
  
5. Statutory Purpose 
If anything from this rather broad range of theories is to inform judiciary seeking sound and consistent 
judgments, it must be sieved and sorted, or even funnelled, to produce some relatively simplistic political 
and intellectual consensus on the statutory purpose to be understood in the interpretive process. As noted 
above, the political consensus centres on a celebration of multiculturalism, along with a tolerance of the 
consequent differences. For these aims to be realised in law, something more detailed is required. 
 Britain’s dedicated anti-discrimination legislation, now consolidated by the Equality Act 2010, 
covers a number of grounds, such as race, sex, transsexualism, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age, 
and disability. The background, and consequent ambition and purpose of the legislation may vary, 
depending on the protected characteristic and particular problem involved. But they have in common 
patterns of disadvantage, represented say, by under-achievement or poor participation in certain civil 
activities and environments, such as education, employment, and housing. There is a political consensus 
that these patterns are signs of failure, and so should be addressed with ideals of formal and substantive 
equality. There are multiple tools to do this, such as economic and social policy, strategic enforcement, and 
of course, providing causes of action for discrimination, the subject of this study.  
 The notions of formal and substantive equality are loosely represented by the principal causes of 
action, direct and indirect discrimination, respectively. These legal tools of addressing patterns of 
disadvantage must be understood within the confines of binary litigation. This is a challenging, if not 
unique, proposition, given the Act’s societal ambitions. This law must extend beyond the common law’s 
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 There are countless examples. In 2002, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, observed that the children of asylum seekers were 
‘swamping’ some schools: The Times (London, 25 April 2002). In 1972 it was observed that the Government’s ‘ambivalent’ policy 
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 See Royce Turner, ‘Gypsies and British Parliamentary language: an analysis’ (2002) 12 Romani Studies, 
pp 1-34, who summarises that they are portrayed in Parliament as: ‘dishonest, criminal, dirty’. For an 
account of the Coalition’s ‘offensive’ on Gypsies and travellers, see J Grayson, ‘Playing the Gypsy “race 
card”’ (2010) Institute of Race Relations June 4, 2010, < http://www.irr.org.uk/2010/june/ha000020.html 
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traditional mind-set of an at-fault tortfeasor causing harm to an individual victim, but not beyond the outer 
boundaries of the basic notion of a defendant, a cause and a victim. 
 The 1975 White Paper, Racial Discrimination noted, ‘...it is insufficient for the law to deal only 
with overt discrimination. It should also prohibit practices which are fair in a formal sense but 
discriminatory in their operation and effect’.
115
 This of course, has roots in the notion of indirect 
discrimination and Griggs v Duke Power
116
 (where a requirement for a high school diploma adversely 
affected African-Americans). But it tells us a number of more general things. First, that a precise cause is 
not necessary, as many patterns have multiple causes, many of which may not be known, or not within the 
control of the defendant. For instance, Duke Power qua employer could not be held responsible for the 
inferior segregated education. And second, although the claimant may need standing to sue, this need not 
be so for every member of the disadvantaged group,
117
 even though they may benefit from the remedy. 
Moreover, the preoccupation with the patterns of disadvantage enables interested non-group members to 
sue for discrimination (direct or indirect). This can include victims of the same disadvantage,
118
 or targeted 
‘associates’ of a protected group,
119
 or even those otherwise harmed by the discrimination.
120
 As the US 
Supreme Court once stated: ‘The [African American] on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim of 
discriminatory housing practices; it is...“the whole community”’.
121
 
 This liberal approach to causation and identifying a victim is also necessary when considering the 
required ‘culpability’ of the defendant. In fact, no culpability is required. The patterns of disadvantage can 
be caused by conduct ranging from openly hostile to completely benign. And so, for the law to address 
these patterns, the effect of conduct should be able to trump its apparent neutrality. Indeed, Griggs also tells 
us any sort of discriminatory intent is not required for indirect discrimination liability. This places even the 
notion of ‘institutional racism’
122
 some way up the culpability scale, as tacit approval of apparently benign 
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 Home Office, Racial Discrimination (Cmnd 6234, 1975) para 35. This explained the inclusion of indirect 
discrimination in the forthcoming Race Relations Act 1976, now consolidated in the Equality Act 2010. 
Emphasis supplied. 
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 (1971) 401 US 424 (US Sup Ct). See further, p 118. 
117
 Essop v Home Office [2017] UKSC 27 [27]. 
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See Explanatory Notes to the EA 2010, para 63. 
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ECR I-5187 (employer announced he would not employ immigrants). See Explanatory Notes to the EA 
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Home Secretary (Cm 4262-I, 1999) at paras 6.1 - 6.34. See above, p 51. 
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conduct, such as word of mouth hiring (‘help a friend’),
123
 or even well-intentioned conduct (most 
obviously, positive action), can have discriminatory effects.
124
 
 If mere conduct (including acquiescence) is all that is required, then defendants in such cases 
should not fear being stamped as racist or the like. In turn, judges should not fear finding liability out of a 
misplaced, or artificial, sympathy for the defendant, nor should they formulate their judgments in terms of 
blame or exculpation. In all, the established liberal approach to all three aspects (victim-cause-defendant) 
requires the courts not to be unduly constrained by the traditional common law tortfeasor and victim mind-
set. 
 The propositions in this section, rooted themselves in the various theories and aims, are embedded 
in the domestic equality legislation, either expressly, or by the obligatory EU legislation and case law, or 
by its (commonly US) antecedents. Moreover, the societal ambition of the legislation is express nowadays, 
with the Equality Act 2010 announcing its ambition ‘to increase equality of opportunity’ and to ‘strengthen 
the law to support progress on equality’.
125
 Thus, it is the judge’s obligation to use the Act as a progressive 
tool to reduce inequality within its bounds (most notably of protected characteristics and activities). As 
such, the judiciary should not fear taking a purposive approach to equality law; indeed, it is an obligation. 
As noted near the start of this section (on statutory purpose), the background, and consequent ambition and 
purpose of the legislation may vary depending on the particular circumstances. Some broader principles, 
flowing from the law’s effect-based ambition, are advocated here. More specific statutory purposes may be 
required according to the issue arising. These will be explored on a case-by-case basis after a consideration 
of the common law and equality. 
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 Suggested in Coker v Lord Chancellor [2002] ICR 321 (CA), [57]. cf Pel Ltd v Modgill [1980] IRLR142 
(EAT) See generally, ‘subjective hiring practices’, below, p 128 et al. 
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3 THE COMMON LAW AND EQUALITY 
  
A central argument of this thesis is that many interpretations of the discrimination legislation are technically 
flawed. The preceding chapters have accumulated some principles by which equality legislation ought to 
be interpreted. Chapter 1 also showed the judiciary to be perfectly familiar with the task of statutory 
interpretation per se. Less was expressed about the judiciary’s aptitude for this task with discrimination 
legislation. So, this chapter scrutinises the common law’s predisposition to address matters of equality. 
Chapter 1 noted the rise and fall of deference to Parliament and statutory wording, along with the 
corresponding inverted relationship to the judicial willingness to challenge the text of legislation. But the 
history of the common law and equality presents a different profile, which is detached from any patterns of 
deference. It is also detached from the espoused common law principles of morality. It shows the common 
law failing to engage with matters of equality, or when doing so, being overtly hostile, and that problems 
with statutory interpretation and equality predate the modern (post-1970) era of dedicated legislation. As 
such, it presents the judiciary as ill-disposed to the task presented by the wholesale legislative impositions 
presented in the 1970s, and offers some insights to the modern-day technical flaws. 
 
  
1. The Common Law and Morality 
From its earliest days, the common law has enshrined a moral dimension. In 1609 Coke CJ pronounced 
that law must be consistent with ‘common right and reason’.
1
 In 1774, Lord Mansfield declared: 
 
[W]hatsoever is contrary, bonos mores et decorum [good morals and propriety], the principles of 
our law prohibit, and the King's court, as the general censor and guardian of the public manners, 
is bound to restrain and punish.
2
 
 
 These opinions are not antique curiosities. Lord Mansfield’s sentiments were cited by the House 
of Lords in 1961. In Shaw v DPP,
3
 Viscount Simonds asserted that the court has ‘a residual power, where 
no statute has yet intervened to supersede the common law, to superintend those offences which are 
prejudicial to the public welfare.’
4
 Similarly, Lord Morris proclaimed:  
 
There are certain manifestations of conduct which are an affront to and an attack upon recognised 
public standards of morals and decency, and which all well-disposed persons would stigmatise 
                                                          
1
 Dr Bonham’s Case (1609) 8 Co Rep 113, 118 a; 77 ER 646, 652. See Ch 1, p 47, n 261. 
2
 Jones v Randall (1774) Lofft 383, 385; 98 ER 706, 707. See also Rex v Delaval (1763) 3 Burr 1434, 1438-1439; 97 ER 913, 915 
(Lord Mansfield). 
3
 [1962] AC 220 (HL). 
4
 ibid 268. 
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and condemn as deserving of punishment. The cases afford examples of the conduct of individuals 
which has been punished because it outraged public decency or because its tendency was to corrupt 
the public morals.
5
 
 
 In Shaw, the House of Lords used this residual power to bypass the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
and convict a person of a conspiracy to corrupt public morals for publishing a directory of prostitutes shortly 
after ‘street soliciting’ was outlawed (by the Street Offences Act 1959). One might suppose that these 
sentiments, appearing in the criminal law, would inform the civil law.
6
 And, further, one might suppose, 
that they would have been invoked by the common law to address, at least, the worst scenarios of 
discrimination, being rather obviously ‘prejudicial to the public welfare’ or tending to ‘corrupt the public 
morals.’
7
 But a brief history of the English common law shows, a laissez faire approach (at best) to racial 
and religious discrimination, the active disabling of women from participation in civil affairs, and manifest 
hostility towards homosexuality. 
  
2. Racial Discrimination 
At common law, it seems, racism is permissible save where it coincides with some other recognisable 
wrong. In Scala Ballroom v Ratcliffe
8
 the Court of Appeal observed that a ‘colour bar’ was a policy that 
the owners of a ballroom ‘were entitled to adopt in their own business interests’.
9
 There are some duties 
from medieval times placed by the common law upon the likes of innkeepers, common carriers and some 
monopoly enterprises such as ports and harbours, to accept all travellers and others who are ‘in a fit and 
reasonable condition to be received.’
10
 A rare (if not only) example of one of these duties coinciding with 
racial discrimination arose in Constantine v Imperial Hotels.
11
 Here, a black West Indian cricketer (and 
later a member of the Race Relations Board) was refused accommodation for fear of upsetting resident 
white American soldiers. The Kings Bench Division awarded Constantine nominal damages for the breach 
of the innkeepers’ duty to receive all travellers. 
 The common law attitude to slavery was less certain. It approached slavery with ambivalence and 
pragmatism, preferring to leave its legal status to Parliament. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it 
                                                          
5
 ibid 292. 
6
 In Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets [2016] UKSC 11 [45], the Supreme Court engaged ‘principles of social justice’ for 
deciding on the scope of common law vicarious liability. 
7
 In Rhys-Harper v Relaxion [2003] 2 CMLR 44 (HL) [78], Lord Hope commented that discrimination was 
‘morally unacceptable’. See further, below, p 77. 
8
 [1958] 3 All ER 220. 
9
 ibid 221, although, in the same laissez faire spirit, the Court refused an injunction to prevent the musician’s union from boycotting 
the ballroom. 
10
 See J Jowell, ‘Is Equality a Constitutional Principle?’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems (Part 2, Collected Papers) 1, 91. See also 
Lord Diplock, Dockers Labour Club and Institute Ltd v Race Relations Board [1976] AC 285 (HL) 295-296. 
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had inched from treating slaves as chattels,
12
 to the excruciating position of refusing to recognise several 
rights asserted by slave owners, but not outlawing slavery itself. Even in the case heralded as signalling the 
end of slavery, Somerset v Stewart,
13
 Lord Mansfield’s judgment was carefully confined to habeas corpus, 
and the jurisdiction of England, leaving alone the British slave owners (and the wealth they produced) in 
the colonies. This pragmatism was demonstrated most shamelessly in The Zong,
14
 where around 133 slaves 
were ‘jettisoned’ to preserve the remainder, as the ship was short of drinking water. The only legal 
proceedings that followed concerned the ship-owner’s insurance claim, based on the notion that the 
drowned slaves were insurable chattels. The claim succeeded and a retrial was ordered, but solely on the 
basis of new evidence that rain had fallen before all of the slaves were thrown overboard, and so there was 
no ‘necessity’, as required by insurance law. All the common law could manage in this notorious case of 
the slave trade was to preserve the commercial legal principle that it was lawful to jettison some of the 
cargo to save the remainder. The abolition of the slave trade, and subsequently, of slavery itself, was 
implemented by Parliament, not the courts.
15
 
  
3. Gender Discrimination 
In the meantime, the common law was more brazen with the rights of women, dictating that women were 
under a disability to perform public functions, even in the face of apparently contradictory legislation. Older 
cases provide plenty of examples. Women were not entitled to sit in the House of Lords,
16
 vote in 
Parliamentary elections,
17
 serve as a town, or county, councillor,
18
 or as a judge or juror,
19
 or practise law.
20
  
 Moreover, this common law, it seems, trumped statute. The Interpretation Act 1850,
21
 section 4, 
stated that: 
 
[I]n all Acts, words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, 
and the singular to include the plural, and the plural the singular, unless the contrary as to gender 
or number is expressly provided. 
 
The subsequent Representation of the People Act 1867, by section 3, provided that every ‘man’ shall be 
                                                          
12 Pearne v Lisle (1749) Amb 75; 27 ER 47, cf Smith v Gould (1706) 2 Lord Raymond 1274; 92 ER 338. 
13 (1772) Lofft 1, 98 ER 499. 
14
 Reported as Gregson v Gilbert (1783) 3 Dougl 232, 99 ER 629. 
15
 Respectively, Slave Trade Act 1807, Slavery Abolition Act 1833. 
16
 Viscountess Rhondda's Claim [1922] 2 AC 339 (HL). 
17
 Chorlton v Lings (1868) LR 4 C P 374. 
18
 Respectively R v Harrald (1871-72) LR 7 QB 361 (QB), Beresford-Hope v Sandhurst (1889) 23 QBD 79 
(CA). 
19
 Coke, 2 Inst. 119, 3 Bl. Comm. 362. See Edwards v Attorney General of Canada [1930] AC 124, 129 
(Lord Sankey LC). 
20
 Bebb v Law Society [1914] 1 Ch 286 (CA). 
21
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entitled to vote in Parliamentary elections. One would imagine the result was straightforward. But in 
Chorlton v Lings,
22
 the court of Common Pleas thought otherwise. The technical reason centred on section 
57 of the Representation of the People Act, which stated that ‘this Act, so far as is consistent with the tenor 
thereof, shall be construed as one with the enactments for the time being in force relating to the 
representation of the people...’ Accordingly, it was held, as the older election statutes expressly excluded 
women, it would be ‘consistent’ to interpret this one accordingly.
23
 The court was keen to avoid the situation 
where some constituencies (created by the new Act) would have female electors while others would not. 
This is a rather one-eyed approach. The court could just as easily be reasoned that where previous statutes 
(e.g. Reform Act 1832) expressly excluded women, the absence of such an expression in a later Act 
indicated that women were included. After all, the later statute was passed in the full light of the 
Interpretation Act 1850. The Court’s trump card was the common law disability of women to vote, which 
was a ‘very strong presumption’,
24
 for no better reason than it had been the practice for several centuries.
25
 
Without a hint of irony, Keating J proclaimed that ‘the injustice of excluding females from the exercise of 
the franchise ... is not a matter within our province. It is for the legislature to consider whether the existing 
incapacity ought to be removed.’
26
 Thus, it was within the province of the common law to ban women from 
voting, but not to permit it.  
 The presumption of disability was the sole reason for the decision in Nairn v University of St 
Andrews,
27
 where the House of Lords held that even the word person in section 27 of the Representation of 
the People (Scotland) Act 1868, did not include women, this time elevating the presumption to a 
‘constitutional principle’.
28
 Accordingly, ‘If it was intended to make a vast constitutional change in favour 
of women graduates, one would expect to find plain language and express statement.’
29
 Using similar logic, 
the Court of Appeal, in Bebb v Law Society,
30
 held that the Solicitors Act 1843 did not rebut the 
‘inveterate’
31
 common law presumption that women were disabled from practising law, despite section 43 
(of the same Act) stating ‘every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to 
a female’, unless ‘there be something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction’. 
  
                                                          
22
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23
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4. Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Until the very late (post-Thatcher) 20th century, attitudes to homosexuality were particularly hostile, as 
these two successful prosecutions demonstrate. In 1973, in Knuller v DPP,
32
 the publisher of a magazine 
carrying advertisements placed by homosexuals for the purpose of meeting possible sexual partners was 
convicted at common law of a conspiracy to ‘corrupt public morals’, despite the legality at the time of such 
sexual relations in private. Matters of equality and discrimination did not even arise in any of the House of 
Lords or Court of Appeal speeches. As in Shaw,
33
 the existence of otherwise exonerating legislation in this 
area,
34
 and even a subsequent undertaking to Parliament that such a common law offence would not be used 
to bypass the Act,
35
 did nothing to persuade the courts that the common law should step back.  
 In the meantime, public order law was being used to prosecute overt homosexual conduct without 
any resistance from the courts. In Masterson v Holden,
36
 in the early hours in Oxford Street, London, two 
men were seen embraced in a kiss at a bus stop. The witnesses were a pair of heterosexual couples, one of 
whom approached the men and shouted: ‘You filthy sods. How dare you in front of our girls?’ This outburst 
in the early hours attracted the attention of the police, who proceeded to arrest the gay couple. Their 
convictions for ‘insulting…behaviour…whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned’,
37
 were upheld 
by a two judge panel of the Queen’s Bench. The only nod to equality was buried in this rather lame comment 
from Glidewell LJ: ‘Overt homosexual conduct in a public street, indeed overt heterosexual conduct in a 
public street, may well be considered by many persons to be objectionable...’ Any gravitas of the equality 
element in this comment evaporated with his next sentence,  
 
[T]he display of such objectionable conduct in a public street may well be regarded by another 
person, particularly by a young woman, as conduct which insults her by suggesting that she is 
somebody who would find such conduct in public acceptable herself.
38
  
 
 Nowhere in the speeches was it suggested that the police had arrested the wrong persons for 
insulting behaviour causing a breach of the peace, which of course, described perfectly the act of the 
(heterosexual) witness, who had insulted the defendants at the top of his voice in the street at two o’clock 
in the morning. Even into the 21st century, an attitude of indifference to state hostility persisted, when the 
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33
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House of Lords refused to interfere with the policy of debasing, humiliating, and then discharging, 
homosexuals in military.
39
 
   
5. Religious Discrimination 
In Miller v Salomons,
40
 the Court of Exchequer upheld steep fines imposed upon a Jewish MP for refusing 
to complete the statutory ‘oath of abjuration’, ending ‘on the true faith of a Christian’.
41
 The majority 
accepted that the oath was so framed in earlier, more volatile, times, purposely to secure the allegiance of 
Roman Catholics, yet upheld the fines upon a literal interpretation. A second argument put by Salomons 
was that the statute itself was void for being obsolete. The oath required a recognition that King George 
was the rightful King. By the time the facts of this case arose, George III was long dead and Queen Victoria 
was the rightful Monarch. Upon this point, the deference to statutory wording vanished, and the whole court 
found no trouble substituting ‘George’ for ‘Victoria’ and ‘him’ for ‘her’, in order to resurrect the crime.  
 Such indifference to religious discrimination persisted into the 20th century, with the Chancery 
Court holding that a legacy excluding Jews and Roman Catholics was not contrary to public policy,
42
 and 
as late as 1976, the House of Lords did not consider a testamentary condition excluding Roman Catholics 
to offend public policy.
43
 
  
6. A Common Law Principle of Equality? 
The common law fared no better when required to engage more directly with principles of equality. In 
Roberts v Hopwood,
44
 Poplar Borough Council embarked upon an equal pay policy for its lowest paid 
workers. The policy was struck down by the House of Lords on the ground that the Council had been 
misguided ‘by some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a feminist ambition to secure the 
equality of the sexes in the matter of wages in the world of labour’.
45
 
 The introduction of discrimination legislation paradoxically reinforced this attitude, allowing the 
common law, apparently in deference to Parliament, to wash its hands of discrimination issues whenever 
the facts fell outside of an activity prescribed by the legislation. This is in stark contrast to its usual approach 
to matters of ‘morality’, where it readily would venture where even dedicated statutes would not tread.
46
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So even where there was patent
47
 or indirect
48
 sex discrimination by the immigration authorities the courts 
considered themselves powerless to act: ‘sex discrimination of itself is not unlawful. It is unlawful only in 
circumstances prescribed by the [Sex Discrimination Act 1975].’
49
 Similarly, the House of Lords rejected 
overt and extreme homophobic and sexual harassment by the state as causes of action, while noting that 
dedicated legislation outlawing such conduct, came ‘too late to assist’
50
 and that this ‘area of law’ was 
‘entirely a creature of statute’.
51
 In the post-war years of the 20th century, while the common law exercised 
itself with ‘outraging public decency’,
52
 ‘corrupting public morals’,
53
 and ‘insulting behaviour’,
54
 notices 
such as ‘No Blacks, No Irish, and No Dogs’ were displayed with apparent impunity.
55
 Coming on the back 
of the Holocaust and the defeat of Hitler, this blind spot on the common law ‘moral radar’ is perhaps all the 
more surprising. 
 As if this record of failure did not exist, from time to time, judges have suggested that the common 
law carries some form of equality principle. In Short v Poole Corporation,
56
 the Court of Appeal suggested 
that the courts could strike down as ultra vires any decision made by a public body made on ‘alien and 
irrelevant grounds’, such as a teacher being dismissed ‘because she had red hair, or for some equally 
frivolous or foolish reason’.
57
 Any hope inferred from this pronouncement was immediately crushed when 
the Court upheld a policy to dismiss married women teachers. Likewise, in Cumings v Birkenhead 
Corporation
58
 Lord Denning MR uttered a similar piety (including skin colour), only to disappoint when 
upholding a policy of confining Roman Catholic primary school children to Roman Catholic secondary 
schools. 
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 More recently, Lord Hoffman hinted that there exists an equality principle in the common law of 
a more substantive nature. In Matadeen v Pointu
59
 he said ‘that treating like cases alike and unlike cases 
differently is a general axiom of rational behaviour’, and thus irrational discrimination was subject to 
judicial review.
60
 In Arthur J Hall v Simons,
61
 he invoked a ‘fundamental principle of justice which requires 
that people should be treated equally and like cases treated alike’, as one of his reasons for holding that 
advocates, like any other professional, should enjoy no immunity from professional negligence claims, a 
private law matter. Lord Steyn has written that there is a ‘constitutional principle of equality developed 
domestically by English courts’ which is wider than the ‘relatively weak’ Article 14 of the ECHR.
62
 
However, arguments (based on these comments) that there exists at common law a general tenet against 
discrimination have so far found little favour in the courts’ decision-making, either being rejected or side-
lined. Lord Hoffman’s comments do no more than pronounce that irrational discrimination (like any 
irrational behaviour) could be subject to judicial review in public law;
63
 and any principle of equality does 
not add much, if anything, to a claimant’s Convention Rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.
64
 Indeed, 
Lord Steyn’s assertion must appear a little hollow to those, having lost their discrimination claims in the 
English courts, found success at Strasbourg, either under Article 14,
65
 or without even the need to resort to 
it.
66
 
A similarly unfulfilled ambition was once suggested by Lord Woolf: 
 
Suppose Parliament enacts a statute depriving Jews of their British nationality, prohibits marriages 
between Christians and non-Christians, dissolving marriages between blacks and whites or vesting 
the property of all red haired women in the State. Is it really suggested that English judges would 
have to apply such a law?
67
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All this came to nothing when a year later the Court of Appeal upheld a ban, partly entrenched in legislation, 
on homosexuals serving in the armed forces.
68
 
 As this brief history shows, notions that the common law would ever develop substantial anti-
discrimination principles are far from the reality, seen in the case law reasoning and decisions. Some insight 
into this negativity, especially in the private law field, was provided by Lord Diplock.
69
 Commenting on 
the Race Relations Act 1968, he lamented, 
 
This is a statute which, however admirable its motives, restricts the liberty which the citizen has 
previously enjoyed at common law to differentiate between one person and another in entering or 
declining to enter into transactions with them.
70
 
 
More recently, in Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group,
71
 Lord Hope provided a more palatable explanation: 
 
It is a remarkable fact that, although discrimination on whatever grounds is widely regarded as 
morally unacceptable, the common law was unable to provide a sound basis for removing it from 
situations where those who were vulnerable to discrimination were at risk and ensuring that all 
people were treated equally. Experience has taught us that this is a matter which can only be dealt 
with by legislation, and that it requires careful regulation by Parliament. ... The fact is that the 
principle of equal treatment is easy to state but difficult to apply in practice.
72
 
 
Lord Diplock’s comment hints that notions of equality interfere with the common law’s moral touchstone 
of individual liberty to choose with whom to deal. This might explain why the common law seemed all too 
willing to step into what it considered to be moral vacuums in other areas of public and private life and 
even promote inequality as a ‘constitutional principle’.
73
 Lord Hope’s slightly more up to date observation 
at least brings discrimination into the moral sphere of the common law. But excusing the common law for 
being just as useless because addressing discrimination was ‘too difficult’ renders his comment vacuous, 
as well as somewhat disingenuous. The ‘experience’ of which he speaks (but does not cite) has taught us 
that the common law was indifferent or positively hostile to matters of equality, as shown above. In none 
of those cases would applying a principle of equality have been too difficult. In some, in fact, it would have 
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amounted to a simpler interpretation of the legislation.
74
 Moreover, the European Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights, and the US Supreme Court each managed to produce a sophisticated 
jurisprudence from a rudimentary ‘equality’ rubric.
75
 Equality law was not ‘too difficult’ for these judges. 
We must then either accept that Lord Hope believed the English judiciary to be inferior to its overseas 
counterparts, or muse that there is some other excuse for the law’s detachment. 
  From this brief account, despite the declarations of concern for the public welfare and morals, it 
is clear that the common law was indifferent - and in some cases, hostile - to matters of equality. And this 
persisted despite dedicated legislation exemplifying a markedly different attitude towards discrimination. 
When Parliament in the 1970s signalled that discrimination fell within the sphere of morality, the courts 
used the legislation as cover for refusing to extend its anti-discrimination principles into other areas. This 
is in stark contrast to the blanket effect given to the principles lying within the Obscene Publications Act 
1959, seemingly against the express instruction within that Act.
76
 The only expressed reason for this 
reticence is that discrimination law is ‘too difficult’. As we shall see in the following chapters, leaving the 
matter to Parliament did not unburden the judiciary entirely of their apparent difficulties with the principle 
of equality. 
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 4 THE ‘BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE’ AND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
  
The preceding chapters have set a context, albeit somewhat pessimistic, for the main body of this work, 
which begins here. This is the first chapter (of the remaining four) to explore particular cases on key 
definitions of the modern discrimination legislation in this context of the common law, history, theories 
and concepts, and most notably, the principles and rules of statutory interpretation. The purpose of these 
chapters is to explain the relative simplicity of the cases, and expose the technical flaws and apparent lack 
of expertise in the judgments. 
 The focus of this chapter is on the legislative definition of direct discrimination, and in particular, 
an importunate insistence by some judges that a discriminatory motive is a necessary ingredient for liability. 
This is notable in cases where defendants have argued that there existed a benign, benevolent, or alternative 
motive for their action. This chapter explores how these arguments have been addressed, and concludes 
that the notion of discriminatory motive in this sense is based on a flawed statutory interpretation and an 
ignorance of the basic tenets of the symmetrical model of direct discrimination employed by the legislation. 
It also finds that judgments rejecting such an approach are themselves flawed. It is not surprising then, that 
many relatively simple cases have become a muddle of dissents, uncertainty, and prolixity. 
  
1. Direct Discrimination and Motive 
The legislation 
In its simplest form, direct discrimination arises when a defendant expressly links the victim’s protected 
characteristic (say, sex) with his less favourable treatment of her. For instance, a job advertisement may 
read: ‘Librarians wanted, no women need apply.’ In reality, most cases, being multifaceted, are not as 
straightforward as that, as we shall see. There is no general (objective justification) defence to direct 
discrimination (except for age),
1
 only specific exceptions for a particular field, such as employment,
2
 the 
provision of goods, facilities, or services,
3
 premises,
4
 or education.
5
 These are very limited defences, and 
so a finding of direct discrimination can be an all-or-nothing affair. 
 The EU equality directives adopted this formula for direct discrimination: 
  
...where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or would 
be treated in a comparable situation...
6
 
  
The formulas for other grounds are substantially the same, as is the domestic version given by section 13(1) 
of the Equality Act 2010, which (save for pregnancy cases), uses this single definition: 
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A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B 
less favourably than A treats or would treat others. 
  
This replaced the previous formula, which was expressed thus: 
 
...a person discriminates against a woman if- 
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a man ...
7
 
 
A similar formula was used for race: ‘on racial grounds he treats that other less favourably than he treats or 
would treat other persons...’
8
 
 These formulas have in common two broad elements: (a) ‘treats less favourably’ and (b) ‘because 
of a protected characteristic.’ The phrase ‘because of’ replaced the one used in previous legislation, e.g. ‘on 
the ground of’. The Explanatory Note (61) to the Equality Act 2010 stated that this ‘does not change the 
legal meaning of the definition’. It was merely ‘designed to make it more accessible to the ordinary user of 
the Act.’ Thus, there should be no difference between the older and newer cases on this basis. It is under 
this element that some judgments have pursued the notion that direct discrimination requires a hostile, or 
discriminatory, motive on the part of the defendant, thus making room for a benign motive ‘defence’. The 
main scrutiny in this chapter falls upon the JFS case,
9
 and first, James v Eastleigh,
10
 which is set in the 
context of the rise and fall of the but for test. 
  
The emergence of the but-for test 
The matter of discriminatory motive and the definition of direct discrimination came to the House of Lords 
for the first time in 1989. In R v Birmingham City Council, ex p Equal Opportunities Commission,
11
 there 
was a general trend over a number of years to move away from (selective) grammar schools towards (non-
selective) comprehensive schools. Small pockets of resistance ensured that a few remained, the majority of 
which were exclusive for boys. So the Council found itself in the position of having more grammar school 
places for boys than for girls. The Equal Opportunities Commission argued that the Council’s consequent 
allocation of places directly discriminated against girls. So the question became whether the allocation of 
grammar school places was ‘on the ground of’ sex. The Council argued that, for liability, there had to be 
an intention or motive to discriminate on the ground of sex, which was absent here. A unanimous House of 
Lords concurred with Lord Goff’s speech rejecting that argument: a but for test showed that the council 
offered fewer places to girls on the ground of their sex. 
                                                          
7
 SDA 1975, 1(1)(a).  
8
 RRA 1976, s 1(1)(a). The substantial difference is the absence of the possessive adjective her or his, which 
is not relevant to this discussion. 
9
 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC). 
10
 [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL). 
11
 [1989] AC 1155 (HL).  
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 It was couched in this way: ‘would the complainant have received the same treatment from the 
defendant but for his or her sex?’
12
 The point of this ‘objective and not subjective’
13
 approach was to avoid 
questions of defendants’ discriminatory intent, or ‘benign motive’. Otherwise it would be a good defence 
for a defendant to show that he discriminated not because of a hostile intent, but (for example) because of 
customer preference, or to save money, or avoid controversy.
14
 
 A year or so after the Birmingham City Council case, in James v Eastleigh Borough Council,
15
 
only a bare majority held this line. This is where the but for test began to unravel, albeit for spurious reasons. 
These relate to three themes in the speeches. First, the but for test was poorly expressed. Second, Lord 
Lowry’s dissent took this at face value, and used it to debunk the test, leaving the way clear to introduce a 
requirement of discriminatory motive. Third, Lord Griffiths’ dissent promoted an inappropriate 
‘benevolence defence’. Moreover, the whole House largely ignored the foundation issue of whether such 
case should be analysed as direct or indirect discrimination.  
 In James, the Council’s municipal swimming baths admitted free-of-charge persons ‘of 
pensionable age’. In the United Kingdom at the time, the state pension age was 65 for men and 60 for 
women.
16
 So when Mr and Mrs James, each aged 61, visited the baths, Mrs James was admitted free whilst 
Mr James was required to pay. Mr James complained that he had been treated less favourably on the ground 
of his sex. The Council argued that the policy was motivated not by sex, but by a wish to help pensioners. 
The county court found for the Council. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, expressly agreeing with 
the Council’s reasoning, but a bare majority of the House of Lords reversed, seemingly adhering to the but 
for test.
17
 Before considering other aspects of the majority decision, it is worth considering the speech that 
dedicated the most attention to the but for test, which was Lord Lowry’s dissent. 
 Lord Lowry offered a meticulous grammatical interpretation of the statutory formula (SDA 1975, 
section 1(1)(a) above), and pointed out that ‘ground’ was attached to the treatment, which was the act of 
the discriminator: 
 
On reading section 1(1)(a), it can be seen that the discriminator does something to the victim, that 
is, he treats him in a certain fashion, to wit, less favourably than he treats or would treat a woman 
and he treats him in that fashion on a certain ground , namely, on the ground of his sex. These 
words, it is scarcely necessary for me to point out, constitute an adverbial phrase modifying the 
transitive verb ‘treats’ in a clause of which the discriminator is the subject and the victim is the 
object. ... the point I wish to make is that the ground on which the alleged discriminator treats the 
victim less favourably is inescapably linked to the subject and the verb; it is the reason which has 
                                                          
12
 [1989] AC 1155 (HL) 1194; James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL) 765 (Lord Goff). 
13
 Nagarajan v LRT [2000] 1 AC 501 (HL) 511 (Lord Nicholls). 
14
 R v Birmingham City Council, ex p EOC [1989] AC 1155 (HL) 1194 (Lord Goff) citing R v Commission 
for Racial Equality ex p Westminster City Council [1985] ICR 827 (CA). 
15
 [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL). 
16
 Under the Pensions Act 2011, women’s State Pension age will increase to 65 between April 2016 and November 2018. From 
December 2018, the State Pension age for both men and women will start to increase and reach 66 by October 2020. 
17
 [1990] 2 AC 751, 774 (Lord Goff) 765 (Lord Bridge). Lord Ackner agreed with both Lord Goff and Lord 
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caused him to act.
18
 
 
 Lord Lowry then turned to the dictionary for the meaning of ‘ground’: 
 
‘A circumstance on which an opinion, inference, argument, statement or claim is founded, 
or which has given rise to an action, procedure or mental feeling; a reason, motive. Often 
with additional implication: a valid reason, justifying motive, or what is alleged as such.’
19
 
 
Consequently, Lord Lowry endorsed Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s opinion in the Court of Appeal: ‘In my 
judgment section 1(1)(a) is looking to the case where, subjectively, the defendant has treated the plaintiff 
less favourably because of his or her sex.’
20
 The inevitable conclusion was that direct discrimination carries 
a subjective element. But Lord Lowry was minded to endorse the Birmingham City Council case, and the 
rejected benign motive ‘defences’ alluded to above. In other words, his interpretation would provide the 
same result. For instance: 
 
If a men’s hairdresser dismisses the only woman on his staff because the customers prefer to have 
their hair cut by a man, he may regret losing her but he treats her less favourably because she is a 
woman, that is, on the ground of her sex, having made a deliberate decision to do so.
21
 
 
 This prompts the question of why provide an alternative test if the result would be the same? The 
answer lies, of course, in the facts of James. Moreover, it is rooted in what Lord Lowry feared. The but for 
test was wrong because, 
 
[it] relieves the complainant of the need to prove anything except that A has done an act which 
results in less favourable treatment for B by reason of B’s sex, which reduces to insignificance the 
words ‘on the ground of’.
22
 
 
In other words, instead of asking ‘What was the ground of the treatment?’ the but for test would encourage 
tribunals to ask, ‘Did the treatment disfavour her because she has a protected characteristic?’ The difference 
between these questions is illustrated by considering the two principal types of discrimination: direct and 
indirect. Indirect discrimination was developed to catch cases where an apparently neutral practice causes 
an adverse effect upon a protected group. Take the classic case of indirect discrimination from the United 
States, Griggs v Duke Power: an employer’s requirement that its workers have a high school diploma 
                                                          
18
 ibid 775. 
19
 ibid citing OED, 2nd ed. (1989) vol VI, p 876. 
20
 ibid 776 citing [1990] 1 QB 61 (CA) 74. 
21
 ibid 779. 
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adversely affected African-Americans, who had a history inferior schooling.
23
 A black applicant, without a 
diploma, was disfavoured by the requirement because inter alia he was black; had he been white, he would 
have had a better chance of meeting the requirement. Now suppose a case of direct discrimination: an 
employer states simply: ‘No blacks need apply’. In either case it could be said that that but for his race the 
African-American applicant would have been recruited. But something more is needed for liability in the 
latter (direct discrimination) case, otherwise it cannot be distinguished from the high school diploma case 
of indirect discrimination. As Lord Lowry interprets it, the but for test cannot distinguish between direct 
and indirect discrimination. Its chief proponent, Lord Goff, seemed to appreciate this, and ‘stressed’ that 
the test should be confined to cases of direct discrimination.
24
 With respect, if one has to identify direct 
discrimination before applying a test designed to identify the very same thing, the test is flawed. In terms 
of statutory interpretation, Lord Goff grasped the purpose of avoiding benign motive defences, but then 
implemented it with an unnecessary and flawed gloss on the statutory language which would have no lasting 
credibility.
25
 
 But Lord Lowry’s criticism is a somewhat overreaction. A slight variation on Lord Goff’s formula 
would resolve Lord Lowry’s particular difficulty. Instead of asking whether the claimant would have 
received the treatment but for a protected characteristic, one should ask would the defendant have treated 
the claimant so, but for a protected characteristic? This shifts the focus from the effect of the treatment to 
the cause, and without much ado, resolves Lord Lowry’s difficulty, which was not with the test per se, but 
with the imprecision with which it was expressed. The first question cannot distinguish between direct and 
indirect discrimination. The second question can.  
 On this basis, Lord Lowry’s interpretation was no different from the but for test, more properly 
expressed. That he came to a different result to the majority is down to an additional requirement. It will be 
recalled that Lord Lowry illustrated his endorsement of Browne-Wilkinson’s LJ ‘subjective’ approach,
26
 
with his ‘hairdresser’ example (above), which ended with these words: ‘...he treats her less favourably 
because she is a woman, that is, on the ground of her sex, having made a deliberate decision to do so’.
27
 
Without this final phrase, Lord Lowry’s example should be harmless enough. This was Lord Lowry’s 
reason to reject Mr James’ claim, as the council’s intention was to treat him less favourably because of his 
(pensionable) age, and not his sex.
28
 Thus, for Lord Lowry’s speech, the demolition of the but for test was 
less about its ability to distinguish direct from indirect discrimination, and more about removing the 
obstacle to consideration of the defendant’s subjective intent.  
 Demanding deliberate treatment on the ground of sex narrows the scope of direct discrimination 
and would exclude, inter alia, subconscious discrimination and stereotyping. This unnecessary additional 
                                                          
23
 401 US 424 (Sup Ct, 1971). The employer here will have the opportunity to ‘justify’ the requirement, by 
showing that the diploma was necessary for the job. 
24
 James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751, 774. 
25
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requirement would significantly reduce the efficacy of the statutory definition. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
later observed in Glasgow CC v Zafar, ‘those who discriminate on the grounds of race or gender do not in 
general advertise their prejudices: indeed, they may not even be aware of them.’
29
 In other words, most 
instances of direct discrimination are not ‘deliberate’. As such, Lord Lowry’s interpretation read words into 
the section (which are not even required by the dictionary definition he cited), cannot fully address the 
mischief, nor serve the purpose of the legislation (which applies irrespective of motive). In other words, it 
fails on all mainstream canons of statutory interpretation. 
 Also dissenting, Lord Griffiths simply agreed with Lord Lowry’s speech and presumably with his 
disapproval of the but for test. But Lord Griffiths added for his own part a less technical approach. He 
reasoned that the disparate state pension age resulted in women being less well off than men at 60. On that 
basis,  
 
[W]hat I do not accept is that an attempt to redress the result of that unfair act of discrimination 
by offering free facilities to those disadvantaged by the earlier act of discrimination is, itself, 
necessarily discriminatory ‘on grounds of sex’.
30
 
 
 The conclusion is built on a half-truth (that retired women are less well off). The disparate 
retirement ages may well be discriminatory, but not necessarily in favour of men. In terms of disadvantage, 
compulsory retirement is double edged, and something resisted by some workers, but positively embraced 
by others. Although these issues were not within the UK (legal) domain at the time of James, they were 
well-developed in both Canada and the United States.
31
 And as recent experience shows, women are 
resisting the raising (and concurrent equalising) of their retirement age.
32
 For Lord Griffiths, the benign 
motive to redress discrimination caused by the disparate state pension ages was the key. As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, he observed that Parliament must have been aware of concessions given to 
pensioners when passing the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act, and so concluded ‘I cannot believe that it was 
the intention of Parliament that this benevolent practice should be declared to be unlawful....’
33
 
 That the courts ought to be able to sanction any scheme designed to redress past or existing 
disadvantage drives the proverbial coach and horses through the conventional notion that the direct 
discrimination formula provides a formal equality model, symmetrical in nature, available not only to the 
principal target groups (e.g. racial minorities and women) but also to their generally advantaged 
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30
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31
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counterparts (whites and men).
34
 The logical consequence of measures addressing disadvantage is they 
would disfavour the generally advantaged groups, and are thus prima facie unlawful as direct 
discrimination. That is why otherwise directly discriminatory measures used to redress past discrimination 
or underrepresentation were catered for on a strictly limited basis elsewhere in the Act.
35
 Given the 
presumption that sections within the same statute should be construed consistently,
36
 it would take more 
than a generalised assumption of Parliamentary intent to rebut the presumption that SDA 1975, section 1, 
did not permit a range of positive actions where these were expressly catered for elsewhere in the statute, 
and, moreover, expressed within very strict boundaries. Lord Griffiths’ speech showed no awareness of this 
context. 
 Thus, his conclusion was based on a half-truth, ignored other parts of the statute, and displayed a 
lack of understanding of a basic tenet of the legislation before him. It also attributed an intention to 
Parliament, that, had he recourse to Hansard, he would have seen did not exist, or at least not in the context 
of direct discrimination: during the passage of the Sex Discrimination Bill, the Government informed 
Parliament that such concessions should be objectively justified on the basis that they were indirectly, rather 
than directly, discriminatory.
37
  
  
Direct or indirect discrimination? 
This Government presumption (that this was indirect discrimination) hints at the real issue in James, which 
was marginalised as both sides debated the but for test. The case was brought principally to test if 
concessions for pensioners (which disfavoured those men aged 60-65) were permissible without specific 
statutory authority.
38
 The Plaintiff, supported by the Equal Opportunities Commission, argued the point 
solely on direct discrimination, not pleading indirect discrimination in the alternative. This assumes that 
(apart from the benign motive issue) such concessions would amount to direct discrimination. Thus, where 
say, an organisation introduced such a policy purely for tax purposes, or some other non-altruistic motive, 
it would amount to direct discrimination. 
 The complication in this case was that a concession for those of pensionable age is not a 
mainstream example of direct discrimination. It differs from the mainstream as it is a facially neutral policy 
incorporating a facially discriminatory factor from an independent source. More conventional ‘benign 
motive’ cases of direct discrimination present themselves as facially discriminatory conduct implemented 
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 This observation was made by Baroness Hale, JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC) [60]. On formal equality, see p 
52. 
35
 See SDA 1975, ss 47- 49; RRA 1976, ss 35-38. See also Hughes v Hackney LB (1986) unreported, London 
Central Industrial Tribunal, digested 7 EOR 27. Discussed by C McCrudden, ‘Rethinking Positive Action’ 
(1986) 15 ILJ 219, pp 233-34. In Hughes, a positive discrimination policy was struck down because inter 
alia the employer had compared its ethnic minority (under)representation with that of the borough, and not 
its recruitment area. See now, EA 2010, ss 104, 158 and 159, which may permit less exact comparisons. 
36
 Clarke v Kato; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance [1998] 1 WLR 1647 (HL). 
37
 HL Deb 14 July 1975, vol 362, cols 1016-17 (Lord Harris). 
38
 [1990] 2 AC 751, 760-761 (Lord Bridge). 
 4 Direct Discrimination 
 
88 
 
to fulfil a ‘benign’ motive, such as customer preference,
39
 chivalry
40
 appearing neutral,
41
 protecting women 
from workplace harassment,
42
 or protecting workers from violence.
43
 Thus, the real issue in James was 
whether a facially neutral policy incorporating a facially discriminatory factor should be classified as direct 
or indirect discrimination. In the context of the facts of James, this meant whether the policy could amount 
to direct discrimination irrespective of the benign motive; and if not, whether it could amount to indirect 
discrimination, which would afford the Council the opportunity to justify its policy.  
 Much less was said about this. As an afterthought, Lord Lowry suggested that the policy could be 
analysed as indirect discrimination because the legislative formula required that it was applied equally to 
all, and not that it ‘applies equally’ to all (in the sense that men and women are equally affected). As such, 
for Lord Lowry, this was no different to height or strength requirements, which would have equally 
predictable results.
44
 
 Of the majority, only Lords Bridge and Ackner gave the matter some (relatively brief) attention. 
Lord Bridge dismissed any notion of the policy amounting to indirect discrimination because (in contrast 
to Lord Lowry’s view) it was not applied equally to all.
45
 This of course, touches on the heart of the issue: 
does the incorporated factor convert a facially neutral policy into a directly discriminatory one? But this 
was as close as the House came to the matter. Instead, Lord Bridge addressed it as one of semantics: 
 
The expression ‘pensionable age’ is no more than a convenient shorthand expression which refers 
to the age of 60 in a woman and to the age of 65 in a man. In considering whether there has been 
discrimination against a man ‘on the ground of his sex’ it cannot possibly make any difference 
whether the alleged discriminator uses the shorthand expression or spells out its full meaning.
46
 
 
Thus, for Lord Bridge, the language used disguised the actual policy. And if the policy could similarly be 
described with facially discriminatory language, it must be directly discriminatory.  
 Lord Ackner incorporated the discriminatory factor before analysing the policy, rather than its 
wording, and so concluded: 
 
                                                          
39
 See the US case, Diaz v Pan Am 442 F 2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) certiorari denied, 404 US 950 (1971) 
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44
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45
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The policy itself was crystal clear - if you were a male you had, vis-à-vis a female, a five-year 
handicap. You had to achieve the age of 65 before you were allowed to swim free of payment, but 
if you were a female you qualified for free swimming five years earlier.
47
 
 
 Despite their differences, these two extracts go some way to recognising the particular facts in 
James. The reasoning within both is deceptively powerful, short-circuiting the heart of the matter as well 
as any need to consider a benign motive and the but for test: Mr James was asked to pay because he was a 
man; Mrs James was admitted free because she was a woman.  
  
The importunate dissenters 
This means that only Lord Goff’s speech in James actually resolved the issue using the but for test, making 
this in fact a pluralist rather than majority decision.
48
 It may have been that this began the decline of the 
test.
49
 But there were other factors as well. There was the technical problem, that (improperly expressed) it 
could not distinguish direct from indirect discrimination. There was also the spectacle of a council, in trying 
to benefit old age pensioners, being found ‘guilty’ of discrimination, which for many was a counter-intuitive 
outcome. 
 Given this spectacle and the polarised debate over the test, it was predictable that several judicial 
statements sympathetic to Lord Lowry’s dissent followed, suggesting a more subjective approach. First, 
comments arose in two cases on the parallel phrase by reason that in the victimisation provisions of the 
discrimination legislation.
50
 In Nagarajan v LRT,
51
 Lord Nicholls suggested: ‘Save in obvious cases, 
answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental processes of the alleged 
discriminator.’
52
 In his dissent, Lord Browne-Wilkinson went further and considered that the courts should 
not introduce: ‘something akin to strict liability ... which will lead to individuals being stamped as racially 
discriminatory ... where these matters were not consciously in their minds.’
53
 And as we saw in Chapter 2, 
in Khan v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, Lord Woolf MR commented: 
 
To regard a person as acting unlawfully when he had not been motivated either consciously or 
unconsciously by any discriminatory motive is hardly likely to assist the objective of promoting 
harmonious racial relations.
54
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 On appeal, the House of Lords appeared to agree by holding that the question was ‘subjective’ and 
found the employer was not liable for victimisation because he had acted ‘honestly and reasonably,’
55
 a 
classic example of a benign motive defence. A year or so later, in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC,
56
 
neither the but for test, James v Eastleigh, nor the Birmingham City Council case were mentioned during 
five lengthy speeches over a claim of direct sex discrimination. Instead, the Law Lords asked why the 
claimant was treated so. What few other comments were made on the issue suggested that tribunals should 
look for a discriminatory motive,
57
 and that the relevant circumstances for the comparison
58
 should be those 
that the defendant took into account,
59
 again pointing to a subjective approach. The sentiment reaches into 
more recent times, with the Court of Appeal rejecting the ‘Cat’s Paw’ theory in one case,
60
 and presuming 
that direct discrimination required motive or intent (conscious or unconscious) in support of its doomed 
reason why theory for indirect discrimination.
61
 
  
Conclusion on James 
The case at least settled the pleaded matter: that concessions for those of state pension age amounted to 
direct sex discrimination and were unlawful as such.
62
 Aside from this, James produced five judgments rich 
in opinion and good intention, but wanting in mastery. The speeches failed in a number of ways. First, they 
did not identify and address the fundamental issue of whether this type of policy (facially neutral, 
incorporating a facially discriminatory factor from an independent source) should be analysed as direct or 
indirect discrimination. Second, Lord Lowry’s eventual demand for discriminatory intent, along with Lord 
Griffiths’s flirtation with positive action shared the characteristics of having no basis in the legislative 
language or purpose. Third, although the but for test was conceived with a statutory purpose in mind (to 
exclude benign motive defences), it was improperly expressed and thus vulnerable to the dissenters, starting 
with Lord Lowry, and continuing with those sympathetic to his dissent, or at least its sentiment. It is 
unsurprising then, that James also marked the beginning of the end for the but for test in direct 
discrimination law. 
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2. R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS 
Given the continuing judicial uncertainty, it is no surprise that the matter of a benign motive returned to the 
Supreme Court, despite having been discussed by the House of Lords a further five occasions following 
James.
63
 In R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS,
64
 eight speeches and a five-four split on 
this issue continued the division, although the majority speeches delivered some coherent guidance on the 
matter. 
  The case centred on the admissions policy of an Orthodox Jewish school. In addition to the ‘benign 
motive’ issue, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of racial group where several sub-groups are 
involved. For many of the speeches, the two issues were intertwined: for these Justices, it was not possible 
to identify the ground of the treatment without first identifying the protected characteristic of the claimant. 
And so this discussion of benign motives and the but for test inevitably is conflated with the meaning of 
race and ethnic origins. 
 The Jewish Free School’s admissions policy gave preference to children recognised as Orthodox 
Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR), which required that the child’s mother be Jewish either by 
matrilineal descent or by conversion under the OCR doctrine. The child, ‘M’, was refused admission 
because he did not meet these requirements. His Italian (previously Roman Catholic) mother was a Masorti 
Jew convert, a denomination not recognised by the OCR. His father brought claims of direct and indirect 
racial discrimination under the Education provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976), as ‘faith 
schools’ enjoyed an exemption from religious discrimination in their admissions.
65
 
 The High Court rejected his claim. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the admissions 
policy amounted to direct discrimination. The Supreme Court, by 5-4 majority (Lord Phillips PSC, 
Baroness Hale, Lords Kerr, Clarke and Mance, JJSC) affirmed, although of the minority (Lord Hope DPSC, 
Lords Rodger, Walker, and Brown JJSC), two (Lords Hope and Walker) found the policy indirectly 
discriminated, and so a 7-2 majority found in favour of M. (Lords Rodger and Brown found that any prima 
facie indirect discrimination was objectively justified.) Eight of the Justices gave reasoned speeches, with 
Lord Walker agreeing with Lord Hope. 
 The principal difficulty in this case is that being Jewish is both a religious and a racial matter. The 
principal issues were whether the admissions policy was religious and/or racial; and even if it were facially 
racial, whether the religious motive behind it rendered the ground of the treatment solely religious. Unlike 
James, the default position seemed to be that if it were not directly discriminatory, the policy would be 
analysed as indirect discrimination. 
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Identifying the ‘racial group’ 
Section 3(1) of the RRA 1976 defined ‘racial grounds’ to mean ‘colour, race nationality or ethnic or national 
origins’.
66
 In Mandla v Dowell Lee, Lord Fraser provided guidance on the meaning of ‘ethnic origins’.
67
 It 
contained two ‘essential’ and five further ‘relevant’ characteristics. The essential characteristics were: (1) 
a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the 
memory of which it keeps alive; and (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs 
and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance. The ‘relevant’ characteristics 
were: (1) a common geographical origin or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (2) a 
common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group; (3) a common literature peculiar to the group; (4) 
a common religion differing from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding 
it; and (5) being a minority, or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community. Lord 
Fraser noted that this definition could include converts. 
 It is not in dispute that Jews form a racial group by ethnic origins.
68
 The JFS case was argued over 
the ethnic status of Jewish sub-groups. The JFS defence rested on identifying two Jewish groups. First, the 
OCR group. Second, the Mandla group which is all practising Jews, or those recognisable by ‘the man in 
the street’.
69
 The Mandla ethnic group would exclude some ‘racially Jewish’
70
 who have long since 
abandoned the Jewish faith and may even be unaware of the genetic link. This is because they do not satisfy 
Lord Fraser’s two essential characteristics. Of course, these persons fell within the OCR group. The JFS 
argument ran that as the OCR definition includes persons not within the (Mandla) Jewish group, it cannot 
be based on ethnic origins, or race. It must be solely religious.
71
 
 Lord Phillips accepted the first part of this proposition but rejected its conclusion, noting: ‘The 
fallacy lies in treating current membership of a Mandla ethnic group as the exclusive ground of racial 
discrimination.’ The requirement for matrilineal descent (cases of conversion to one side) was ‘racial, and 
in any event, ethnic’.
72
 Hence, he concluded: ‘Discrimination against a person on the grounds that he or she 
is, or is not, a member of either group is racial discrimination.’
73
 
 Lord Kerr explained that although the claimant could be defined as Jewish according to the Mandla 
criteria, ‘belonging to that group is not comprehensive of his ethnicity.’
74
 There can be ‘mixed ethnic origins 
that do not fall neatly into one group or category’ and so the claimant also could define his ethnic origins 
as a half-Italian Masorti Jew;
75
 that was the ground of discrimination in this case. Similarly, Lord Clarke 
found that identifying the ground of treatment was not an either/or question (either religious or ethnic). The 
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definition of ethnic origins was more flexible. So it was possible to discriminate on both religious and ethnic 
grounds.
76
 Lord Mance suggested that the Orthodox Judaism could be regarded as a separate Mandla ethnic 
group,
77
 but in any case, M was at a disadvantage because of his descent.
78
 Baroness Hale held that ‘M was 
rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins, which were Italian and Roman Catholic.’
79
 
 At its heart, the decision means this: the JFS criteria included a racial element: those ‘racially 
Jewish’. This included those who had long since abandoned the Jewish religion, and could even be 
practising Roman Catholics, Buddhists, atheists, or indeed, Masorti Jews. No matter what other 
compensating elements were provided, this element was racial. If the claimant were racially Jewish, he 
would have been preferred no matter what his faith. If not, he would have to satisfy the (purely religious) 
‘convert test’. The wider comments call for some consideration. 
 The consideration begins with the notion of sub-groups and overlaps. Section 3(2) of the RRA 
1976 provided: ‘The fact that a racial group comprises two or more distinct racial groups does not prevent 
it from constituting a particular racial group for the purposes of this Act.’
80
 On the face of it, this prevents 
reducing each racial group to its smallest possible number. Thus, discrimination against ‘the Spanish’ would 
be actionable, even though that group comprises Basques and Catalans, among others. It is implicit in 
section 3(2) that this logic can be inverted. In Ealing LBC v Race Relations Board,
81
 Lord Simon suggested 
that within Great Britain, Scots, Welsh and English could each be defined by national origins.
82
 On this 
basis, ‘sub-groups’ such as Catalans, Basques, Walloons (Belgians of French origin), Sicilians, Bretons and 
the Cornish are definable by ethnic or national origins, and discrimination against one of these sub-groups 
would be actionable. 
 Lord Simon’s example also suggests that sub-groups can still exist even if they overlap. After all, 
the English, Welsh, and Scottish certainly overlap. This should also be the case with further sub-groups, 
such as the Cornish. But, when the JFS case was in the High Court, Munby J found ‘there is no evidence 
... to suggest that, for example, either Orthodox Jews or Masorti Jews (as opposed to Jews generally) have 
distinct ethnic origins.’
83
 The key word here is ‘distinct’. It means that to qualify under the Act, a racial 
group must have no (or very little) overlap with any other group. While this accorded with section 3(2), the 
sub-section could not be the basis of such a statement. Section 3(2) could only apply where there are distinct 
groups, which was not the finding of Munby J. It is also in no way exclusionary. It merely offers the courts 
an option of recognising a group as a whole, despite being made up of distinctive sub-groups. 
 In any case, Munby’s J view was not shared by the Supreme Court, where Lord Mance in particular 
disagreed: ‘That may be said to focus purely on ethnic origins in a way which the Mandla test was intended 
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to discourage.’
84
 Presumably, he means that the Mandla definition of ethnic origins is more fluid than that. 
In any case, the majority speeches confirm that a sub-group exists even if it overlaps with other sub-groups. 
 The fluidity of identifying sub-groups was illustrated in the United States case Walker v Secretary 
of the Treasury,
85
 where a predominantly dark-skinned black workforce discriminated against a light-
skinned black colleague. The Federal District Court found that Ms Walker could succeed under the Civil 
Rights Act 1964 in her claim for direct discrimination claim based solely on her colour (‘light-skinned 
black’ being a sub-group of, and overlapping with, ‘black’). The Court cited Felix v Marquez,
86
 where it 
was noted that ‘colour’ may be the ‘most practical’ claim where the victim has mixed heritage. 
 The logical extension of this approach is that there can be liability even where a racial group 
discriminates against a person from the same racial group. This was confirmed by Lord Clarke: 
 
I do not see that the identity of the discriminator is of any real relevance .... There is certainly 
nothing in the language or the context of section 1 of the Act or in its statutory purpose to limit 
the section in that way.
87
 
 
 Again, this follows the practice in the United States.
88
 It is also correct under the British legislation. 
There is nothing in the statutory definition restricting its scope in such a way. It points in the other direction, 
in fact, stating that there should be no less favourable treatment ‘because’ of race. It says nothing about the 
characteristic of the discriminator, save that he must be acting within one of the specified activities, such 
as employment, education, housing, etc. Moreover, the logical consequence of barring such claims would 
be extraordinary. A man could not claim sex discrimination at work if his employer were male, neither, in 
a corresponding scenario, could a woman. An Asian worker could make a claim against a black employer, 
but not an Asian one. On this basis, a victim of sexual orientation discrimination would have to discover 
the orientation of the defendant before making a claim.
89
 
 So far, so good. On the matter of distinguishing ethnic and religious groups, the majority speeches 
were quite right to emphasise the flexibility permitted in identifying a racial group. However, in the context 
of this religion/ethnic debate, they overlooked one important point. The legislation only demanded that the 
treatment is on racial grounds, or nowadays, because of race. Thus, it is not necessary for the victim to 
belong to a racial group, although that will often be the case. It is enough for liability that the victim does 
not belong to a particular racial group.
90
 And here, M could not meet the racial element. The complicating 
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factor in this case is that M’s essential complaint was that as a Masorti Jew he could not gain access to a 
Jewish school. But this cause of action could have been brought by anyone not ‘racially Jewish’, which is 
all M needed to argue, and all that the Court needed to identify to resolve the case.
91
 Some recognition of 
this can be found in Lord Mance’s speech: 
 
A test of membership of a religion that focuses on descent from a particular people is a test based 
on ethnic origins This case cannot therefore be viewed as a mere disagreement between different 
Jewish denominations.... It turns, more fundamentally, on whether it is permissible for any school 
to treat one child less favourably than another because the child does not have whatever ancestry 
is required, in the school’s view, to make the child Jewish.
92
 
 
Thus, elaborate discussions on the meaning of ‘ethnic origins’, and the ethnic identity of the claimant (such 
as a ‘half-Italian Masorti Jew’ or ‘Italian Roman Catholic’) were irrelevant. As such, even entertaining the 
JFS’s elaborate argument was unnecessary. 
  
Less favourable treatment and the comparison 
Identifying the relevant racial group inevitably affects the identity of any comparator for the purpose of 
establishing less favourable treatment. To this end, section 3(4) of the Race Relations Act 1976 provided: 
 
A comparison of the case of a person of a particular racial group with that of a person not of that 
group ... must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially 
different, in the other.
93
 
 
Upon this, if the favoured group is identified as those ‘racially Jewish’, then the comparator would be 
anyone not racially Jewish. On the way the case was presented (on the claimant’s status as a Masorti Jew), 
the comparison could be refined by using more ‘relevant circumstances’. Bearing in mind this was a claim 
of racial discrimination, the racial factor should be the only difference. As such, while the claimant is a 
Masorti Jew who had not descended from Jacob
94
 through the matrilineal line, the comparator is a Masorti 
Jew who had. This comparator would have qualified without more, while the claimant would not have done. 
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 For most, the comparison was not a major issue, their focus being on the claimant’s racial identity 
and issues flowing from the benign motive ‘defence’. But for Lord Rodger’s dissent, it was central. It began 
by (correctly) noting that the claimant’s particular racial identity was irrelevant (all that mattered is that he 
was not Orthodox). But this led Lord Roger to bypass the racial question and jump to the ‘conversion’ stage 
of the admissions policy when making the comparison: 
 
[M’s] mother’s Jewish status as a result of her conversion was accordingly the only issue which 
the governors were asked to consider or did consider.... Therefore ... the appropriate comparator 
could only be a boy whose mother had converted under Orthodox auspices.
95
 
 
This comparison tests the defendant’s argument by its own (religious) terms, rather than by the (race) 
legislation invoked by the claimant. Given that the defence rests on the proposition that the whole matter is 
purely religious, the result was inevitable. Rather than test the claimant’s racial discrimination claim, Lord 
Rodger bypassed it, treating the defence as the ‘only’ issue. This was most odd, and ignores completely the 
‘descent’ element of the challenged policy. The ‘Conversion’ criterion only came into play because M was 
not racially Jewish, a point overlooked in Lord Rodger’s speech. The technical, or ‘mechanical’, failure 
here is the illogical progression from the racial identity question to a religious comparison, which – for this 
case at least – deprived the definition of direct racial discrimination of any efficacy at all. 
  
Conclusion on groups 
Overall, the majority speeches confirmed four principles of racial identity under the legislation. First, there 
can be sub-groups of a racial group. Second, groups or sub-groups may overlap. Third, a sub-group may 
include persons not included in the parent group, rather like Basques and Catalans (each group straddles 
the Spanish-French border). Fourth, it makes no difference to liability if the discriminator belongs to the 
same racial group as the victim. Given the statutory wording, its purpose, and the existing UK and US case 
law at the time, none of this broke new ground. Moreover, what the majority speeches failed to do was to 
grasp the simplicity of the case: M was subjected to the ‘conversion test’ because of who he was not. This 
reveals a technical misunderstanding of the definition of direct discrimination, which does not require that 
the claimant belongs to a specific (racial) group, only that the treatment was because of race (or another 
protected characteristic). Otherwise, practices such as ‘whites only’, or ‘British only’, would be lawful. It 
also shows a lack of appreciation of precedent, where the House of Lords recognised ‘non-British’ and 
‘non-ECC’ as racial groups
96
 Thus, discussions as to whether or not M belonged to an ethnic group, 
occupying some 65 paragraphs,
97
 were irrelevant. 
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3.  Direct Discrimination, the But For test, and the Benign Motive ‘Defence’ 
Once they had established that the descent requirement was racial, the majority turned their attention to 
whether the ‘benign’ religious motive behind it rendered the ground of the treatment solely religious, and 
so not ‘on racial grounds’. They dealt with this by invoking Lord Nicholls’s suggestion from Nagarajan v 
LRT: ‘Save in obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental 
processes of the alleged discriminator.’
98
  
 This envisages two types of direct discrimination.
99
 There were ‘obvious’ (or ‘inherent’) cases, 
where the reason for the treatment is patently racial (or patently because of another protected characteristic). 
Presumably, an example would be ‘No Blacks need apply’. In these cases, there is no need to enquire into 
the defendant’s motive, no matter how worthy it might be. Second, there are ‘less obvious’ (or ‘subjective’) 
cases. Lord Phillips provided a vivid example: A shopkeeper says to a fat black man, ‘I do not serve people 
like you.’
100
 A more subtle example was given by Baroness Hale, where in job applications, the patent 
criterion is ‘that elusive quality known as “merit”’.
101
 In such cases, it is necessary to assess the motive of 
the defendant to ascertain the ground of the treatment: respectively, whether it was obesity or colour, or 
merit or race. The racial bias may even be subconscious, to be discovered by proper inferences from the 
evidence.
102
 
 Although little was said about the actual application of the but for test, it was not expressly 
overruled. Of the majority, only Lord Phillips expressed an opinion, and that was in the mildest of terms, 
saying that he did not find the test ‘helpful’.
103
 Baroness Hale cited the Birmingham City Council and James 
cases, and expressly approved the decisions, rather than the but for test itself.
104
 Lords Mance and Kerr 
stuck to Lord Nicholls’s formula, and only Lord Clarke stated that the but for test was reconcilable with 
Lord Nicholls’s formula, stating that ‘...it is inherently unlikely that there is any distinction between the 
principles established by those cases [Birmingham and James] and the reasoning in the Nagarajan case’.
105
 
This was because Nagarajan provided ‘a separate basis on which direct discrimination can be 
established’.
106
 
  
The dissenters and the benign motive ‘defence’ 
As all agreed this was an ‘obvious’ case, it was not strictly necessary to address the but for test. Not so for 
Lord Hope (with whom Lord Walker agreed entirely), who had to side-line the test in order to embark upon 
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a tortuous route to a benign motive ‘defence’, which went via Lord Nicholls’s ‘mental processes’ test, the 
mind of the Chief Rabbi, and the comparison. 
 Thus, of the minority (on direct discrimination), Lord Hope was the only Justice to criticise the 
but for test, stating that it was ‘expressed too broadly’.
107
 Upon this, he read Lord Nicholls’s ‘mental 
processes’ formula to be applicable to obvious, as well as less obvious, cases: 
 
It may be that the tribunal will not need to look at the alleged discriminator’s mental processes in 
‘obvious cases’, as his mental state is indeed obvious. But he does not say that the tribunal is 
precluded from doing so.
108
 
 
This enabled Lord Hope to distinguish cases of anti-Semitic abuse
109
 (racial in nature), from the present 
case, where: 
 
Those who are said to have been responsible for the discrimination, whether at the level of the 
school authorities, the OCR or the Chief Rabbi himself, are thoughtful, well-intentioned and 
articulate.
110
 
 
The difficulty here is that there is nothing in Lord Nicholls’s ‘mental processes’ speech from Nagarajan to 
support this interpretation. Lord Nicholls said, it will be recalled, that some consideration of the mental 
processes of the defendant will be called for, save in obvious cases.
111
 Furthermore, where it was 
appropriate to consider the defendant’s mental processes, this was not for the purpose of establishing a 
benign motive. In the following paragraph Lord Nicholls stated that this question must be ‘distinguished 
sharply’ from the reason why the defendant acted so. ‘In particular,’ he continued, ‘if the reason why the 
alleged discriminator rejected the complainant’s job application was racial, it matters not that his intention 
may have been benign’.
112
 Lord Nicholls could not have been clearer. Lord Hope did not misinterpret or 
distort Lord Nicholls’s speech. He re-wrote it. 
 Regardless of this, having aligned the ‘mental processes test’ with the ‘obvious’ ground of the 
treatment, Lord Hope turned to the mind of the Chief Rabbi, and found that his motive was purely religious. 
In doing so, he compared how the OCR treated (a) a secular descendant of an orthodox convert, and (b) a 
practising descendant of a non-orthodox convert, in order to show that the OCR motive was purely 
religious, on the basis that the secular descendant would be admitted.
113
 Thus, the reasoning goes, the OCR 
requirement is rooted in the historical ‘religious’ event of conversion. Rather like Lord Rodger’s 
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comparison,
114
 the example bypasses the claim and the racial discrimination legislation. In Lord Hope’s 
comparison, the claimant has no racial identity and two religious ones, as does his comparator (if one 
accepts secularism as a religious identity). Thus, it is not even clear what Lord Hope considers to be the 
basis of the claim. It could be ‘secularism’ or ‘conversion’. Whichever it is, his comparison introduces 
secondary non-relevant circumstances. 
 Presumably, in conceding that this is an ‘obvious’ case, Lord Hope acknowledged that those not 
‘racially Jewish’ were at a disadvantage. To combine the ‘mental processes’ test with a comparison using 
the non-racial factors was incoherent, and of course, technically flawed. It seems that Lord Hope’s 
manoeuvre was to load the comparison with benign (solely religious) factors and reflect them back to the 
mental processes of the Chief Rabbi. 
 Lord Brown’s dissent (with which Lord Rodger agreed
115
), went further, arguing that benign 
preferential treatment should be defendable, this time, using the vehicle of indirect discrimination: 
  
It therefore seems to me of the greatest importance not to expand the scope of direct discrimination 
and thereby place preferential treatment which could well be regarded as no more than indirectly 
discriminatory beyond the reach of possible justification.
116
 
 
This is of a similar flavour to the dissents in James. As Lord Griffiths endorsed the ‘benign’ preferential 
treatment of women,
117
 Lord Lowry flirted with indirect discrimination.
118
 In any case, Lord Brown 
appeared to rely on two similar bases for his view. First, the good faith behind the policy. He continued: 
 
This is especially so where, as here, no one doubts the Chief Rabbi’s utmost good faith and that 
the manifest purpose of his policy is to give effect to the principles of Orthodox Judaism as 
universally recognised for millennia past.
119
 
 
In other words, ‘utmost good faith’ transforms a case of direct discrimination into one of indirect 
discrimination, permitting preferential treatment, should it be ‘justifiable’.  
 Second, Lord Brown had to dispose of the seemingly incompatible but for test. He dealt with this 
by distinguishing James: 
 
There is not the same exact correlation between membership of the Jewish religion and 
membership of the group regarded on the Mandla approach as being of Jewish ethnicity as there 
was between retirement age and sex in James…
120
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With respect, it is difficult to see how James could be distinguished on this basis. In both cases the defendant 
has adopted a policy which incorporates a facially discriminatory factor. And if anything, a correlation 
between pensionable age and sex is somewhat looser, as the recent enactments equalising the ages 
demonstrate,
121
 thus making it somewhat more mutable than a religious law ‘recognised for millennia past’.
 The particular feature common to James and JFS (facially neutral factor incorporating a facially 
discriminatory factor from another source) may be the basis of arguments that they should be analysed as 
indirect discrimination.
122
 But none of the arguments could depend on something as hollow as ‘utmost good 
faith’. More generally, by casting the school policy as ‘preferential treatment’, at the same time, Lord 
Brown acknowledges it is facially discriminatory, and so presumably, directly discriminatory. The 
arguments of principle and statutory interpretation attacking Lord Griffiths’ speech in James
123
 apply with 
all the more force here, because Lord Brown had at his disposal an additional 20 years in which neither the 
courts, nor Parliament, saw a reason to upset the basic tenet of James, that aside from specific legislative 
exceptions, a benign motive is no defence to facially discriminatory conduct.
124
 
 Save for Lord Brown’s misplaced understanding of the purpose of the legislative structure, the 
judgments of Lords Hope and Brown failed to engage with the text of the legislation or employ any rules 
of statutory interpretation, and notably, as they were departing from the strict wording, expressed no 
allusions to the intention of Parliament or statutory purpose. This was in addition to their questionable 
treatment of precedent. They would have done better to have explored whether cases such as James and 
JFS could be analysed as indirect discrimination, given their particular nature (on this, see further below),
125
 
or at least have adopted one of Counsel’s secondary arguments, that when providing a faith-school 
exception for religious discrimination, Parliament could not have intended that it applied to all religious 
schools bar Jewish ones.
126
 
  
Policy and purposive considerations 
Those were the technical solutions of the Court. The benign motive issue also gave the case a public policy 
dimension. Many of the Justices expressed ‘sympathy’
127
 for the predicament of the School, having a 
definition of religion that included a racial element. For them, the Chief Rabbi had expressed a Jewish law 
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that had stood for thousands of years;
128
 he had given an ‘honest and sincere’ opinion,
129
 with an 
‘unimpeachable’ motive,
130
 and (as already noted) had acted in ‘utmost good faith’.
131
 Of course, none of 
this mattered to the majority decision. Jews were free to practise their long standing law, so far as this did 
not encroach into certain defined activities. As Lord Kerr put it, although it was ‘logical’ to describe the 
OCR definition as religious, ‘when the answer to that religious question has consequences in the civil law 
sphere, its legality falls to be examined.
132
 Lord Clarke used an extreme, albeit real, case to make the same 
point:  
 
[A] person who honestly believed, as the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa until recently 
believed, that God had made black people inferior and had destined them to live separately from 
whites, would be able to discriminate openly against them without breaking the law.
133
 
 
Lord Clarke went on to cite Bob Jones University v United States,
134
 where the US Supreme Court upheld 
the IRS decision to revoke the University’s tax exempt status because it denied admission to anyone 
engaged in interracial marriage, despite this policy being based on a sincerely held religious belief. He also 
cited Campbell and Cosans v UK, where the European Court of Human Rights stated that beliefs ‘must be 
worthy of respect in a democratic society’ and not ‘incompatible with human dignity’.
135
 
 Given this, and the result, the majority’s aforementioned expressions of sympathy may ring a little 
hollow. But the sympathies of the minority drove them to some extraordinary thinking. For two of these 
Justices, the consequences of lifting the policy was a reason to find that it was not discriminatory. Lord 
Brown, for instance, reasoned: 
 
This policy could as well have been struck down at the suit of anyone desiring admission to the 
school. If the argument succeeds it follows that Jewish religious law as to who is a Jew … must 
henceforth be treated as irrelevant. Jewish schools in future, if oversubscribed, must decide on 
preference by reference only to outward manifestations of religious practice…. To hold the 
contrary would be to stigmatise Judaism as a directly racially discriminating religion.
136
 
 
 Here, Lord Brown observes that the majority decision meant that the policy not only excluded 
Masorti Jews, but anyone not ‘racially Jewish’, and concludes that the accompanying stigmatism of the 
school was a basis for holding that it did not directly discriminate. While this observation inadvertently 
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acknowledged the true nature of the case, the conclusion is reminiscent of the comments in the wake of 
James, suggesting that the well-meaning should not be ‘stamped’ as culpable, or even racist,
137 
which of 
course, have no basis in the statutory wording, purpose,
138
 nor precedent. 
 Lord Rodger’s reasoning was similarly sensationalist: 
 
The majority’s decision leads to such extraordinary results, and produces such manifest 
discrimination against Jewish schools in comparison with other faith schools, that one can’t help 
feeling that something has gone wrong.
139
 
 
Once again, Lord Rodger provides no basis in the statutory wording. This dictum appears in ignorance of 
the school’s racially-based preference, which distinguished it from most other faith schools. This ‘feeling’ 
also evokes an ideological predilection voiced by Lord Diplock back in 1974
140
 of the individual’s freedom 
to define his business, enterprise, or religion (and correspondingly whom is suitable for admission), a liberty 
not to be trumped by meddlesome equality law. But rather than ‘feeling that something has gone wrong’, 
he would have better made the point by bringing the matter back to the process of statutory interpretation, 
and embracing and examining Counsel’s more, sober, articulate, and concrete, reflection (noted above), 
that Parliament could not have intended that the religious exemption applied to all faith schools bar Jewish 
ones.
141
 Moreover, these comments of Lords Brown and Rodger can only serve to encourage further 
indulgencies in a benign motive defence, and maintain an argument that should have been put to bed 
decades ago. 
  
Treating some of the group less favourably 
In their dissents (on the direct discrimination claim), Lord Hope found the Dutch Reformed Church analogy 
‘quite different’ as it was ‘overtly racist’,
142
 whilst Lord Brown did not consider the examples to be 
‘parallel’, as the Church rule was ‘self-evidently... on the ground of race and irredeemable by reference to 
the church’s underlying religious motive’.
143
  
 The Dutch Church example is different, because in racial terms it is binary in nature, excluding 
100 per cent of blacks, unlike the JFS policy, which, with its convert rule, does not exclude all those not 
(racially) Jewish. But should that make a difference: what if the Dutch Church admitted all whites and only 
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black converts? This issue thus becomes quasi-technical: can there be direct discrimination if only some of 
the claimant’s group are treated less favourably? This matter was barely addressed by the majority. 
 The clearest answer was provided by Counsel for the claimant, and adopted by Lord Mance: ‘[A]n 
organisation which admitted all men but only women graduates would be engaged in direct discrimination 
on the grounds of sex.’
144
 This makes the point succinctly and effectively, but none of the speeches 
explained how the statutory wording supported this conclusion.  
 The legislative formula(s), set out at the start of this chapter, describe the victim as an individual. 
This suggests that there can be direct discrimination against just one of a racial group, which in turn suggests 
that there can be direct discrimination against just some members of a group. This makes sense when 
realised in two corresponding examples. An employer of several black persons says to just one, ‘I am 
dismissing you because you are a typical lazy black.’ This is undoubtedly direct discrimination, even though 
the employer does not mistreat any other black workers. Second, in addition to Counsel’s example (above), 
a nightclub admitting all women, and only ‘good looking’ men would be treating men less favourably 
because they are men, even though some would be admitted. Thus, the conclusion that direct discrimination 
covers less favourable treatment of just some of the group appears a logical extension of the assumption it 
covers less favourable treatment against just one of the group. 
  
The ‘Incorporated’ issue 
But that, combined with identifying the racial or ethnic element in the admissions policy, was as far as the 
majority went in explaining why this was a case of direct discrimination. What they missed was that 
‘structurally’, the JFS policy resembled that in James: a facially neutral (‘religious’) policy incorporating a 
facially discriminatory factor (‘racially Jewish’) from an independent source (Jewish Law). This 
distinguishes these two cases from the ‘some-of-the-group’ examples above, and the vast majority of direct 
discrimination cases. It suggests that there are arguments that such cases should be analysed as indirect 
discrimination.
145
 Indeed, the matter was not entirely without authority. In Schnorbus v Land Hessen,
146
 the 
issue was considered by Advocate General Jacobs in the context of sex discrimination, who advised that 
unless the incorporated measure was ‘indissociable’ from sex (e.g. pregnancy) the case should be addressed 
as indirect discrimination.
147
 The Court of Justice agreed.
148
 Thus, not only was the issue ignored in JFS, 
there existed an authoritative basis on which to discuss it.
149
 Given the simplicity of the case in terms of 
identifying racial groups, this was in fact the only issue of substance, which went unrecognised and 
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unaddressed.  
  
4.  Conclusion on JFS  
The decision confirmed that (1) group definition could be fluid, multiple, and overlapping; (2) there is no 
benign motive defence to direct discrimination; (3) the defendant’s motive is relevant only in ‘less obvious’ 
cases, (4) the only purpose of identifying the motive is to discover the ground (protected characteristic) of 
the treatment; (5) it is possible for one member of a protected group to directly discriminate against a 
member of the same group; and (6) it is possible to directly discriminate against just some members of a 
protected group. 
 Whilst it may be helpful to have these points reaffirmed, they say nothing new to anyone familiar 
with discrimination law. The obvious difficulty in this case was that the OCR’s definition straddled 
religious and racial factors. However, it was not difficult to unravel the two and identify the racial strand, 
and then grasp the point that the claimant’s particular racial identity was unimportant: what mattered is that 
he was not ‘racially Jewish’. Instead, the Justices were drawn into an irrelevant debate over JFS’s over-
elaborate submission, which in essence argued that the definition of a racial group was fixed, exclusive, 
and static. Addressing a party’s misplaced argument is one thing, but defining a judgment by it is quite 
another.  
 Technical shortcomings aside, the failure of the minority to reject the benign motive defence, and 
the majority’s attempts to reconcile its previous seven cases on the matter, still leaves some doubt. Most 
notably, the majority failed to overrule, refine, or even distinguish, the ‘honest and reasonable defence’ 
advanced in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan.
150
 Treating it as good law can only fuel the 
advocates of a benign motive defence. Indeed, in his dissent on this issue, Lord Hope (with whom Lord 
Walker agreed) used Khan to support the JFS defence of religious motivation.
151
 More generally, the 
speeches appeared to prefer the ‘mental processes’ formula to the but for test. This follows the general drift, 
but the preference was neither expressed nor explained, leaving many interested parties, and the layperson, 
with little chance of understanding what the test should be, and why it has changed. After all, the but for 
test was the basis, or ratio decidendi, of the unanimous decision in the Birmingham City Council case and 
played a part, at least, in James, cases that have never been overruled. 
 There was also a complete failure to address the distinguishing and, in substance, central issue in 
this case: whether a facially neutral policy incorporating a facially discriminatory factor amounted to direct 
or indirect discrimination. Given that cases raising matters of public importance go to the Supreme Court, 
this was a serious omission. 
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 The minority speeches fared worse, with Lords Hope and Rodger simply bypassing the racial 
identity question and Lord Hope re-writing Lord Nicholls’s ‘mental processes’ test. All gave undue weight 
to the ‘good faith’ behind the policy, encouraging, once again, the arguments for a benign motive ‘defence’ 
made in the wake of the dissents in James, and the continuing validity of Khan’s ‘honest and reasonable 
defence’. That this was a 5-4 split on the benign motive issue, and came on top of seven previous House of 
Lords cases on that question, undermines any confidence that the JFS case, for all its judicial input, will 
stand as a seminal one.  
 At this point, it is worth repeating the caution made by Lord Diplock: 
 
The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before 
committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal 
consequences that will flow from it. ... [T]he court must give effect to what the words of the statute 
would be reasonably understood to mean by those whose conduct it regulates.
152
 
 
Little of the reasoning in JFS (or indeed James) was rooted in any recognisable notions of statutory 
interpretation. For nine Justices of the Supreme Court to entertain this case seemed excessive, and was 
likely to cause more uncertainty than understanding. This was exacerbated with the abundance of eight 
divisive and over-elaborate speeches which left the best of lawyers debating their meaning, let alone the 
wider audience with equality law interests. 
 Finally, one must be concerned why this case attracted the attention not only of the Supreme Court, 
but the unusually large panel of nine Justices. Given the rare nature of Jewish identity - straddling religious 
and racial factors – the decision is unlikely to affect many other faith schools, if any.
153
 Further, on the 
assumption that parents would have to engage their children in outward manifestations of Jewish religious 
practice, and that successful entrants would be taught the Orthodox Jewish faith ‘in the hope and expectation 
that they will come to practise it’,
154
 the majority decision is unlikely to encourage hordes of non-Jewish 
‘pushy parents’ to sign up, no matter how high the academic standards. Indeed, the JFS maintained that 
dropping the policy would endanger the school’s survival: ‘we are going to need to supply children out of 
thin air’.
155
 And although using the dramatic potential of the case as a reason to dismiss the claim, the 
minority were more obviously concerned with the relatively narrow, but serious consequences for just 27 
out of many thousands of the nation’s schools.
156
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 The point is that, save for the unaddressed ‘incorporated’ point, the case was of little interest 
beyond a tiny fraction of the nation’s schools. The racial group question was straightforward and the benign 
motive defence question had been (apparently) well settled for some 20 years. Given all this, it is baffling 
that it has taken 610 paragraphs, 10 judicial speeches, and 13 judges to settle the matter. And even then, 
given the range and number of opinions, the case must be a candidate for one of the worst examples of 
prolixity in the law reports.  
  
5. The Status of the But For Test 
Unlike the House of Lords in the Birmingham City Council case (and perhaps some counterparts in James), 
the majority in JFS rejected the benign motive defence without expressly relying on the but for test, 
displaying a similar indifference to it as displayed in the House of Lords cases following James.
157
 They 
merely found that its apparent antithesis, the ‘mental processes test’, was suitable for ‘less obvious’ cases. 
Although the Birmingham and James decisions were not overruled, or at all criticised, the implication is 
that the but for test itself is defunct. A short time before the JFS judgment was handed down, a thoughtful 
judgment from Underhill J afforded the test more credibility, but inadvertently perhaps, provided another 
reason for its demise. In Amnesty International v Ahmed,
158
 he stated that the but for test was appropriate 
for both ‘obvious’ and ‘less obvious’ cases, although its ‘real value’ was in the latter. In this context, he 
explained its purpose thus: 
  
[I]f the discriminator would not have done the act complained of but for the claimant’s sex (or 
race), it does not matter whether you describe the mental process involved as his intention, his 
motive, his reason, his purpose or anything else - all that matters is that the proscribed factor 
operated on his mind. This is therefore a useful gloss on the statutory test.
159
 
 
 This, of course, is the but for test, properly expressed, and would have produced the same outcome 
in JFS. Underhill J went further however, and identified a third category of direct discrimination where the 
but for test would be ‘misleading’.
160
 This could be conveniently labelled ‘background cases’. He gave an 
example of the case of Seide v Gillette Industries,
161
 where a worker was moved to a different department 
to escape anti-Semitic harassment. In his new department, he fell out (for non-racial reasons) with his 
colleagues and was disciplined. The claimant argued that but for the prior anti-Semitic harassment, he 
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would not have been in the situation where he was disciplined. It was held, however, that he had not been 
disciplined on racial grounds. 
 Underhill’s J analysis that the but for test would have led to the wrong decision was based upon a 
reversion to the improper expression of the test. Properly expressed, it would have provided the identical 
result for Mr Seide: it could not be said that the employer would not have disciplined Mr Seide but for Mr 
Seide being Jewish, or indeed because of the harassment he had once suffered. If the test were properly 
expressed, the ‘background’ in this case has nothing to do with the question. Once again, it seems, a judge 
(who has presided over numerous discrimination cases, and now sits in the Court of Appeal) has not grasped 
the technicalities of the test nor significance of expressing it precisely. 
 Aside from this misplaced loyalty, and the more fashionable cold-shoulder for the but for test, 
there exists a concrete reason to doubt its correctness. It loses its efficacy when applied to mixed ground 
cases. Take Owen and Briggs v James,
162
 for instance, where an applicant was rejected because of her poor 
employment record, her ‘unsatisfactory demeanour’, and her race. Here, where there were both 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons for the treatment, the test becomes problematic. The 
theoretical objection was explained by the US Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v Hopkins:
163
 
 
Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose that either force acting 
alone would have moved the object. As the [but for test] would have it, neither physical force was 
a ‘cause’ of the motion unless we can show that but for one or both of them, the object would not 
have moved; apparently both forces were simply ‘in the air’ unless we can identify at least one of 
them as a but-for cause of the object’s movement. ... Events that are causally overdetermined, in 
other words, may not have any ‘cause’ at all. This cannot be so.
164
 
 
 Its practical weakness is that it could lead a tribunal into far too much speculation as to the 
proportion, or weight, of the various factors which led to the treatment, as well as what might have been, 
but for the protected ground. If it were applied in the Owen and Briggs v James case (which predated the 
but for test), the tribunal would have been drawn into the position of deciding - or speculating - whether 
Ms James still would have been rejected simply because of her employment record and/or her 
‘unsatisfactory demeanour’. Being inappropriate for mixed ground cases, the but for test is flawed as a 
universal test for direct discrimination.  
 Thus, the test has two problems, one superficial, and one fundamental. The superficial problem is 
that, constantly it seems, it has been improperly expressed. The second, fundamental problem, is that it is 
unsuitable for mixed ground cases. That it has caused so much judicial debate is largely down to the first 
problem, which was entirely judge-made. Nonetheless, if a statutory definition should have a consistent 
interpretation, the second problem indicates that the but for test is not the vehicle to deliver this. 
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 Underhill’s J cheer for the but for test could not disguise its general fall from grace in favour of 
the ‘mental processes’ formula, a fall barely acknowledged, let alone explained, in the JFS speeches, or 
indeed in any cases. Yet good reasons existed to abandon the test, and had been expressed in the United 
States Supreme Court as early as 1989. That these were not apparent to the (UK) Supreme Court in JFS is 
not only ironic, given its almost invisible rejection of a test so prominent the House of Lords some years 
before, it displays once again an apparent lack of mastery of the subject. 
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5 THE ‘BENIGN MOTIVE DEFENCE’ AND VICTIMISATION 
  
The importunate dissenters
1
 did not confine their desire for a benign motive ‘defence’ to direct 
discrimination. They were equally exercised about its need in cases of victimisation, even though, once 
again, the legislative text afforded no scope for this. There is one difference though: in these cases, the 
benign motive ‘defence’ seems to have prevailed, albeit in a coded form. The focus in this chapter falls on 
the emergence of the ‘defence’ in two House of Lords cases decided under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
(SDA 1975) and the similarly worded Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976). 
 Victimisation provides a separate course of action for persons treated unfavourably because they 
had complained of discrimination, or supported a complaint, or did something else by reference to the 
legislation. The appeal in St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Derbyshire
2
 turned on whether placing 
public pressure on equal pay claimants to compromise their claim amounted to victimisation. The House 
of Lords took this opportunity to attempt to clarify the meaning of the ‘honest and reasonable’ (benign 
motive) defence afforded to employers by the House previously in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 
Police v Khan.
3
 
  
1. The legislation 
At the time,
4
 Victimisation was defined in SDA 1975, section 4: 
 
(1) A person (‘the discriminator’) discriminates against another person (‘the person victimised’) 
in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if he treats the person 
victimised less favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would treat other persons, and 
does so by reason that the person victimised has— 
 
(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act or 
the Equal Pay Act 1970 ... or 
(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person 
... under this Act or the Equal Pay Act 1970... or 
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act or the Equal Pay Act 1970..., 
or 
(d) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which 
(whether or not the allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act or... 
the Equal Pay Act 1970... 
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 Paragraphs (a) to (d) are known generally as ‘protected acts’. Along with discrimination and 
harassment, victimisation was outlawed only for certain activities, in this case employment. Section 6 of 
the SDA 1975 outlawed discrimination by employers in recruitment, access to opportunities for promotion, 
transfer or training, or any other benefits, facilities or services; dismissal; or by subjecting her to any other 
detriment. So the elements appear to be: (1) the victim does a protected act; (2) the employer treats the 
victim less favourably in recruitment, or access to benefits etc., or by dismissal, or any other detriment; and 
(3) it did so ‘by reason that’ the victim did the protected act. The RRA 1976 provided substantially the 
same definitions for both victimisation and employment.
5
 
 The phrase ‘by reason that’ was parallel to ‘on the ground of’ used for direct discrimination, and 
it has been accepted that it should share the same meaning,
6
 an approach endorsed by the Equality Act 
2010, which replaced both terms with the common phrase, because of.
7
 This element was the initial vehicle 
for the benign motive ‘defence’, although, as we shall see, it was subsequently switched to the ‘catch-all’ 
employment requirement that the employer subjected the claimant to ‘any other detriment’.  
  
2. The cases 
In St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Derbyshire,
8
 510 catering staff brought an equal pay claim. 
Most compromised, but 39 persisted. The employer then wrote directly to all 510 members of staff 
(bypassing their trade union and the claimants’ solicitor) stating that should the claim succeed, the resulting 
cost was likely to cause redundancies. The employment tribunal found that the letter was ‘effectively a 
threat’, ‘intimidating’, and ‘directed against people who were in no position to debate the accuracy of the 
... pessimistic prognostications’. Reasonable reactions could include ‘surrender induced by fear, fear of 
public odium or the reproaches of colleagues’.
9
  
 Consequently, the 39 claimants brought a separate claim of victimisation. They succeeded in the 
employment tribunal and the EAT. The Court of Appeal reversed, only for the House of Lords to restore 
the employment tribunal’s decision. (In the event, the 39 persisted and won six times the compromise offer. 
The price of a school meal increased by a third, and job losses were approximately ten per cent, with no 
redundancies.
10
) 
 At first sight, this attempt to bully litigants into abandoning their equal pay claim appears to be a 
rather obvious example of victimisation. That the case progressed to House of Lords can be explained by 
its complex legal backdrop, comprising a number of cases, from the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords, 
and the ECJ, one of which requires particular attention. In Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v 
Khan,
11
 Sergeant Khan brought proceedings for racial discrimination against his employer. Whilst his claim 
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was pending, he applied for a job with the Norfolk Police. His employer, the Chief Constable, acting on 
legal advice, refused to provide a job reference to ‘protect his position in the discrimination claim’. It seems 
that the Chief Constable was minded to provide a negative reference and his lawyers feared that this could 
be used against him in the discrimination trial. As a consequence, Khan brought a separate claim of 
victimisation. The House of Lords unanimously rejected this claim, holding that the Chief Constable had 
not acted ‘by reason that’ Khan had brought proceedings, because he had acted ‘honestly and reasonably’ 
in accordance with ‘perfectly understandable advice.’
12
 In coming to this conclusion, the House relied on 
the distinction, made by the Court of Appeal in Cornelius v University College of Swansea,
13
 between a 
reaction to the bringing of proceedings (unlawful) and their existence (lawful). 
 It was no surprise that the employer in Derbyshire relied on this analysis. However, the 
employment tribunal distinguished Khan, noting that the employer wanted the applicants to abandon their 
claims. It was reacting, ‘if not to the commencement of proceedings, certainly to their continuance ....’
14
 A 
majority of the Court of Appeal reversed.
15
 Lloyd and Parker LJJ, applied Khan, and after noting the 
distinction between the bringing and the existence of the proceedings, held that the ‘honest and reasonable’ 
test applied equally to attempts to compromise proceedings. Thus, the tribunal’s distinguishing of Khan 
was an error of law.
16
  
 A unanimous House of Lords restored the decision of the employment tribunal, holding that the 
tribunal was entitled to come to its decision. Lord Bingham held that the tribunal was entitled to distinguish 
Khan: ‘The contrast with the present case is striking and obvious, for the object of sending the letters was 
to put pressure on the appellants to drop their claims.’
17
 Lord Hope interpreted the tribunal’s reasoning as 
a finding that the employer’s conduct ‘while no doubt honest, could not be said to have been reasonable’; 
in other words, the tribunal had properly distinguished Khan on its finding of fact.
18
 Baroness Hale held 
that the correct test was whether the employer’s conduct caused the claimant a ‘detriment’. As the tribunal 
had addressed that question,
19
 its decision could not be disturbed.
20
 Lord Neuberger came to much the same 
conclusion,
21
 but added, in line with Lord Hope’s reasoning, that the tribunal had found the employer’s 
conduct did not satisfy the ‘honest and reasonable’ test.
22
 Lord Carswell agreed with Lord Neuberger.  
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 It is apparent from this that although the House was unanimous in the decision, the reasoning 
varied. Four law lords gave speeches, with Lord Bingham agreeing with them all,
23
 Baroness Hale
24
 and 
Lord Carswell
25
 agreeing with Lord Neuberger, Lord Hope agreeing with Lord Neuberger on the Court of 
Appeal’s decision,
26
 but not on the meaning of Khan (or Cornelius). However, Lord Neuberger agreed with 
Lord Hope’s entire opinion,
27
 From this, it can be deduced that Lord Neuberger’s was the leading judgment. 
  
The ‘honest and reasonable defence’ 
In Khan Lord Nicholls had said: 
 
Employers, acting honestly and reasonably, ought to be able to take steps to preserve their position 
in pending discrimination proceedings without laying themselves open to a charge of 
victimisation. ... An employer who conducts himself in this way is not doing so because of the fact 
that the complainant has brought discrimination proceedings. He is doing so because, currently 
and temporarily, he needs to take steps to preserve his position in the outstanding proceedings.
28
  
 
 Lord Neuberger stated that whilst this conclusion was correct, its judicial analysis and subsequent 
interpretation were ‘not entirely satisfactory’.
29
 He gave four reasons. First, no such defence is provided by 
the legislation. Second, it placed a ‘somewhat uncomfortable and unclear meaning on the words “by reason 
that”’.
30
 Third, it suggested that the matter should be judged from the point of view of the employer, when 
it should be ‘primarily from the perspective of the alleged victim’.
31
 
 From this, Lord Neuberger reasoned, when considering the employer’s defence or reaction to 
proceedings, ‘a more satisfactory conclusion’ was to focus on the element ‘any other detriment’ rather than 
‘by reason that’.
32
 Citing Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah, he said this test was objective: ‘a detriment exists 
if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to his 
detriment’.
33
 Lord Neuberger speculated: 
 
If ... the employer’s solicitor were to write to the employee’s solicitor setting out, in appropriately 
measured and accurate terms, the financial or employment consequences of the claim succeeding, 
or the risks to the employee if the claim fails, or terms of settlement which are unattractive to the 
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employee, I do not see how any distress thereby induced in the employee could be said to constitute 
‘detriment’ ... The bringing of an equal pay claim, however strong the claim may be, carries with 
it, like any other litigation inevitable distress and worry. Distress and worry which may be induced 
by the employer’s honest and reasonable conduct in the course of his defence or in the conduct of 
any settlement negotiations, cannot (save, possibly, in the most unusual circumstances) constitute 
‘detriment’ for the purposes of sections 4 and 6 of the 1975 Act.
34
 
 
Thus, the employer’s attempts to settle became unlawful by ‘going public’. Otherwise, it seems normal 
private responses in discrimination litigation will not amount to victimisation.  
 Lord Neuberger’s fourth reason for this change of approach was EU law, which applied in this 
case, but not in Khan, which predated the Race Directive.
35
 In the victimisation case, Coote v Granada, the 
ECJ focused on the deterrent effect of the employer’s act on workers.
36
 In other words, the consideration 
was from the perspective of the worker, rather the employer.  
 Lord Hope took a similar line,
37
 but Baroness Hale alone was more trenchant, succinctly stating: 
‘It would be better if the [honest and reasonable] “defence” were laid to rest and the language of the 
legislation, construed in the light of the requirements of the Directives, applied.’ Baroness Hale reduced 
her analysis to the statutory elements.
38
 
 By contrast, Lord Neuberger attempted the seemingly impossible task of finding a just result 
without upsetting Khan. The trick was switching the ‘honest and reasonable defence’ to the element of ‘any 
other detriment’. His logic was that honest and reasonable conduct by the employer equates to causing the 
worker no detriment: 
 
In my judgment, a more satisfactory conclusion, which in practice would almost always involve 
identical considerations, and produce a result identical, to that in Khan, involves focusing on the 
word ‘detriment’ rather than on the words ‘by reason that’.
39
 
 
 The obvious difficulty with this is that overlooks the holding in Khan that the claimant had 
suffered a detriment. The only fact to which Lord Neuberger could point in support (he did not) was that 
Sergeant Khan’s reference would have been negative. So it was arguable he suffered no detriment. But as 
Lord Hoffman observed in Khan, the employment tribunal has jurisdiction to award compensation for 
injury to feelings, and so ‘the courts have given the term “detriment” a wide meaning.’
40
 Staying with Khan, 
Lord Hoffman adopted the interpretation of ‘detriment’ in Jeremiah (above) and held: 
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Mr Khan plainly did take the view, ... that not having his assessment forwarded was to his 
detriment and I do not think that, in his state of knowledge at the time, he can be said to have been 
unreasonable.
41
  
 
Similarly, Lord Nicholls had reasoned: 
 
I accept Sergeant Khan’s claim that the refusal to provide a reference for him constituted a 
detriment ... even though ... this did not cause him any financial loss. Provision of a reference is a 
normal feature of employment.
42
 
 
Not only is Lord Neuberger’s opinion in Derbyshire effectively overruling Khan on this point, it is ignoring 
the two reasons underpinning that decision, that the legislation envisages liability purely for injury to 
feelings, and the (apparently approved) dictum from Jeremiah. 
 It also overlooks that the Chief Constable did more than merely refuse to provide a reference. He 
wrote to the Norfolk Police explaining the reason, that Khan had brought industrial tribunal proceedings. 
That alone would be enough to dissuade many employers from selecting a candidate, and even if that did 
not happen in Khan’s case, a reasonable worker would be entitled to fear so. This alone would cause a 
detriment.
43
 Further, in many cases, withholding a negative reference will cause the claimant a detriment 
simply because he will present an incomplete application, excluding him from any selection process.  
 Finally, even if Lord Neuberger’s opinion could be reconciled with Khan, his opinion remains 
exposed. Where, more commonly, a reference would be positive (or neutral), its withholding is even more 
likely to cause a detriment, and notably, a tangible loss. Of course, the employer may be withholding the 
reference for the same (‘honest and reasonable’) motive as Khan’s employer: a positive reference could be 
used against the employer in the principal proceedings.
44
 Thus, the technical flaw in Lord Neuberger’s 
reasoning, is the holding that honest and reasonable conduct can be equated to causing no detriment. 
 Moreover, there were any number of reasons why an ‘honest and reasonable defence’ should have 
been purged from any element of victimisation. First and most obvious, the reasons given by Lord 
Neuberger for ruling out an ‘honest and reasonable defence’ for the element of ‘by reason that’ apply as 
cogently to the element of detriment (it does not appear in the legislation, and the matter should be viewed 
from the worker’s perspective). This chimes with a literal reading of the statutory phrase ‘subjecting him 
to any other detriment’, which suggests merely that the employer causes the worker to suffer a detriment. 
Thus, there are two considerations of relevance: first, the suffering of the claimant, and second, whether 
this was caused by the employer. As relatively innocuous conduct, such as standard reactions in defence to 
                                                          
41
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litigation, can cause considerable detriment (e.g. a frozen career, or prolonged unemployment), the 
reasonableness and honesty of the defendant’s conduct are relatively minor, if not irrelevant, considerations. 
 Second, many employer responses could be characterised, not as ‘any other detriment’, but as 
discrimination in relation to ‘access to benefits, facilities or services’ under say, what was SDA 1975, 
section 6(2)(a).
45
 This would include the suspension of a grievance procedure, transfer rights, or indeed, 
the withholding of a reference.
46 
In these scenarios, the honest and reasonable defence, logically tied (as 
Lord Neuberger would have it) to the element of detriment, becomes redundant. The error of interpretation 
and application here is the assumption that the phrase ‘any other detriment’ applies exclusively to a number 
of scenarios more specifically covered by other parts of the provision. 
 Third, as noted in Chapter 4, in spite of the importunate dissenters, such a benign motive ‘defence’ 
has been ruled out of the similarly formulated definition of direct discrimination. The flawed equation 
between honest and reasonable conduct on the employer’s side, and ‘detriment’ on the claimant’s, in 
substance disregards the claimant’s perspective in favour to that of the employer: if the employer acts 
honestly and reasonably, then, according to the equation, the claimant could not have suffered a detriment. 
Yet, as noted above, in such cases a worker can suffer a frozen career, or even lengthy unemployment, for 
several years if the matter goes to appeal, no matter how honestly and reasonably the employer behaved. 
Given that the House of Lords had ruled that the elements of direct discrimination and victimisation should 
be given parallel meanings, and that ‘victimisation was as serious a mischief as direct discrimination’,
47
 
this was a major, and unacknowledged, departure from precedent. As such, all bar Baroness Hale effectively 
aligned themselves with the importunate dissenters, and for victimisation, elevated the benign motive 
defence to precedential respectability. 
 Fourth, another, albeit lesser, danger associated such a defenceis the risk of yet another technical 
error.  A tribunal may inadvertently broaden the defence by inverting the question and demanding that for 
liability the employer must have acted dishonestly and unreasonably.
48
 Here, the employer need only show 
that its response was say, not dishonest even though it was unreasonable (and less likely, vice versa). For 
instance, an employer may threaten to expose a claimant’s extra-marital affair should she persist with her 
claim; or report the worker’s suspected fraudulent conduct to the police only after the worker instigated 
discrimination proceedings.
49
 Such responses may be characterised as unreasonable, but not necessarily 
dishonest. 
  
The distinction between the bringing and the existence of proceedings 
The decision in Khan relied on this distinction, first aired in Cornelius v University College of Swansea.
50
 
The speeches in Derbyshire did not question this distinction, with Lord Bingham (a party to the Cornelius 
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decision) and Lord Hope citing it with approval.
51
 In Cornelius, the claimant brought sex discrimination 
proceedings against her employer. Pending the outcome the employer refused her transfer request and 
access to the grievance procedure. Consequently, she brought a separate claim for victimisation. The Court 
of Appeal rejected her claim, inter alia because: 
 
The existence of the proceedings plainly did influence [the employer’s] decisions. No doubt, like 
most experienced administrators, they recognised the risk of acting in a way which might 
embarrass the handling or be inconsistent with the outcome of current proceedings. They 
accordingly wished to defer action until the proceedings were over. But that had ... nothing to do 
with the appellant’s conduct in bringing proceedings under the Act.
52
 
 
 This is linguistic nonsense, of course. The futility of this distinction is realised by adding a second 
protected act to the claim: that the claimant had ‘otherwise done anything under or by reference to this 
Act’.
53
 As well as having brought proceedings, she was ‘otherwise’ maintaining them in existence. This 
repeats the error of assuming that one statutory phrase applies exclusively to a number of scenarios more 
specifically covered by other parts of the provision. The fragility of the distinction was exposed when the 
employment tribunal in Derbyshire made a third distinction: that the employer reacted not to the 
commencement or existence of proceedings, but to their ‘continuance’.
54
 
 Further, this fragile, futile and nonsensical distinction between the bringing and existing of 
proceedings (leading to a third category of ‘continuance’) frustrates Lord Diplock’s plea that the rule of 
law demands that legislation is ‘reasonably understood ... by those whose conduct it regulates’.
55
 Moreover, 
in this context, it shows a drift away from the ‘straightforward’ approach adopted by the House of Lords in 
Nagarajan v LRT, where ‘in the application of this legislation’, Lord Nicholls urged, ‘legalistic phrases, as 
well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far as possible.’
56
 
 The result of the distinction will always favour the defendant, and shows that, once again, it was 
devised with the employer’s perspective in mind. For the House in Derbyshire to endorse it rather 
undermines a foundation of its decision, that in light of Coote v Granada,
57
 the question should be viewed 
from the claimant’s perspective. 
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 Deterring other workers – the ‘chilling’ effect 
A broader issue was left untouched in the Derbyshire speeches. The statutory purpose ought to include the 
deterrent, or ‘chilling’, effect of the employer’s reaction on other workers.
58
 Take Khan again. Even if it 
could be said (as the House in Derbyshire asserted) that Sergeant Khan himself suffered no detriment, the 
act of withholding the reference still sent a signal to other workers (most of whom presumably would 
receive positive or neutral references) making them think twice before complaining of discrimination. As 
noted above, the House of Lords in Derbyshire took recourse to EU law - in particular Coote v Granada - 
to switch the focus to the perspective of the worker. But given the facts, the judgment in Granada went 
further than that. 
 Mrs Coote sued her employer following her pregnancy-related dismissal. After those proceedings 
were complete, the employer refused to give her a reference and Mrs Coote sued again, this time for 
victimisation. The question referred to the ECJ was whether the victimisation provisions should protect 
former employees. Predictably, the ECJ ruled that they should, observing that: 
 
Fear of such [reprisals], where no legal remedy is available against them, might deter workers who 
considered themselves the victims of discrimination from pursuing their claims by judicial 
process, and would consequently be liable seriously to jeopardise implementation of the aim 
pursued by the Directive.
59
 
 
Although the refusal of a reference may have caused Mrs Coote a detriment, it could not be said to have 
deterred her, because at the time of the refusal, her pregnancy discrimination claim was complete. So the 
ECJ’s judgment must have been directed at the broader chilling effect of the employer’s conduct.  
 Assuming that Derbyshire, being in the House of Lords, was a case of public importance, and that 
the House chose to broaden the matter beyond the case in hand, by revisiting Khan and Cornelius, and 
invoking Granada, a failure to identify this aspect was remiss. 
  
3.  Conclusion 
Derbyshire was an easy case to decide. The sending of the letters treated the claimants less favourably than 
other workers, and the effect of this was undoubtedly to their detriment, indeed, it is arguable that the 
conduct was so serious that it ought have attracted criminal proceedings (for contempt of court).
60
 But in 
attempting to reconcile the decision with an ‘honest and reasonable defence’ and upholding the futile and 
fragile distinction between the bringing and existence of proceedings, the House of Lords perpetuated bad 
law. This obvious and flagrant case of victimisation took several years and a House of Lords decision to 
decide because of this law, originating in Cornelius and Khan, which encouraged the employer to think it 
could bully the claimants with impunity. Indeed, it convinced the Court of Appeal to hold that the 
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employer’s conduct did not amount to victimisation.
 61
 Yet, in the face of this, the majority perpetuated the 
benign motive ‘defence’. Moreover, in switching it to another element whilst at the same time holding that 
it cannot be found in the legislation,
62
 it did so in the most clumsy, perverse, and technically flawed manner. 
 The speeches also fell short of offering clarity on the meaning of victimisation, notably on the 
chilling effect. The only useful guidance must be inferred from the decision. This suggests that normal 
private negotiations to compromise should be lawful. Any broader guidance, that honest and reasonable 
conduct by the employer will not cause ‘any other detriment’, was of limited use, because (1) claimants 
often could bring claims under the more specific features of employment (e.g. ‘access to opportunities for 
promotion, transfer or training, or to any other benefits, facilities or services’); and (2) ‘honest and 
reasonable’ conduct will not necessarily equate with causing no detriment. It was apparent that the courts 
had a certain sympathy for the employers in these cases, which is evocative of the benign motive ‘defence’ 
peddled by the importunate dissenters in the direct discrimination cases. This time though, the defence was 
championed by the majority. 
 Underhill J once suggested some efficacy for this defence when observing that it is confined to 
victimisation cases ‘of a very particular type’ because the employer was defending litigation; thus, it should 
not be applied in other scenarios.
63
 But there was nothing expressed in the Derbyshire or Khan speeches to 
indicate such a limit. Indeed, as if to illustrate the unsatisfactory state of this law, examples of both 
approaches can be found in the law reports.
64
 Furthermore, given that ‘particular types of case’ were not 
identified in the legislation, this is hardly a sound interpretation of the provisions. In these cases, it would 
have been much clearer to admit that legislation could not be read to accommodate this sympathy.
65
 There 
was nothing in the EU jurisprudence to suggest such a sympathetic approach (in fact Granada suggested 
the contrary), and so a ‘purposive’ redrafting along the lines of the Ghaidan approach,
66
 or Marleasing,
67
 
to narrow the scope of the protection would have been wholly inappropriate. And even if the failure of the 
legislation to accommodate these ‘litigation cases’ were the result of an obvious drafting error, it was not 
‘abundantly clear’ what Parliament’s policy would have been, let alone any specific drafting to implement 
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this, as required to ‘fill the gaps’ under Inco Europe.
68
 As such, the courts in Cornelius and Derbyshire 
ought to have referred the matter to the Court of Justice,
69
 or at the very least, signalled to Parliament their 
concerns over the drafting. 
 Aside from the messy and unconvincing attempts to reconcile the technical aspects of the law, 
what stands out in these cases is that those who complain of discrimination should not expect special, or 
enhanced, protection from retaliation. This is in the face of victimisation provisions which by their existence 
suggest quite the opposite: discrimination complainants are not ‘ordinary’ complainants. The failure to 
provide the enhanced protection mandated by Parliament has some unfortunate echoes of the historical 
common law indifference to matters of equality. 
  
4. The effect of the Equality Act 2010  
As it happens, Parliament has provided a new vehicle upon which the ‘honest and reasonable’ debate can 
be had. The victimisation provisions of the RRA 1976 and SDA 1975 were superseded by the Equality Act 
2010, section 27: 
 
(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— 
(a) B does a protected act, or 
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. 
  
The main purpose of this revision was to remove the comparative element (less favourable 
treatment), which had caused problems.
70
 It also brings the formula into line with that used in the growing 
number of victimisation provisions in Part V of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which cover areas such 
as whistle blowing, jury service, health and safety, Sunday working, family leave and working time rights. 
 The abolition of the comparative element simplifies matters and as such is an improvement for 
both claimants and defendants. But the choice of wording suggests, perhaps inadvertently, codification of 
the ‘honest and reasonable’ doctrine as reformulated in Derbyshire. It is no longer necessary to prove that 
the defendant treated the victim ‘less favourably’, only that the defendant subjects him to a detriment. In 
itself, this may appear to add up to much the same thing. But it enables the courts to redeploy the Derbyshire 
formulation, which was located in the employment provisions, to the actual definition of victimisation. This 
could resolve one weakness with the Derbyshire formulation, that it can be bypassed where the conduct 
affects a worker in the more specified ways, such as ‘opportunities for promotion … or access to any other 
benefits, facilities or services’.
71
 In all cases (not just ‘litigation cases’), courts could now consider that they 
have discretion to assess the reasonableness and honesty of the conduct irrespective of whether it related to 
‘opportunities’ or ‘benefits’ etc. of employment.  
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 But this seemingly attractive vehicle for the ‘honest and reasonable defence’ still runs into the 
problem of equating the employer’s conduct with the worker’s perspective of a detriment. Such a 
misconceived notion of detriment not only jars with a literal reading of the statute, it is also at odds with 
the statutory purpose, given the legislative history of section 27. In its response to its Consultation, the 
Government stated: 
 
We recommended ending the need for a comparator through aligning with the approach in 
employment law because this offers a more effective, workable system – not one in which it would 
necessarily be easier to win a case, but one where attention rightly focused on considering whether 
the ‘victim’ suffered an absolute harm, irrespective of how others were being treated in the same 
circumstances.
72
 
 
 The final clause (‘irrespective of how others were being treated in the same circumstances’) 
suggests that a ‘normal’, ‘reasonable’, or ‘standard’ reaction to litigation (or any other protected act) does 
not necessarily exonerate the defendant. This is so even where the reaction is one taken against all 
complainants, whether or not they are complaining of discrimination. Thus ‘general policy’ reactions, such 
as the withholding of a reference, or the suspension of a transfer, promotion, or grievance procedure, should 
attract liability, irrespective of the honesty and reasonableness of such conduct. In effect, it reverses Khan 
and Cornelius. This view is sustained by the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Bill and to the resulting 
Act, which provided this example: 
 
A woman makes a complaint of sex discrimination against her employer. As a result, 
she is denied promotion. The denial of promotion would amount to victimisation.
73
 
 
Assuming the ‘complaint’ amounts to proceedings, the facts of this example are on all fours with Cornelius, 
the only difference being the denial of a promotion rather than a transfer.  
 Given the courts’ obvious sympathy for the employer’s position, and their cavalier approach (in 
Cornelius, Khan, and Derbyshire) to the text of the legislation, it is just as likely that they will not see this 
as an impediment to their interpretation of the new formula. Moreover, if the UK’s secession negotiations 
fully detach domestic discrimination law from the EU, the courts will have further grounds to marginalise 
the claimant’s perspective and effects of the conduct, as these notions, expressed in Derbyshire, were rooted 
in Granada. In any case, the courts may still continue to use the ‘causative’ element, because of, for the 
distinction between the bringing and existence of the proceedings. As such, one must fear the new definition 
provides the courts with as much licence as before to focus on the employer’s conduct, despite a 
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Consultation Response and Explanatory Note to the contrary, both of which are standard guides to 
interpretation.
74
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6 PROBLEMS WITH INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
The next group of cases centre on several elements of the definition of indirect discrimination. In general, 
indirect discrimination law is group-based and effect-based, and is most closely tied to substantive equality. 
It is the antithesis of the binary fault-based litigation usually coming before the courts. The handling of four 
aspects of this law are explored below: (1) the defendant’s facially neutral requirement, (2) the disadvantage 
required, (3) the comparison required, and (4) the nature of the causative element: proving the reason why 
the group was disadvantaged by the defendant’s facially neutral practice.  
 
  
 THE FACIALLY NEUTRAL REQUIREMENT: THE ‘PERERA PROBLEM’ 
The original Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975) and Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976) provided 
a definition of indirect discrimination (since revised) intended to reflect the US Supreme Court’s definition 
given in Griggs v Duke Power.
1
 This was based on the US Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, which simply 
outlawed discriminatory employment ‘practices’. In the seminal case, Griggs, a unanimous Supreme Court 
fashioned its indirect discrimination (or adverse impact) theory with the following reasoning: 
 
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide 
equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On 
the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken 
into account. It has - to resort again to the fable - provided that the vessel in which the milk is 
proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business 
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
2
 
 
More legalistically, this meant that if a plaintiff could prove that a facially neutral employment practice 
disparately impacted on a racial group, the burden switched to the employer to show that the practice was 
necessary for job performance. 
 The inclusion in Britain’s anti-discrimination legislation was a direct result of the then Home 
Secretary’s (Roy Jenkins) discovery of Griggs whilst on a trip to the United States.
3
 Upon his return, the 
Home Secretary introduced this concept using a late amendment to the Sex Discrimination Bill, which 
became section 1(1)(b) of the 1975 Act: 
 
                                                          
1
 (1971) 401 US 424. 
2
 ibid 431. 
3
 See Lord Lester’s account (he accompanied the Home Secretary on the trip) ‘Discrimination: what can 
lawyers learn from history?’ [1994] PL 224, 227. 
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1 (1) A person discriminates against another in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any 
provision of this Act if... 
 
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to a man 
but—(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is considerably 
smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and (ii) which he cannot show to be 
justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to whom it is applied, and (iii) which is to her 
detriment because she cannot comply with it. 
  
The subsequent Race Relations Act 1976 adopted the same formula with the necessary adjustments for 
race.
4
 Until its revision decades later,
5
 the element requirement or condition proved frustratingly 
problematic. The Act demanded that for prima facie discrimination to be proved, the discriminator must 
have applied a requirement or condition that adversely affected the victim’s group (as well as the victim). 
Often that would not be a problem. For example, a job advertisement might read, ‘Librarians wanted. 
Applicants must be over six feet tall’. That would adversely affect some racial groups and women. But if 
the advertisement were amended to read, ‘Librarians wanted. Applicants who are at least 6 feet tall will be 
preferred’, the exchange of the word must for preferred hints at the trouble to come. Particular racial groups 
and women would remain disadvantaged by the modified criterion, yet it is arguable that the preference 
was no longer a requirement or condition. As we shall see, this argument was well-received in the Court of 
Appeal. The analysis of this problem takes four perspectives: (1) whether the section should be given a 
narrow or liberal interpretation, (2) the application of the literal rule, (3) international comparisons, and (4) 
the role of EC law. 
  
1. A Narrow or Liberal Interpretation?  
A narrow interpretation would create a loophole in this law. Employers could evade the legislation simply 
by relegating any (indirectly) discriminatory requirements to ‘mere preferences’. Consequently, with this 
element in particular, the role of the judges is stark as well as critical. In this context, there were three ways 
of approaching this aspect of indirect discrimination. First, there must be a requirement or condition in the 
sense that it is an absolute ‘must’ (the first librarian advertisement). Second, there need only be an 
(employment) practice (the second advertisement). These two views envisage a cause and an effect, the 
cause being the requirement or practice having the effect of disadvantaging the victim’s group (and the 
victim). The third possibility is to look solely for the adverse effect, and from this deduce that there must 
                                                          
4
 RRA 1976, s 1(1)(b) provided: ‘he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to 
persons not of the same racial group as that other but—(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the same racial group as that 
other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it; 
and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of the person 
to whom it is applied; and (iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply with it’. 
5
 See below, p 137. 
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have been a requirement or practice that caused the effect. This would resemble the ‘fair share’ theory of 
discrimination law rejected in Western democracies,
6
 leaving a choice between the first and second options.  
 The matter was not helped by the use of language in the first White Paper to explain the intended 
policy. The last-minute amendment to the SDA 1975 accounts for the omission of any Government policy 
on indirect discrimination in the preceding White Paper.
7
 The opportunity came several months after the 
passing of the Act, when the Government published its ‘parallel’ White Paper on Race Relations.
8
 At first, 
the policy seems clear but then the matter becomes confused with a careless use of language, clearly not 
envisaging how divisive this was to become. This White Paper stated that direct discrimination laws alone 
could not address the ‘practices and procedures which have a discriminatory effect’ and ‘practices’ which 
are ‘fair in a formal sense but discriminatory in their operation and effect’.
9
 This is language obviously 
informed by Griggs. Further on, the White Paper outlined the intended legislation. In place of the words 
practice and procedure we find requirement and condition,
10
 the words adopted for the legislative formula. 
 In the early days of the legislation the EAT drew on the American progenitor to identify the 
purpose or mischief and suggest a liberal interpretation. In Clarke v Eley (IMI) Kynoch
11
 Browne-Wilkinson 
J stated obiter: 
 
In our view it is not right to give these words a narrow construction. The purpose of the legislature 
in introducing the concept of indirect discrimination into the 1975 Act and the RRA 1976 was to 
seek to eliminate those practices which had a disproportionate impact on women and ethnic 
minorities and were not justifiable for other reasons. The concept was derived from that developed 
in the law of the United States which held to be unlawful practices which had a disproportionate 
impact on black workers as opposed to white workers: see Griggs v Duke Power. If the elimination 
of such practices is the policy lying behind the Act, although such policy cannot be used to give 
the words any wider meaning than they naturally bear it is in our view a powerful argument against 
giving the words a narrower meaning thereby excluding cases which fall within the mischief which 
the Act was meant to deal with.
12
 
  
                                                          
6
 See, Ch 2, p 58 et al. 
7
 Home Office, Equality for Women (Cmnd 5724, 1974). 
8
 Home Office, Racial Discrimination (Cmnd 6234, 1975). 
9
 ibid, para 35. Note that even within one paragraph there is inconsistent use of terms, practices and 
procedures followed by practices alone. 
10
 ibid, para 55. Lord Lester has recalled how the Home Secretary and he were ‘powerless’ to secure a less 
restrictive definition of the Parliamentary drafter’s interpretation of Griggs: ‘Discrimination: what can 
lawyers learn from history?’ [1994] PL 224, 227, n 11. 
11 [1983] ICR 165 (EAT). 
12 ibid 170-171, rejecting an argument that ‘Condition’ included qualifications for the job and not disqualifications to continue holding 
the job, where only part-timers (all female) were made redundant. See also: Steel v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] 1 WLR 64 
(EAT), 70-71, where Phillips J cited Griggs for ‘assistance’ in defining the ‘heavy onus’ of justification, where the preferable rounds 
were allocated according to length of ‘permanent’ service, not available to women until 1975; Snoxell v Vauxhall Motors [1978] QB 
11 (EAT), 29, citing Griggs, and another US case which was relevant to the facts (‘red circling’ defence to equal pay claims): Corning 
Glass Works v Brennan 417 US 188 (Sup Ct, 1974). 
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Shortly afterwards, the EAT cited this passage in Watches of Switzerland v Savell,
13
 where counsel 
formulated the employer’s practice as a ‘...vague, subjective, unadvertised promotion procedure which does 
not provide...any adequate mechanisms to prevent subconscious bias unrelated to the merits of the 
candidates...for the post....’
14
 The EAT found that the procedure, so formulated, could amount to a 
requirement or condition within the meaning of SDA 1975, section 1(1)(b).
15
 These early EAT cases 
showed an appreciation of the statutory purpose using the legislation’s American antecedent, and 
accordingly attributed a liberal interpretation to the phrase requirement or condition.  
 Things changed abruptly when the Court of Appeal came to the matter for the first time in 1983, 
just a few months
16
 after Clarke v Eley. In Perera v Civil Service Commission (no. 2),
17
 for the post of legal 
assistant, candidates were assessed inter alia on their command of the English language, experience in the 
UK, age,
18
 and possession of British nationality. Without reference to Browne-Wilkinson’s J dictum, nor 
to Griggs, the Court of Appeal held that these ‘mere preferences’ did not amount to a requirement or 
condition within the meaning of the section 1(1)(b). To come within the Act, the Court stated, an employer 
should elevate the preference to a requirement or ‘absolute bar’ which had to be complied with, in order to 
qualify for the job. 
 This change of tune was all the more surprising as it upheld the decision of the EAT, with Browne-
Wilkinson J presiding.
19
 This decision predated Clarke v Eley, and one can only surmise that in the 
meantime the judge had a change of heart in Clarke in order to cite Griggs in support of a consideration of 
the statutory purpose and the consequent liberal interpretation, features conspicuously absent in his Perera 
speech. 
 Nevertheless, the Clarke v Eley dictum was now history. This was confirmed a few years later 
when the Court of Appeal followed Perera in Meer v London Borough of Tower Hamlets.
20
 In this case, 
the employer attached twelve ‘selection criteria’ to an advertised post. One of these was experience in the 
Tower Hamlets district. That put persons of Indian origin at a disadvantage because a higher than average 
proportion of them were new to the area. The Court of Appeal rejected Meer’s claim of indirect 
discrimination holding that the criterion (or preference) of Tower Hamlets experience did not amount to a 
requirement or condition. Balcombe LJ acknowledged that this interpretation of section 1(1)(b) ‘may not 
be consistent with the object of the Act’
21
 and declined to expound upon this statement. He curtly 
                                                          
13
 [1983] IRLR 141. The Claim Failed Because That Procedure Did Not Adversely Affect Women. 
14
 ibid [17]. 
15
 ibid [23]. 
16
 22 Sep 1982 - 2 February 1983. 
17
 [1983] ICR 428. 
18
 Younger applicants were preferred. Ethnic minority applicants were more likely to have arrived in the 
UK and/or attained qualifications later in life. 
19
 [1982] ICR 350, 356. The EAT found that each criterion did not amount to an ‘absolute bar’ as each could 
be offset by another. Perera’s separate claim that a more specific age requirement (to be under 32) attached 
to a separate job indirectly discriminated against ethnic minorities was upheld and not appealed: ibid 358-
359. 
20
 [1988] IRLR 399. 
21
 ibid [10]. 
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distinguished the Clark v Eley dictum as being made ‘in a context wholly different’,
22
 and followed Perera 
as binding precedent. 
 These were not just simple narrow interpretations rooted in a blinkered adherence to the literal 
rule. The two Court of Appeal decisions were underpinned with (misplaced) notions of statutory purpose,
23
 
expressed in defiance or complete ignorance of the Clark v Eley dictum and the American progenitor upon 
which the statutory definition was based. The closest they came to the history was when Stephenson LJ, 
giving the leading speech in Perera, said: 
 
I appreciate the importance of looking at the way in which what is alleged to be a discriminatory 
requirement or condition operates, as is clear when one looks at the origin of this provision in the 
United States and decisions there, on which this statutory provision in section 1(1)(b) is based.
24
 
 
This proved to be a meaningless meander, as Stephenson LJ had his own theory, explained thus: 
  
[A] brilliant man whose personal qualities made him suitable as a legal assistant might well have 
been sent forward... in spite of being, perhaps, below standard on his knowledge of English...
25
 
  
Instead of being related to the statute or its purpose, this is in fact an ideological predilection that employers 
should be free to choose whom to employ. There is no need for ‘special’ treatment for minorities. That the 
‘exceptional’ underdog can prosper is proof of that. Of course, the explanation also reveals the technical 
flaw in the theory, which seriously reduces the statute’s efficacy. The candidate had to be ‘brilliant’ to 
compensate for a racially-connected disadvantage: a ‘brilliant’ black person will obtain a post otherwise 
suitable for an ‘average’ white person. The Court of Appeal also failed to address Mr Perera’s argument 
deployed in terms of the Court’s logic: that several ‘preferences’ which could not be complied with added 
up to an absolute bar. If a candidate lacked a good command of the English language, experience in the 
UK, youth, and British nationality, he stood no chance of being selected. Stephenson LJ merely noted the 
argument and the EAT’s rejection of it for lack of evidence that any such combination had been applied.
26
 
 A more elaborate underpinning of the ‘absolute bar’ doctrine was offered in Meer. Staughton LJ 
rejected the appeal because otherwise: ‘...section 1(1)(b), RRA ... would have such an extraordinary wide 
and capricious effect.’
27
 This of course overlooks the possibility that ‘wide and capricious’ discriminatory 
practices were the mischief intended to be addressed by the legislation. Instead, it evokes a related 
ideological predilection that equality law is the problem, rather than a solution; it interferes with the 
                                                          
22
 ibid [9]. 
23
 The EAT in Perera [1982] ICR 350 expressed nothing in support of its ‘absolute bar’ interpretation. 
24
 [1983] ICR 428, 437. 
25
 ibid 437-438. 
26
 ibid 435. 
27
 [1988] IRLR 399, [20]. 
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individual’s liberty to choose whom to employ. This can be seen Staughton’s LJ example given in support, 
which requires quoting in full: 
 
Suppose an employer takes into account, amongst other things, whether an applicant’s surname 
begins with the letter ‘A’. If it does, that is a factor to be taken into account in his favour. Suppose 
also, and this is not difficult, that the letter ‘A’ has no relevance to the job on offer and the 
requirement or factor is not justified - it is just adopted at the whim of the employer. I do not doubt 
that a racial group could be found somewhere in which the proportion of persons whose surnames 
begin with the letter ‘A’ is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not in that group 
whose surnames begin with the letter ‘A’. There will be a risk that a person from that racial group 
whose surname does not begin with the letter ‘A’ will have applied for the job and not been 
awarded it. The applicant will be able to say that he suffered a detriment in the shape of an inability 
to take advantage of a factor which would have told in his favour. That is an extreme example in 
order to make the point clear.
28
 
 
 This example reveals two problems. First, with respect, Staughton LJ missed the point because the 
issue ought not to be the specifications within the whim, but whether or not they amounted to a requirement 
or condition within the meaning of the Act. Second, this employer’s ‘whim’ could conceivably amount to 
discrimination if a higher than average proportion of a protected group were affected by it. For instance, 
excluding those whose name begins with the letter ‘P’, would exclude all Patels, which would be likely to 
adversely affect those of Indian origin. A major feature of indirect discrimination law is its effects-based 
nature. Yet Staughton LJ failed to appreciate the discriminatory effect of the ‘whim’. 
 Staughton’s LJ ideological predilection manifested in his speech as a matter of discriminatory 
intent. The judge used his example in support of his view that otherwise an employer would be exposed to 
a charge of racial discrimination: ‘...whether or not he had the slightest intention to discriminate on racial 
grounds and whether or not racial grounds had any effect whatever on his decision.’
29
 Staughton LJ is 
suggesting that section 1(1)(b) should be read to exclude cases of unintentional discrimination, thus 
confining liability to intentional discrimination (an ongoing judicial preoccupation with direct 
discrimination
30
). As well overlooking the provision’s antecedent, Griggs,
31
 and its purpose, the comment 
has no basis in the statutory wording. For instance, RRA 1976, section 57(3) provided that no damages 
should be payable in cases of unintentional indirect discrimination,
32
 a provision rendered meaningless by 
this opinion. Thus, the comment in support of the narrow interpretation fails to recognise the mischief, adds 
                                                          
28
 ibid [21]. 
29
 ibid [20]. 
30
 See p 89 and ‘The importunate dissenters’. 
31
 ‘[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
“built-in headwinds” for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability’: (1971) 401 US 424, 432. 
32
 See also SDA 1975, s 66(3). See, for example Orphanos v Queen Mary College [1985] AC 761 (HL). 
See now, a modified version: EA 2010, s 124(5) (employment) and s 119(6) (other claims). 
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words to the statute, and renders a part of it otiose, breaching a ‘cardinal rule’ of statutory interpretation.
33
 
From a technical viewpoint, implanting an element of discriminatory intent into the inherently effect-based 
definition of indirect discrimination would alter its character to such an extent that it would no longer 
resemble indirect discrimination. If such an error were put into practice, it would seriously damage the 
efficacy of the law of indirect discrimination. 
Aside from these distractions, and the American progenitor, there was another reason to afford the 
legislation the liberal interpretation. The Equal Treatment and Equal Pay Directives
34
 were part of the 
Community’s push to achieve sex equality in employment, expressed in Article 119 of the original Treaty 
of Rome. As long ago as 1961, the Member States had expressed by a Resolution the goal of elimination 
of all direct and indirect sex discrimination in employment.
35
 This was cited in the preamble to the Equal 
Pay Directive. Meanwhile, article 3(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive instructed that the principle of 
equal treatment meant that ‘there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex’. None of this, 
nor any case law, suggested anything so restrictive as indirect discrimination applying only to ‘absolute 
bars’. This being the case, it is no surprise that the Court of Justice at the time had not addressed the 
‘absolute bar’ issue (and never has since, of course). But in those early days of discrimination law for the 
Court, the Advocate General had cited the Resolution in a (successful) argument to expand the scope of the 
UK’s equal pay law,
36
 whilst the Court had cited the European Social Charter in support of the principle 
that the elimination of sex discrimination was a ‘fundamental human right’.
37
 (One could hardly argue that 
any lesser principle applied to race.) Given this, and the aspiration to eliminate all indirect sex 
discrimination and the edict requiring no sex discrimination whatsoever, it would have been inconceivable 
for the Court to entertain a restrictive ‘absolute bar’ rubric, let alone sanction one just for the United 
Kingdom. Notable here would have been the Court’s teleological and schematic approaches, and the 
principle of uniformity.
38
 
When Perera was decided, all of this was available to the Court of Appeal. The Equal Treatment 
Directive applied to sex discrimination in recruitment, and so dictated the meaning ascribed to the SDA 
1975. As the SDA 1975 could not be interpreted as requiring an ‘absolute bar’ for indirect discrimination 
in employment, nor, one would imagine, could the parallel provision of the RRA 1976, these being statutes 
in pari materia.
39
 After all, it would have been inevitable that one day any incongruity between them would 
                                                          
33
 Re Florence Land Co (1878) 10 Ch D 530 (CA) 544 (James LJ). See further, p 23, n 70. 
34
 Respectively Council Directives 76/207/EEC and 75/117/EEC. See now Recast Directive 2006/54/EC. 
35
 Emphasis supplied. See the account in Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (No 2) [1976] ECR 455, paras 43-56: the ‘Resolution of the 
Conference of Member States of 30 December 1961’, to extend a time limit to the end of 1964, was made in frustration at the failure 
of all member states fully to implement Article 119 by its ‘first stage transitional period’, which expired on 31 December 1961. (It 
was held that the time extension in the Resolution had no effect to exonerate a member state from earlier failures to implement Article 
119.)  
36
 Case 61/81 EC Commission v UK [1982] 3 CMLR 384, Opinion of Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat, para 
291. 
37
 Case 149/77 Defrenne v SABENA (No 3) [1978] ECR 1365, para 28 (but Article 119 did not extend to 
conditions of work or dismissal). 
38
 See Ch 1, p 37. 
39
 See Ch 1, p 26. 
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be exposed in court.
40
 None of this potential was even considered by the Court of Appeal in Perera or 
Meer.
41
 If it had, the Court would have had another reason to afford the legislation a liberal approach. 
 
In summary, the Court of Appeal maintained that the words requirement or condition in section 1(1)(b) 
should be given a narrow interpretation because: (i) employers may not intend to discriminate when using 
mere preferences;
42
 (ii) ‘...a brilliant man...’ may overcome a disadvantageous preference;
43
 and (iii) 
otherwise the section would have ‘...such an extraordinary wide and capricious effect.’
44
 All of this was 
without reference to the White Paper, that stated the purpose, as noted above, that direct discrimination 
laws alone could not address the ‘practices and procedures which have a discriminatory effect’ and 
‘practices which are fair in a formal sense but discriminatory in their operation and effect’.
45
 Given that 
reference to White Papers was at the time commonplace,
46
 this omission, in exchange for a number of 
speculative, spurious, flawed and ultimately doomed theories, is puzzling, and somewhat remiss, as was 
the failure to continue the early practice of the EAT and refer to the Act’s American antecedents for 
guidance, or even to consider the certainty of an inconsistent interpretation being given under EU law to 
the parallel provision in the SDA 1975. 
 Perera stood as precedent for many years, leading to two notable consequences. On the one hand, 
tribunals side-stepped its negative connotations. On the other, it had potential to be misapplied, wrecking a 
claim from the outset. 
 
  
Side-stepping Perera 
It is clear from the facts of these two cases that mere preferences could amount to discrimination in fact. 
The only escape route open to tribunals, it seemed, was to sidestep Perera by finding that criteria expressed 
as preferences in substance operated as absolute bars. This could occur in two ways. First, a list of 
discriminatory ‘preferences’ taken together could amount to an absolute bar. That is the case even though 
each criterion, taken in isolation, would not be so. We saw that argument put forward by Mr Perera and left 
unaddressed by the Court of Appeal for want of sufficient evidence. Thus, a tribunal finding sufficient 
evidence could take that line without offending Perera.  
                                                          
40
 It arose in Falkirk Council v Whyte [1997] IRLR 560 (EAT). See below, p 132. 
41
 Many years later, in Adekeye v Post Office (No.2) [1997] ICR 110, 119, the Court of Appeal rejected such 
a proposition as ‘extraordinary’. Adekeye was overruled in Relaxion v Rhys-Harper [2003] 2 CMLR 44. 
42
 Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399, [20] (Staughton LJ). 
43
 Perera v Civil Service Commission (No. 2) [1983] ICR 428, 437-438 (Stevenson LJ). 
44
 Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399, [20] (Staughton LJ). 
45
 Home Office, ‘Racial Discrimination’ (Cmnd 6234, 1975). 
46
 Indeed it was used in a discrimination case by a differently constituted Court of Appeal just a few years earlier: Shields v Coomes 
[1978] 1 WLR 1408 (CA) 1425. See p 27. 
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 Second, a criterion expressed as a ‘mere preference’, might be applied as an absolute bar. For 
instance in Jones v University of Manchester,
47
 a job advertisement stated that the successful candidate 
would be ‘a graduate, preferably aged 27-35 years’. It was alleged this put women at a disadvantage because 
a larger proportion of women than men obtained degrees as mature students.
48
 An industrial tribunal found 
that although the advertisement expressed age as a preference, in practice the employer had applied the age 
limit as a requirement. Thus, the tribunal interpreted section 1(1)(b) in accordance with Perera; but was 
prepared to look beyond the form of the criterion to the recruitment practice. The Court of Appeal had 
doubts about the tribunal’s interpretation of the evidence,
49
 but refused to interfere with their finding of 
fact, that the employer had applied a ‘requirement’ for the purposes of SDA 1975, section 1(1)(b). With the 
retrospective blessing of the Court of Appeal, the industrial tribunal side-stepped Perera and the obvious 
consequences of following it. In each of the two examples above, the Act could cover criteria expressed as 
mere preferences without distorting the statutory words. 
  
Misapplying Perera 
Beyond such ingenuity by a willing tribunal given fortuitous facts, there was for a time little escape from 
Perera. Moreover, not only was it a precedent of ‘bad law’, it had the potential to be misapplied, further 
frustrating the purpose of the legislation. In Mutemasango v Staffline Recruitment Ltd,
50
 Staffline specialised 
in recruiting workers who were available immediately or at short notice. Consequently, it targeted the 
unemployed. But Staffline had a policy of not recruiting those who had been unemployed for more than six 
months. This was because, it claimed, the long term unemployed were unreliable. However, the evidence 
showed that Staffline had recruited those applicants who had given a good reason for being out of work for over 
six months. It was not the practice of Staffline to ask for such a reason; it only considered the long-term 
unemployed if a reason was volunteered. 
 Mutemasango approached Staffline for work. When asked, he stated that he had been unemployed for 
fifteen months. He was rejected without being asked for a reason for his long term unemployment. He brought 
a claim of indirect racial discrimination based upon statistics that showed that a disproportionately high amount 
of the long term unemployed were from ethnic minorities.
51
 The EAT held, applying Perera, that the ‘six month 
rule’, being open to exceptions, was a ‘mere preference’, and not being an ‘absolute bar’ it was not a 
requirement or condition within RRA 1976, section 1(1)(b). 
 It is quite alarming that when faced with statistical proof that the policy adversely affected ethnic 
minorities, the EAT followed Perera without considering the implications. If it had done, it would have realised 
                                                          
47
 [1993] ICR 474 (CA). The claim failed because there was no adverse impact on women. See further 
below, p 138. 
48
 See also Price v Civil Service Commission (No. 2) [1978] ICR 27 (EAT) where an upper age limit of 28 
years was held to adversely affect women, who were more likely to take time out from work for family 
responsibilities. Discussed below, p 141. 
49
 See for instance [1993] ICR 474, 490-491 (Ralf Gibson LJ). 
50
 EAT 13 May 1996. 
51
 It seems from the Report that the claimant was ‘African’ although his individual protected characteristic 
was not part of the EAT’s reasoning.  
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that Perera had led it to fail to identify properly the policy under attack. The EAT identified the policy solely 
as: ‘not recruiting those unemployed for over six months’. It then noted that that policy was subject to an 
exception (the ‘good reason’ explanation). Hence, the logic went, the policy is not an absolute bar to the long 
term unemployed, it was only a ‘preference’. Of course, the true policy here, for the purposes of a discrimination 
claim, was ‘not recruiting those unemployed for over six months without good reason.’ Hence, if a person was 
long term unemployed without ‘good reason’ there was an ‘absolute bar’ to his or her recruitment. If the 
claimant’s racial group had been adversely affected by this policy, the burden of justification would have shifted 
to the defendant and the tribunal would have been able to scrutinise the policy, by asking, for instance: whether 
Staffline had any evidential or objective basis to consider the long term unemployed unreliable; what Staffline 
considered to be a ‘good reason’; and whether the policy was applied uniformly (say, why applicants had to 
volunteer the good reason).  
  
2. The Application of the Literal Rule 
The analysis so far is expressed in negative terms, with the implication that under the mischief (or 
purposive) rule, the statutory words should have been given a ‘secondary meaning’, interpreted liberally, 
or even distorted, to address the mischief. But in fact, none of this was necessary to fulfil the statutory 
purpose. 
 The crude logic of Perera is that the phrase requirement or condition equates to an absolute bar, 
or a ‘must’. In fact, this in itself was not seriously harmful. To explain how the harm arises, we should first 
consider the actual cause of action in these cases, provided by the employment Part of the legislation. For 
instance, RRA 1976, section 4 provided: 
 
(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in Great 
Britain, to discriminate against another— 
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should be offered that 
employment... or 
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer him that employment.
 52
 
  
It was noted above that Stephenson LJ underpinned the decision by stating that the ‘brilliant man… might 
well have been sent forward’.
53
 In effect, this is stating that the employer’s requirements should be an 
absolute bar to the job, which assumes the claim was under paragraph (c). The error here was connecting 
the requirement to the job, when it should be connected only with the arrangements for recruitment, under 
paragraph (a). No mention of section 4 was made at all in Perera, whilst in Meer, although paragraph (a) 
alone was cited, the judgments assumed again that the criterion should be an absolute bar to the job, thus 
treating the claim as one under paragraph (c).  
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 The drafting may or may not have been intended to cover cases in this sense; it may be that the 
relevance of paragraph (a) to mere preferences was more fortuitous than foreseen. Nonetheless, these 
recruitment cases fall readily into paragraph (a), and given that the reasons underpinning Perera and Meer 
were spurious, there is nothing to suggest that paragraph (a) should not apply.  
 Once this is established, the claim can be more properly formulated. Combined with the definition 
of discrimination, the law thus demanded a requirement or condition in the arrangements for recruitment 
with which the claimant, and a disproportionate amount of persons of the claimant’s racial group (and the 
claimant), could not comply. Accordingly, in Perera’s case, to gain an advantage in the selection process 
there were requirements to have inter alia a command of the English language, experience in the UK, youth, 
or British nationality. Similarly, in Meer, compliance with each of the twelve ‘arrangements’, or selection 
criteria, would carry credit. Of course, those unable to comply with some might have been compensated by 
compliance with others. In that sense, each criterion is not a barrier to the job. However, each criterion 
could be a barrier to obtaining credit in the selection process and this would be to the detriment of the 
claimant.
54
 The requirement is that to gain an advantage in the selection process one must comply with any 
particular criterion. In short, rather than having applied a literal or narrow interpretation, the Court of 
Appeal in Perera exchanged the statutory word ‘arrangements’ in favour of an imaginary phrase, ‘the job’. 
One could surmise that the Court of appeal mistakenly judged the case under paragraph (c), but as this was 
not explained at all in either case, that would be too generous an assumption.  
 Given that the objections expressed in Perera and Meer to the liberal interpretation were spurious, 
and that this literal interpretation accords with the purpose expressed in the White Paper, the American 
antecedent on which the provision was based, these decisions were wrong, not because they took the narrow 
interpretive option, but because they had no basis whatsoever in any rule of interpretation. 
  
3. International Case Law Comparisons 
Had tribunals
55
subsequent to Perera looked a little further afield, they would have realised that its doctrine was 
becoming increasingly an isolated approach to indirect discrimination law. In the United States, for instance, in 
the wake of Griggs v Duke Power,
56
 as early as 1972, subjective hiring practices (which would fall outside of 
the Perera doctrine as ‘mere preferences’, at best) were challengeable under the employment provisions of the 
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Civil Rights Act 1964 (Title VII). In Rowe v General Motors,
57
 the following promotion/transfer procedure 
was identified: 
 
(1) The foreman’s recommendation was the indispensable single most important factor in the 
promotion process.  
(2) Foremen were given no written instructions pertaining to the qualifications necessary for 
promotion. (They were given nothing in writing telling them what to look for in making their 
recommendations.)  
(3) Those standards which were determined to be controlling were vague and subjective.  
(4) Hourly employees were not notified of promotion opportunities nor were they notified of the 
qualifications necessary to get jobs. 
(5) There were no safeguards in the procedure designed to avert discriminatory practices.
58
  
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this ‘procedure’ amounted to an employment practice for the 
purposes of Title VII
59
 which adversely affected black workers, who occupied predominantly the ‘Hourly’ 
jobs. 
 Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court has recognised subjective hiring practices. Action Travail 
des Femmes v Canadian National Railway
60
 is a classic example. The defendant Railway Company 
discouraged women from working on blue collar posts with these recruitment practices: 
 
(1) The employer had not made any real effort to inform women in general of the possibility of 
filling blue collar positions in the company. 
(2) Canadian National’s recruitment programme with respect to skilled crafts and trades workers 
was limited largely to sending representatives to technical schools where there were almost no 
women. 
(3) When women presented themselves at the personnel office, the interviews had a decidedly 
‘chilling effect’ on female involvement in non-traditional employment; women were expressly 
encouraged to apply only for secretarial jobs. Women applying for employment were never told 
clearly the qualifications which they needed to fill the blue collar job openings. 
(4) The personnel office did not itself do any hiring for blue collar jobs. Instead, it forwarded 
names to the area foreman, and Canadian National had no means of controlling the decision of the 
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foreman to hire or not to hire a woman. (The evidence indicated that the foremen were typically 
unreceptive to female candidates.)
61
 
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the decision of the tribunal of first instance that these 
practices amounted to sex discrimination. Dickson, CJ commented: 
 
...systemic discrimination in an employment context is discrimination that results from the simple 
operation of established procedures of recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is 
necessarily designed to promote discrimination. The discrimination is then reinforced by the very 
exclusion of the disadvantaged group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and 
outside the group, that the exclusion is the result of natural forces, for example, that women ‘just 
can’t do the job’.
62
 
 
 Although the courts in these two cases were not restricted by the statutory words requirement or 
condition, they illustrate the proper reach of indirect discrimination law, which in these cases went beyond 
even the ‘mere preferences’ left untouched by Perera.  
 A more precise case for comparison arose five years after Perera. The Federal Court of Australia 
(New South Wales District) entertained a case of ‘mere preferences’ under the identical statutory phrase 
requirement or condition, given in the Australian SDA 1984, section 5(2).  
 The case was Secretary of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and: Styles.
63
 The complaint 
concerned a job selection process. The post was that of a Counsellor in the Department located in London. 
It was advertised by a circular distributed within the Australian Public Service. Although this post was 
designated ‘Grade A2’ journalist, it was quite clear that anyone Grade Al could apply. Grade Al was 
immediately below Grade A2. Twelve members of the Australian Public Service applied; two of them 
Grade A2 and the other ten Grade Al. Helen Styles was among the Grade Al applicants. The Department 
considered only the two Grade A2 applicants and disregarded all 10 of the Grade Al applications. Of the 
two Grade A2 applicants, one was considered to be needed elsewhere in Canberra and so the other was 
chosen. What happened here is clear. The Department preferred a Grade A2 applicant. It may have 
considered the exceptionally brilliant Grade Al candidate (but did not). Or, more likely, in the absence of 
any Grade A2 journalists applying, it would have considered the Grade Al applicants. In the same way, the 
employers in Perera and Meer preferred applicants to have certain characteristics. Helen Styles based her 
claim on the basis that men were overrepresented (85 per cent) in the category Grade A2. Of course, to 
support this claim she had to show that the preference for Grade A2 was a ‘requirement or condition’ so as 
to come within section 5(2).  
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 In a common judgment Bowen, CJ and Gummow J considered Perera and held:  
 
In construing these words [SDA 1984, s 5(2)] it is essential to bear in mind that the concept of 
indirect discrimination ... is concerned not with form and intention, but with the impact or outcome 
of certain practices. ... to look solely at the terms of the departmental circular is to put misplaced 
reliance on the formal terms of the criteria for selection, which is both contrary to the legislative 
intent and would tend to encourage evasion of the operation of the statute. ... A requirement or 
condition, therefore, means a stipulation which must be satisfied if there is to be a practical (and 
not merely a theoretical) chance of selection.
64
 
 
 In contrast to Perera and Meer, this judgment recognised the purpose of indirect discrimination 
law, as well as the potential loophole. The closest the Court of Appeal came to this was in Meer, with 
Balcombe’s LJ unexplained doubt about the correctness of Perera. Styles illustrates that the Court of Appeal 
should not have felt fettered by the language of section 1(1)(b). It might be argued that Styles is 
distinguishable because, rather like the conclusion in Jones v University of Manchester,
65
 it was found that 
in practice a requirement had been applied: no A1 applicants were short-listed. But this logic is vulnerable 
to the error that holds that the requirements must be for the job, rather than for any aspect of the recruitment 
process.
66
 Moreover, the Styles decision was explained as much by the statutory purpose as it was on the 
specific facts, suggesting that the Australian court would have taken a more generous approach to 
disadvantages within a recruitment process, such as those evident in Perera and Meer. 
 These three international cases, ranging from 1972 to 1989 illustrate not only the increasing 
international isolation of the Perera doctrine in terms of statutory purpose and (in the case of Styles) 
wording, but also how insular the Court of Appeal, and the tribunals that followed it, had become. Further 
similar indications were to come from EU law. 
  
4. The Role of EU Law 
Given its flaws and increasing isolation, it is surprising that Perera stood for fourteen years before its 
decline even began. This was with a predictable consequence of EU law, a directive passed in 1997. The 
first indication, if one were needed, that EU law would not countenance the Perera approach, came in fact 
a little earlier in 1994. 
 Suppose a case parallel to Perera, save that the claimant were an Italian national. His claim under 
the Race Relations Act 1976 would fail presumably because of Perera. At the time, there was no 
Community legislation on racial discrimination, but EC law did prohibit discrimination against EC workers 
on the grounds of nationality.
67
 Rather like its American counterparts, no specific formula defining indirect 
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discrimination was provided; it was left for the ECJ to develop. Given that the definition of ‘race’ in the 
RRA 1976 included ‘nationality’,
68
 one might have supposed the Court of Appeal to have been aware of 
the potential for a conflict, which would arise unless the ECJ found a reason to adopt Perera’s ‘absolute 
bar’ notion. Given that no other comparable court had done so, this was unlikely. 
 Hence, when a ‘mere preference’ case came before the ECJ, such an argument was not even on 
the table. In Ingetraut Scholz v Opera Universitaria di Cagliari,
69
 Scholz, a German woman who had gained 
Italian nationality by marriage, applied for one of 21 posts as a canteen assistant with the University. The 
University applied selection criteria that included two-and-half points merit per year of similar or superior 
public sector work experience, and one point per year of other public service experience. Scholz had seven 
years’ experience as a postal assistant in Germany, which would have placed her eleventh among the 
candidates; but the University only gave credit for experience gained in Italy. Without those seven points, 
Scholz came 54th, and so was not appointed. 
 The criterion was not an ‘absolute bar.’
70
 It merely put candidates at an advantage if they possessed 
the stated experience. The University would have offered Scholz the job if her lack of Italian experience 
were offset by other qualifications, or if some of the other candidates did not score so highly, or there were 
fewer than 22 candidates. Scholz complained that the University’s criterion amounted to nationality 
discrimination. This was not considered as a case of direct discrimination because Scholz was, at the time, 
an Italian national.
71
 However, in the words of Advocate General Jacobs, the selection procedure was: 
 
...more likely to affect nationals of other Member States more severely than it affects Italian 
nationals. That is so because most Italian candidates will have acquired their previous experience 
(or the greater part of it) in Italy, whereas most candidates from other Member States will have 
acquired their previous experience (or the greater part of it) in other Member States.
72
 
  
Note here, that Advocate General Jacobs is concerned that the criterion was ‘more likely to affect … more 
severely’ other nationals, rather than ‘absolutely bar’ them. Accordingly, the ECJ held that: 
 
[T]he Treaty prohibits not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all forms of 
covert discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the 
same result. 
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Consequently, the Court found in favour of Scholz, and signalled, to a British audience at least, it made no 
distinction between absolute bars and mere preferences. What mattered was the effects of the challenged 
criterion. 
 Despite the significance of the case, Scholz went unnoticed in the English courts, to be mentioned 
only in passing in 2015,
73
 long after Perera ceased to be an issue. Instead, it was Europe’s sex 
discrimination legislation and the Scottish EAT that first marked the demise of Perera. In Falkirk Council 
v Whyte,
74
 an employer advertised a post of first-level line manager. One of the selection criteria stated that 
both ‘management training and supervisory experience’ were ‘desirable’. The three female complainants, 
each having made unsuccessful applications for the post, alleged that the criteria amounted to unlawful sex 
discrimination because a considerably smaller proportion of women than men had such training or 
experience. (The claimants themselves had none.) 
 The EAT recognised a discrepancy between the SDA 1975 (according to Perera) and the Equal 
Treatment Directive
75
 and preferred to follow the Directive for two reasons.
76
 First, it distinguished Perera 
as a case under the RRA 1976, not the SDA 1975 in question. Second, if there was a conflict between 
domestic and European law, the European law must prevail. Scholz was not cited, and given that the 
Directive provided nothing more than a general edict against sex discrimination, and that there was no other 
ECJ case law on the matter, the tribunal must have had a further reason to decide that European law was 
different from Perera. It did. Citing Griggs v Duke Power, it reasoned: 
 
In many ways this was a classic situation of indirect sex discrimination, with mostly women in basic 
grade posts, and mostly men in promoted management posts - a vivid example of what the Act and its 
forerunners in the United States set out to eliminate, i.e. those practices which had a disproportionate 
impact on women and were not justifiable for other reasons...
77
 
 
 For the first time since Perera, the EAT looked beyond the Court of Appeal for its understanding 
of what the law ought to be. The judgment was that Griggs was a better guide than Perera to the meaning 
of the Directive and indeed, the meaning of indirect discrimination; the EAT found for the claimants 
accordingly. 
 Whyte stated what every discrimination lawyer knew. But this was merely an EAT decision, still 
theoretically vulnerable to an overruling and carrying limited precedential weight. Perera’s fate was sealed 
soon after in more concrete terms with the Burden of Proof Directive,
78
 article 2 of which provided a 
definition of indirect discrimination, which ‘shall exist where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
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practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex...’. This was the clearest 
possible signal that Perera had no place in EU discrimination theory, and in time, successive equality 
directives carried similar formulas,
79
 which in turn fed into to the domestic derivatives, recast nowadays in 
the Equality Act 2010, section 19. Given that Perera was so at odds with the established definition and 
purpose of indirect discrimination law (notably nowadays, its goals of substantive equality and equality of 
opportunity), as well as being internationally isolated, it is unlikely that UK secession from the EU should 
upset the wording of section 19. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Perera and Meer provided technically flawed interpretations made on no recognised rule of statutory 
interpretation. The decisions were laced with misplaced purposes and could not even be described as literal 
interpretations. They were narrow and myopic. The Court of Appeal’s explanations merely disclosed an 
utter misconception of the nature and purpose of indirect discrimination (including the now-familiar 
flirtation with fault-based liability), which was not only easily divinable with a little consideration, but had 
been expressed elsewhere, notably in the White Paper and Griggs. 
 Many subsequent tribunals slavishly following Perera failed to show the imagination, wisdom, or 
simple trade craft (demonstrated in Styles, Whyte, and Jones v University of Manchester) to sidestep Perera. 
Ultimately, the European Union came to rescue of this judicially embarrassing affair. Yet, as the proper 
literal interpretation showed,
80
 Perera and Meer were easy cases with an easy solution producing good law. 
  
DISADVANTAGE AND MANDLA  
The Court in Perera may have been influenced by a similarly reductionist judgment on indirect 
discrimination delivered the previous summer by a differently constituted Court of Appeal (and which was 
not reversed until after Perera was decided). It will be recalled that the RRA 1976, section 1(1)(b) stated 
that the challenged requirement must be such that: ‘the proportion of persons of the same racial group ... 
who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who 
can comply with it...’ 
 In Mandla v Dowell Lee,
81
 Gurinder Singh Mandla, an orthodox Sikh boy was denied entry to a 
school because he failed to comply with its dress code, which required short hair and the wearing of a cap. 
Mandla’s religion dictated he kept his hair unshorn and restrained with a turban. His father complained to 
the Commission for Racial Equality, which pursued the case on their behalf. The Court of Appeal (Lord 
Denning MR, Oliver, Kerr LJJ) rejected the complaint.  
 To understand how the court came to the decision, one must first understand the ratio decidendi, 
which was that Sikhs did not constitute a racial group within the meaning of RRA 1976 (the case predating 
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dedicated religious discrimination legislation). The Act defined ‘racial grounds’ to mean ‘colour, race, 
nationality or ethnic or national origins’.
82
 Adopting the antithesis of the purposive approach, each judge 
used a dictionary to deliver an interpretation of ‘ethnic origins’ with the result that as Sikhs could show no 
common biological characteristic, they could not constitute racial group.
83
 Bolstering his resort to the 
dictionary, Oliver LJ said, ‘I do not believe that the man in the street would apply the word “ethnic” to a 
characteristic which the propositus[
84
] could assume or reject as a matter of choice.’
85
 
 By reducing the term ‘ethnic origins’ to a biological test, the Court effectively assimilated the term 
with ‘race’, offending the ‘cardinal rule’ that a statute ought not to be read in a way that renders any of its 
words otiose.
86
 Even without the purposive approach, this alone should have alerted the Court that they 
were on the wrong path. Further, this scientific approach to identifying a racial group was at odds with a 
House of Lords dictum. As far back as 1972, in an otherwise restrained interpretation of ‘national origins’ 
in the Race Relations Act 1968, Lord Simon had reasoned: 
 
‘[R]acial’ is not a term or art, either legal or ... scientific. I apprehend that anthropologists would 
dispute how far the word ‘race’ is biologically at all relevant to the species amusingly called homo 
sapiens.
87
 
 
This part of the judgment was not cited by the Court of Appeal. And, once again, had the Court troubled 
look overseas for guidance, they would have found a similar ‘anti-scientific’ sentiment expressed in the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal. In King-Ansell v Police,
88
 Richardson J said: 
 
[A] group is identifiable in terms of its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population 
distinguished from others by a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and 
characteristics derived from a common or presumed common past, even if not drawn from what 
in biological terms is a common racial stock.
89
 
 
The Court’s rejection of Sikhs as a racial group was enough to dismiss the appeal. But Oliver and 
Kerr LJJ ventured further. They held that as Mandla could physically comply with the dress code, by cutting 
his hair, removing the turban, and fitting the school cap, he could comply with the dress code. For Kerr LJ, 
the issue was inevitably tied to the finding that Sikhs did not constitute a racial group. He suggested that as 
the definition of a racial group is based upon unalterable characteristics; the statutory phrase ‘can comply’ 
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must be contrasted with ‘something approaching impossibility’. Thus, ‘It was not intended to be measured 
against criteria of free will, choice, or conscience.’
90
 Similarly, Oliver LJ thought the law was aimed at 
‘impossible’ requirements related to things such as ‘height, pigmentation, or linguistic or educational 
qualifications’ and not matters ‘which some individual members of a group are unwilling to fulfil or may 
find unacceptable by reason of religious or conscientious scruple’.
91
 
 Of course, a consequence of such logic would undermine the efficacy of the legislation. Employers 
would argue that as women had a ‘choice’ as to marriage and childbirth, ‘family-hostile’ policies, such as 
the hiring of only young persons or full-timers, or a last-in-first-out redundancy process, would not even 
have to be justified, despite their inevitable impact on women.
92
 Similarly, a public house would argue that 
as Romanies could abandon a nomadic ‘lifestyle’ after seeing a ‘No Travellers’ sign, they need not be 
adversely affected.
93
 
 There is no doubt that all three judges were influenced by the motive underlying the dress code, 
which was to ‘to minimise the divisive differences of race, class or creed, and to serve as a good 
advertisement for the school.’
94
 Oliver LJ considered this ‘a perfectly respectable viewpoint and is the 
sincerely held and responsible opinion of a man who is running a multi-racial school in a difficult area’.
95
 
As such, the headmaster was ‘entirely blameless’,
96
 or in Lord Denning’s MR opinion, not ‘at fault in any 
way’.
97
 Meanwhile, Kerr LJ declared that ‘This school was demonstrably conducted harmoniously on a 
multiracial basis.’
98
 Although a consideration for any justification defence, none of this is at all relevant to 
the issues supposedly in question. It suggests, once again, that liability for discrimination must be fault-
based. Kerr LJ betrayed another dimension to his thinking, when he embellished the decision by telling the 
young Mandla with a flourish, ‘If persons wish to insist on wearing bathing suits they cannot reasonably 
insist on admission to a nudist colony....’
99
 In doing so, as Lord Rodger had done in JFS,
100
 he brought to 
his judgment the ideological predilection that the individual’s liberty to define his business should not be 
trumped by meddlesome equality law. 
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Conclusion 
The judgment could be characterised as one turning on the literal rule of interpretation. (It was indeed 
curious to witness Lord Denning, a leading and active advocate of the purposive approach,
101
 resort to a 
dictionary.) But the wider comments suggest that the Court was led by its sympathy for the headmaster, 
rather than an adherence to a literal rule. Technically, the Court would have done much better to have 
invoked its sympathy within the justification defence, rather than produce these wholly inadequate models 
of statutory interpretation.  
 One could also ascribe to this judgment a broader policy objective, in support of mono-culturalism, 
despite the unconvincing comments equating the policy (minimising ‘divisive differences of race, class or 
creed’) with multiculturalism.
102
 Any monoculture policy objective was at odds with the long-standing 
political commitment to multiculturalism, which no doubt was an underlying purpose to the Race Relations 
Act 1976, a purpose totally ignored.
103
 More worrying was the confusion of mono- and multi-culturalism 
concepts. This would undermine any attempt, were there one, at a purposive interpretation. Allied to the 
Court’s expressed sympathy for the headmaster and the (‘swimwear’) admonishment of the schoolboy, was 
of course the now familiar gravitation to the common law’s traditional at-fault tortfeasor and victim mind-
set.  
 As a postscript, the Court dedicated over 1,000 words of heavy criticism directed at the 
Commission for Racial Equality for pursuing the case.
104
 The Commission’s perseverance was rewarded 
when the House of Lords rescued the situation by reversing the Court of Appeal on all counts.
105
 
Nonetheless, the criticism exposed the distance between those who understand this law and this Court of 
Appeal, and was evocative of the historical negativity, if not hostility, towards matters of equality. 
 
  
 THE COMPARISON REQUIRED 
As noted above, the old ‘requirement or condition’ definition of indirect discrimination gradually gave way 
to a new formula, consolidated in the Equality Act 2010, section 19: 
 
(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or 
practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation 
to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if— 
                                                          
101
 ‘The literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced ... In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt 
such a construction as will promote the ‘general legislative purpose’ underlying the provision.’: Nothman v Barnet LBC [1978] 1 
WLR 220 (CA) 228 (Lord Denning MR) emphasis supplied. 
102
 In addition to Oliver’s LJ comment above, Kerr LJ said, [1983] QB 1, 20: ‘the school’s aim is clearly to 
provide a multi-racial approach to the education of all its pupils for life in the present-day multi-racial 
society of this country’. 
103
 See the argument of Irvine QC, [1983] QB 1, 7. 
104
 ibid: 90 words, at 13 (Lord Denning MR) 801 at 17-18 (Oliver LJ) and 150 at 24-25 (Orr LJ). 
105
 [1984] 2 AC 548. 
  6 Problems with Indirect Discrimination 
 
142 
 
 
(a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, 
(b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular 
disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, 
(c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and 
(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
  
On the matter of making a comparison for the purpose of establishing the ‘particular disadvantage’, 
guidance is provided by section 23(1): 
 
On a comparison of cases for the purposes of [indirect discrimination] there must be no material 
difference between the circumstances relating to each case. 
 
Although establishing the ‘particular disadvantage’ ought to be easier
106
 than establishing that a 
‘considerable smaller’ proportion of persons ‘can comply’ with the requirement or condition (under the old 
definition), the formula for the comparison provided by section 23 remains essentially the same.
107
 Upon 
this rubric, case law has developed a method of analysing a pool comprising persons whose circumstances 
are materially the same, save for the protected characteristic. The pool is analysed to see if the protected 
group has been put at a particular disadvantage. The analysis is measuring the impact of the provision, 
criterion, or practice on the claimant’s group in comparison with the impact on the others in the pool. Apart 
from excluding material differences, the courts have been troubled on how to select the pool, as observed 
by Sedley LJ:  
 
[O]ne of the striking things about both the race and sex discrimination legislation is that, contrary 
to early expectations, three decades of litigation have failed to produce any universal formula for 
locating the correct pool, driving tribunals and courts alike to the conclusion that there is none.
108
 
 
Thus, for Sedley LJ, there is no single principle. It is a question of fact in each case.
109
 That may be largely 
true, but one technical rule, beyond the material differences rubric, is that the challenged factor(s) should 
not be used in defining the pool, as this would frustrate the purpose of assessing its impact.
110
 The problem 
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can be seen in the dissent of Aikens LJ in Rolls Royce v Unite.
111
 In this age discrimination case, the 
challenged practice was credit for long service in a redundancy selection procedure: those with longer 
service were less likely to be made redundant. The majority of the Court of Appeal accepted that this 
adversely affected younger workers (although it was objectively justified). In his dissent on the adverse 
effect element, Aikens LJ assembled a pool of workers of all ages who completed the same length of 
service. He then compared the group of older workers (50-55) with younger ones (40-45), with the 
inevitable conclusion that the criterion did not adversely affect the younger group.
112
 The technical error, 
of course, was including the challenged practice of length of service (albeit rather unrealistically uniform) 
in the definition of the pool. 
 That said, on the whole, the Court of Appeal seemed to have mastered this process. In Jones v 
University of Manchester,
113
 the job requirement was to be a graduate aged 27-35. The claimant argued that 
the age requirement indirectly discriminated against women. She argued that the pool should comprise 
graduates who had obtained their degree as mature students, i.e. aged at least 25. The Court of Appeal 
rightly rejected this, as the age factor should be disregarded. The correct pool was all graduates. (Then the 
proportion of female graduates within the age requirement was compared with the proportion of male 
graduates within the age requirement.) 
 In another sex discrimination case, Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College,
114
 where part-
time lecturers were dismissed and rehired through an agency on inferior terms, the part-time factor was 
disregarded providing a pool of all the College’s teaching staff. The comparison was between the 
proportions of female full-timers and male full-timers (i.e. those not dismissed), which was 21 and 38 per 
cent respectively. A further example of good practice can be seen in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. 
In McCausland v Dungannon DC,
115
 the claim was that a job requirement to be an existing member of staff 
indirectly discriminated against Catholics. The other (unchallenged) requirement was a ‘standard 
occupational classification’ (SOC) of 1, 2 or 3. The pool consisted of anyone from the whole Northern 
Ireland workforce with a SOC 1, 2 or 3. (The comparison was between the proportions of Catholics and 
Protestants from the pool who could comply with the requirement to be an existing member of staff.) 
 Thus, the Court of Appeal showed a good grasp of the process, with comparisons which were 
proper, practical, and served to identify whether or not there was any adverse impact. This was thrown into 
doubt by the majority’s pronouncements in the House of Lords case Rutherford v Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry (No. 2).
116
 In this case, predating the first specific age discrimination legislation,
117
 Mr 
Rutherford was dismissed at the age of 67. At the time, by section 109 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
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those over 65 could not claim for unfair dismissal.
118
 Mr Rutherford argued that section 109 adversely 
affected men and so was contrary to EU sex discrimination law. The majority compared men and women 
over 65 who were in work, and concluded that there was no adverse impact at all, because section 109 
treated these workers equally, irrespective of sex. Notable in this methodology is the inclusion of a 
challenged factor (age) in defining the pool. Baroness Hale explained why younger persons should not be 
in the pool: ‘Indirect discrimination cannot be shown by bringing into the equation people who have no 
interest in the advantage or disadvantage in question.’
119
 This does not tally with the exclusion of younger 
workers, who are advantaged by unfair dismissal rights. Thus, the decision could be confined to something 
narrower than this dictum, which is itself troublesome. The technical problem with its logic is that it 
supposes a binary pool, where every member is either advantaged or disadvantaged by the challenged 
factor. This fails to account for the wider purpose (and efficacy) of indirect discrimination law, which is to 
address adverse impacts on protected groups. In Griggs v Duke Power,
120
 for instance, the statistics used 
included all those of post-high school age in North Carolina, most of whom had no interest whatsoever in 
working at Duke Power and so were neither (directly) advantaged or disadvantaged by Duke Power’s 
recruitment practices. But the statistics helped show the adverse impact on African Americans generally. 
A more realistic explanation for the chosen pool in Rutherford might be that the majority struggled to equate 
an age limit with a condition, such as that for two-years’ service for unfair dismissal rights.
121
 In any case, 
the claimant’s case was relatively simple: as men have a greater tendency to work beyond 65, they are 
disproportionately affected by section 109. This argument may have led the majority into a rather pointless 
debate between a pool comprising all citizens over 65 (working or retired) or just all those in work over 65. 
Both outcomes are wrong for including the challenged (age) factor, rendering the comparisons unable to 
assess that factor’s impact. Disregard the age factor and the pool (crudely) is the nation’s entire 
workforce.
122
 Now a proper comparison can be made, between the proportions of men and women who 
cannot meet the condition (to be under 65). In the event, as the minority found, this comparison did not 
show a significant enough difference to suggest that that section 109 adversely affected men.
123
 The 
majority’s approach compared only those in the disadvantaged group, with the inevitable result of no 
adverse impact. Indeed, the impact was precisely the same on men and women, a sure sign that their test 
might have been technically flawed. 
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 This pool, along with Baroness Hale’s advantaged/disadvantaged dictum, has led to confusion in 
three particular ways. It has produced a polarised debate, been honoured in name only, or used to support 
a fundamentally incorrect pool. 
 First, Rutherford has been taken by some to mean that the pool should be narrowest possible, 
which has produced a counter-argument advocating the widest possible pool. This rather polarised debate 
arose in BMA v Chaudhary.
124
 Here, the challenged practice was a bar by the BMA to financially supporting 
racial discrimination claims by its members against regulatory bodies. While the claimant argued for a pool 
comprising its total membership, the BMA asserted the other extreme, that it should comprise only those 
few members wanting to bring racial discrimination claims. The Court of Appeal, obiter,
125
 applied 
Rutherford and agreed with the BMA. As everyone in that group was disadvantaged (as in Rutherford), the 
claim had to fail. 
 Some sense was restored in Grundy v British Airways,
126
 where Sedley LJ in particular, neutralised 
this debate. He stated that the guiding principle is that provided by what is now EA 2010, section 23(1): 
like should be compared with like. Within this, ‘the pool must be one which suitably tests the particular 
discrimination complained of’.
127
 As such, it ‘needs to include, but not be limited to, those affected by the 
term of which complaint is made, which can be expected to include both people who can and people who 
cannot comply with it’.
128
 Note here, the pool need not comprise only those ‘affected’ (i.e. advantaged or 
disadvantaged) by the challenged factor. Using the old case of Price v Civil Service Commission,
129
 he 
offered two extreme examples to defuse notion that either one or the other is correct. In Price, the employer 
stipulated an age limit of 17-27. This was challenged as adversely affecting women.
130
 The employer argued 
for a pool comprising the nation’s entire workforce. Such a pool would ‘empty the issue of reality’, Sedley 
LJ observed. On the other extreme, a pool of only those over 27 ‘would have assumed the legitimacy of the 
very rule that was in issue.’
131
 The correct pool (actually used in that case) was those men and women who 
were (otherwise) qualified for civil service employment. Accordingly, the correct pool for BMA v 
Chaudhary suggested Sedley LJ, was those members seeking support for legal claims.
132
 This is indeed 
correct. The challenged factor in Chaudhary was ‘claims for racial discrimination’, and so it would be 
proper to include in the pool those seeking other claims, including other discrimination claims. 
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 The whole court in Grundy considered that that the ratio of Rutherford was not clear.
133
 If 
Rutherford were taken to provide a universal rule, Sedley LJ added, ‘it is hard to see how indirect 
discrimination claims could ever succeed.’
134
 These comments and the general guidance should, one would 
hope, effectively confine Rutherford to its own facts, the lawyers’ euphemism for it being quietly forgotten. 
 But that is not to be. More recently, a differently constituted Court of Appeal showed Rutherford 
more deference. This is a second consequence of Rutherford. In Somerset CC v Pike,
135
 teachers returning 
to work part-time, could not make pension contributions, unlike their full-time counterparts. The claimant 
argued that this indirectly discriminated against women. The employment tribunal decided upon a pool 
comprising all teachers. Apparently applying Rutherford, the Court of Appeal reversed, as this was 
‘bringing into the equation people who have no interest in the advantage or disadvantage in question’.
136
 
The correct pool, according to the Court of Appeal, was those teachers returning to work. (This showed an 
adverse impact on women of the part-time factor, as the part-timers were predominantly female by 
comparison to the full-timers.) Although this is the correct pool, using the advantaged/disadvantaged 
dictum affords it credibility it does not merit. It worked here by the happenstance of the facts providing a 
tangible pool readily defined by the (non-challenged) factor of those teachers returning to work. (Of course, 
applying the actual decision in Rutherford would have provided a pool of only part-time returnees and a 
pointless and doomed comparison would follow.) Similarly, in XC Trains v CD, ASLEF,
137
 the EAT gave 
an unnecessary nod to Rutherford in coming to the correct conclusion. Here it was held that an unsocial 
hours roster adversely affected women, using a pool of the whole workforce (17 women, 532 men) ‘[a]s in 
Rutherford’, the EAT reasoned.
138
 It gave no explanation as to why this pool resembled anything in 
Rutherford, and rejected the employer’s pool
139
 of just those who had requested (and been denied) different 
hours (4 men, 2 women),
140
 which would have been a ‘Rutherford pool’: it was defined by the challenged 
factor (denials) and no one apart from these six were advantaged or disadvantaged by the denials. It was 
not clear whether this was tactful sidestep or a less than full understanding of Rutherford. 
 These cases may have produced satisfactory outcomes, but they left the meaning of Rutherford in 
even more confusion. All that can said in their favour is that they managed to sidestep its neutralising 
effects. But that may be better than the third consequence of Rutherford, which is to produce fundamentally 
incorrect pools, with the inevitable result. This can occur either with Baroness Hale’s 
advantaged/disadvantaged dictum or simply by using the challenged practice to dictate the composition of 
the pool.  
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 An example of the first occurred in Bailey v Brent Council.
141
 In a challenge to library closures, 
the Court of Appeal held that the pool should be confined to library users. The consequence of such a 
comparison was set out by the trial judge: 
 
In any event, since Asians are the largest ethnic group among the users of Brent libraries, 
it would be expected that they would be the most numerically disadvantaged. But the Asian 
users of the libraries were not proportionately more disadvantaged or indeed advantaged 
than non-Asians. 76% of Asian users and 76% of non-Asian users use the libraries that 
remain and 24% of Asian users and 24% of non-Asian users use the libraries that will close. 
Moreover... the percentage of users of all Brent libraries who were Asian and the 
percentage of users of the six to be closed who were Asian differed by 0.04.
142
 
 
 These figures, displaying a virtually equal impact, were received by the Court of Appeal without 
a degree of scepticism. All they tell us is that the impact upon Asians and non-Asians was evenly distributed 
geographically.
143
 They measured the impact on library users across the borough, but failed to measure the 
impact on Asian residents of the borough, who relied on the libraries to a greater degree than non-Asians. 
Hence, the claimants advanced their case upon a different pool:  
 
... 28% of the population of the Borough is Asian, 46% of the active borrowers from libraries 
are Asian. The corresponding figures for whites are 45% population, 29% active borrowers, and 
for blacks 20% population, 19% active borrowers.
144
 
 
 A comparison using these figures showed a significant disproportionate impact of the closures on 
the Asian residents. But these figures were disregarded, using Baroness Hale’s logic from Rutherford that 
the pool should not include ‘people who have no interest in the advantage or disadvantage in question.’
145
 
Pill LJ (with whom the Court agreed)
146
 bolstered this conclusion by quoting Sedley LJ from Grundy 
(above), to the effect that being a fact-sensitive exercise, tribunals had considerable discretion in selecting 
a pool. This selective citation overlooked the point of this part of Sedley’s LJ speech, which was that 
Rutherford should not be applied as a universal rule otherwise ‘it is hard to see how indirect discrimination 
claims could ever succeed’.
147
 Of course, the claimant’s figures suggest that no matter how the council went 
about closing its libraries, an adverse impact on Asians would be inevitable. But that is a matter for 
justification, not the prima facie case. 
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 Perhaps the most pitiful use of Rutherford arose in Hacking & Paterson v Wilson.
148
 In a case 
where requests for flexible working by property managers were universally denied, the Scottish EAT held 
the pool comprised only those who had actually requested flexible working, the rest of the workforce being 
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by the practice.
149
 So constructed, the pool merely demonstrated that 
100 per cent of men and 100 per cent of women had their requests denied. The result was so inevitable that 
this case was actually an appeal by the employer to strike out the claim for want of any chance of success. 
But Lady Smith (sitting alone), while advocating this pool, somehow considered that the result was not 
inevitable. She reasoned thus: 
 
The fact that all of them did or would have received a negative response to a request for flexible 
working does not mean that all would have suffered what can properly be characterised as a 
disadvantage or that the disadvantage to them would necessarily have been the same.
150
 
 
 It is difficult to imagine a scenario where women in this pool could show that they suffered a 
particular disadvantage, that is one compared to the men (if any). It could occur perhaps where the women 
needed flexible work for child care, whilst the men needed it to play golf. But even this might not pass 
muster under Lady Smith’s guidance. She suggested that society had ‘changed quite dramatically’
151
 since 
1984 and the case of Home Office v Holmes,
152
 where, with the approval of the EAT, an industrial tribunal 
found ‘unhesitatingly’
153
 that a refusal of flexible working would disadvantage women. Nowadays, 
reasoned Lady Smith, women and men request flexible working for child care, ‘or to combine jobs, pursue 
other interests or follow educational courses.’
154
 Moreover, mothers may prefer part-time work out of 
‘choice rather than necessity’, and so ‘it is difficult to see that it would be correct to talk in terms of that 
employee being disadvantaged’.
155
 Of course, the particular disadvantage here need not be one of the 
consequences of the denial, such as an inability to spend more time with one’s children compared to an 
inability to play golf (or ‘pursue other interests’). Such comparisons would import value judgments 
(possibly gender-loaded) and risk of bringing the courts into ridicule. The disadvantage would be quite 
simply the inability to work flexibly. As such, the result is inevitable. Whatever the flavour or relevance of 
the judge’s social commentary, at the heart of this case is the technical error of defining the pool by the 
challenged practice. 
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Conclusion 
The cases demonstrate that beyond the statutory ‘material difference’ rubric (EA 2010, s 23), tribunals and 
courts have to resort to their understanding of discrimination law and its technicalities more generally. After 
a largely sound start in the Court of Appeal and below, the House of Lords then displayed the least 
understanding, which, obvious to say, is most worrying. It is sad to report that Rutherford has not been 
quietly forgotten, or confined to its facts, but has created confusion and will be cited before any tribunal or 
court credulous enough to take it as a universal principle, as occurred in Bailey and Wilson. As well as 
showing a worrying lack of expertise, some of these faulty cases demonstrated a considerable indifference 
to the outcome, evoking once again, a negativity towards matters of equality. 
 
  
 THE COURT OF APPEAL’S REASON WHY THEORY 
Section 19(2)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 requires that the challenged practice ‘puts’ the claimant’s group 
‘at a particular disadvantage’, as well as putting the claimant at that disadvantage (s 19(2)(c)).
156
 This 
causative element demands a connection between the challenged practice and the claimant’s group. Where 
there are tangible challenged practices, causation is unlikely to be an issue. It goes without saying that, for 
instance, entrance exams,
157
 last-in-first-out selection for redundancy,
158
 or length of service benefits,
159
 
will have a tangible impact on those who respectively, fail the exam, are selected for redundancy, or who 
have shorter service. In such cases the issue will be whether that impact falls disproportionately upon a 
protected group (the ‘particular disadvantage’), which in these concrete examples is a relatively 
straightforward task, as there are likely to be statistics available to assess any such impact.  
 All this was thrown up in the air for some 21 months by an ultimately doomed rewriting of indirect 
discrimination theory by the Court of Appeal in two cases, Essop v Home Office,
160
 shortly followed by 
Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice.
161
 In two convoluted judgments, the Court of Appeal launched its 
reason why theory, which, in essence, placed an extra and generally insurmountable burden on claimants 
to explain not only that they were disadvantaged by the challenged practice, but also to explain the reason 
why.  
  
1. Essop v Home Office 
The facts were straightforward. To be eligible for promotion, employees of the Home Office were required 
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to pass a generic core skills test (CSA). In 2010, a report commissioned by the Home Office found that the 
pass rates for candidates who were black and ethnic minority (‘BME’), and those who were older (i.e. those 
over 35), were significantly lower than for white, or younger, candidates respectively. This was confirmed 
by another report, finding that the selection rate for BME candidates was 40.3 per cent of the white 
candidate selection rate. For older candidates the rate was 37.4 per cent. In each there was a 0.1 per cent 
risk that this could happen by chance. Having failed the test, each claimant brought a case of indirect 
discrimination, either on race or age grounds. 
 Reversing the decision of the President of the EAT, Langstaff J, the Court of Appeal held that 
these facts alone (the tests combined with the statistics) were not enough to found a prima facie case under 
section 19(2)(b) or (c) (respectively group and individual disadvantage). It reasoned that the claimants had 
to show the reason why the group performed disproportionately poorly,
162
 and then the reason why each 
individual failed the test.
163
 In other words, there was a ‘known unknown’, and the claimants had to identify 
it to progress their case. 
  
Paragraph (b) – the group ‘particular disadvantage’ 
It will be recalled that the section 19(2)(b) requires that the challenged practice ‘puts, or would put, persons 
with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom 
B does not share it...’ 
 To satisfy paragraph (b), the argument came down to whether it was sufficient to prove the 
comparative success rates, or in addition, paragraph (b) required the reason behind those rates. The 
comparative success rates could be proved by statistics alone (combined with the tests). Case law of the 
ECJ, Enderby v Frenchay,
164
 suggests that statistics alone (in that case combined with a pay structure) can 
be enough to raise this inference. This explains the statutory Code of Practice: 
 
 4.11 In some situations, the link between the protected characteristic and the disadvantage might 
be obvious... In other situations it will be less obvious how people sharing a protected characteristic 
are put (or would be put) at a disadvantage, in which case statistics or personal testimony may help 
to demonstrate that a disadvantage exists... 
 
 Example: 
A consultancy firm reviews the use of psychometric tests in their recruitment procedures and 
discovers that men tend to score lower than women. If a man complains that the test is indirectly 
discriminatory, he would not need to explain the reason for the lower scores or how the lower 
scores are connected to his sex to show that men have been put at a disadvantage; it is sufficient 
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for him to rely on the statistical information.
165
 
 
 It also explains why Langstaff J held that section 19 ‘does not in terms require members of a 
disadvantaged group to show why they have suffered the disadvantage, in addition to the fact that they have 
done so’.
166
 Speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeal,
167
 Sir Colin Rimer disagreed, holding that this was 
a ‘somewhat literal interpretation’ overlooking ‘that it is conceptually impossible to prove a group 
disadvantage … without also showing why the claimed disadvantage is said to arise’.
168
 In this context, he 
observed: 
 
Many BME and older candidates did pass the test and there is no logical warrant for an assertion 
that any who did not pass failed it only because of the disadvantage to the group posed by the 
CSA.
169
 
 
 There are a number of problems with this reasoning. First, Sir Colin Rimer speaks as if 
momentarily detached from the common law tradition of proof, which is centred on thresholds, such as an 
asserted fact being ‘more likely than not’, or ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, rather than any notion of ‘absolute 
truth’. Hence, many a defendant has been found liable or convicted upon circumstantial evidence, from 
which inferences were drawn. It might be conceptually impossible to prove group disadvantage, but it is 
not legally impossible to infer it from the evidence. Aside from any common law tradition, Sir Colin Rimer 
ought to have heeded a recital in the Race Directive, recognising that indirect discrimination could be 
established on the basis of statistical evidence.
170
 Thus, implanting an additional element (and burden) into 
the definition of indirect discrimination with no consideration of the related rules of proof was a technical 
shortcoming that would deprive the provision of much of its efficacy.  
 Second, the Court of Appeal distinguished Enderby as a case centred on the meaning of the 
objective justification defence.
171
 This is somewhat misleading. Enderby was a case of statistics showing a 
difference in pay between two occupations, one 63 per cent female (pharmacists), and the other 98 per cent 
female (speech therapists). The first question asked was whether the employer had the burden of proving 
that the difference was not the result of sex discrimination. This is exactly the point in Essop. In the answer 
to the question, the ECJ held: 
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[W]here significant statistics disclose an appreciable difference in pay between two jobs of equal 
value, … Article 119 EEC
172
 requires the employer to show that that difference is based on 
objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex.
173
 
 
Enderby could be distinguished as a case of equal pay, which has a particular framework of proof;
174
 but it 
was a case of indirect discrimination, and shows that the ECJ readily will shift the burden to the employer 
to objectively justify a disparity apparent from statistics alone. 
 Third, Sir Colin Rimer’s suggestion that the reason why is required because some in the claimants’ 
groups passed the test misunderstands a fundamental (and technical) aspect of indirect discrimination law. 
It is not confined to group exclusion, but group disadvantage. Otherwise, paragraph (b) would require a 
‘particular exclusion’.
175
 
 Fourth, another basis of the reason why requirement was that as it should be asked for direct 
discrimination, it should be transposed into the group context of indirect discrimination: 
 
In indirect discrimination claims, there is also a necessary ‘reason why’ question but it is of a 
different nature. It does not go to the employer's motive or intention, whether conscious or 
unconscious. It is as to why the PCP disadvantages the group sharing the protected characteristic.
176
 
 
Given that direct and indirect discrimination are said to be mutually exclusive definitions,
177
 making 
parallels without support is a somewhat precarious undertaking, requiring very persuasive reasoning. The 
Court presented no precedential nor other conceptual basis for this proposition. The obvious flaw is the 
starting point: the suggestion that direct discrimination requires a discriminatory motive or intent (conscious 
or unconscious), a notion persistently discredited by a number of House of Lords and Supreme Court 
pronouncements, as explained in Chapter 4. Thus, even the starting point for this notion is illusory. 
 Fifth, the only possible statutory word on which Sir Colin Rimer could hang the reason why theory 
(he did not try) was the adjective ‘particular’ attached to ‘disadvantage’, which appears rather redundant in 
an otherwise tightly drafted provision,
178
 and so open to interpretation. In essence, the phrase ‘particular 
disadvantage’ replaced the statistically natured threshold ‘considerably smaller’, found in the original RRA 
1976 and SDA 1975. This was in response to EU Directives, which had themselves evolved from 
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‘substantially higher proportion’
179
 to the current phrase. The change was explained by Baroness Hale in 
Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, as ‘... intended to do away with the need for statistical 
comparisons where no statistics might exist’.
180
 It was not intended to make it more difficult to establish a 
prima facie case, ‘quite the reverse’.
181
 That makes a general (and valid) point, but it does not explain the 
inclusion of ‘particular’. In a judgment post-dating Essop (in the Court of Appeal), the Court of Justice 
stated, 
  
[T]he concept of ‘particular disadvantage’ ... does not refer to serious, obvious or particularly 
significant cases of inequality, but denotes that it is particularly persons of a given racial or ethnic 
origin who are at a disadvantage because of the provision, criterion or practice at issue.
182
 
 
 This of course was not available to the Court of Appeal at the time, but it accords generally with 
Baroness Hale’s interpretation in Homer (which was available). It suggests that any disadvantage (such as 
a disproportionate failure rate) should relate to the particular group, and gives the word a purpose. This may 
not be wholly convincing,
183
 as none of this explains why the omission of the word ‘particular’ would cause 
problems. But at least it makes sense of the word, and is a lot more persuasive than the reason why theory. 
 Sixth, even if the word ‘particular’ did not suggest any ambiguity in the statutory definition, one 
might have thought the Court of Appeal would have looked outwards to some relevant jurisprudence before 
embarking upon an isolated new theory of indirect discrimination law. In addition to Enderby, the Court 
could have considered R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith where the ECJ and 
the House of Lords held that an increase in the qualification period for unfair dismissal rights raised a prima 
facie case because it disproportionately affected women.
184
 Note that in Enderby, some women were 
pharmacists and in Seymour-Smith, some women satisfied the longer qualification period, just as some 
BME and older workers passed the test in Essop.  
 Of course, a court concerned with pronouncing a theory of indirect discrimination would be remiss 
in omitting from its consideration the law’s progenitor and subsequent case law from a jurisdiction heavily 
experienced in (class-action) discrimination cases based on statistics. In Griggs v Duke Power,
185
 the 
evidence was that 58 per cent of white candidates, in contrast to six per cent of black candidates, passed the 
entrance exams. The US Supreme Court held that it was for the employer to justify its use of the tests. It 
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did not hold that the claimants should show why black workers disproportionately failed the tests.
186
 
 The Griggs court had the benefit of the background racially disparate educational achievements 
of the state, a result of historical school segregation. Griggs also concerned entrance exams. But the 
principle persists without such background information, and for promotion exams, as seen in two further 
US cases. In Bushey v New York State Civil Service Commission,
187
 a written examination was used for the 
post of Captain in State prisons. Two hundred and forty three whites and 32 non-whites took the test. One 
hundred and nineteen (49 per cent) of the whites and 8 (25 per cent) of the non-Whites passed the test. 
Upon this, a prima facie case was made out. In Bridgeport Guardians v City of Bridgeport,
188
 tests used in 
the promotion of police officers to the rank of sergeant were challenged, as 68 per cent of whites, 30 per 
cent of blacks, and 46 per cent of Hispanics, passed the test. Again, a prima facie case was made out. In 
none of these American cases were the plaintiffs required to demonstrate why the minority groups passed 
at lower rates. 
 It would seem from Griggs, Bushey and Bridgeport Guardians, an inference of causation was 
made from a simple finding of an adverse impact (despite some of the claimant’s group passing the tests). 
What these American cases have in common is proof of (a) an employment recruitment/promotion practice, 
and (b) a disproportionate success rate for protected groups. Upon this, an inference of causation was 
assumed. None of these cases demand a reason why to establish a prima facie case. Indeed, that was the 
line taken in Enderby. As such, Essop is indistinguishable. 
 The same approach has been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg). In 
DH v Czech Republic,
189
 primary school children who performed poorly in intelligence tests were placed 
in a special school for those with learning disabilities. Statistics showed that in one district a Roma child 
was 27 times more likely to be placed in a special school. The bald result of this facially neutral policy was 
that over half of Roma and just 1.8 per cent of non-Roma children were placed in these special schools. 
The Court cited a number of authorities including Griggs, and reasoned that: ‘to guarantee those concerned 
the effective protection of their rights, less strict evidential rules should apply in cases of alleged indirect 
discrimination’.
190
 In a case of a protected group disproportionately failing tests, the Court accepted 
statistics as proof of a prima face case of indirect discrimination;
191
 the reason why was not relevant to this. 
The similarity to Essop is striking. And of course, it was irrelevant that some Roma children would have 
performed well in the tests. Although the Convention does not afford employment rights per se, the case 
contributes to the picture of the Court of Appeal being completely isolated in its understanding of indirect 
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discrimination, a picture also including the House of Lords, the ECJ, the Code of Practice, and the 
antecedent American case law. 
 Seventh, instead of taking note of all this weighty opinion on the definition of indirect 
discrimination, Sir Colin Rimer selected a quote from Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire in 
support of his reason why theory.
192
 The quote requires context. In Homer, the challenged practice was a 
requirement to obtain a law degree, which adversely affected older workers approaching (compulsory) 
retirement age. As Baroness Hale described: 
 
Put simply, the reason for the disadvantage was that people in this age group did not have time to 
acquire a law degree. And the reason why they did not have time to acquire a law degree was that 
they were soon to reach the age of retirement.
193
 
 
 In that case, the reason was obvious (to quote the Code of Practice
194
). In Essop, and cases like it, 
the reason is not obvious. Ignoring Baroness Hale’s more general observation - that the new formula was 
intended to make proof easier for claimants
195
 - rendered this a selective quote, to say the least. Moreover, 
the distinction between obvious and not-obvious cases was under the nose of the Court of Appeal. In the 
EAT below, Langstaff J noted: ‘The purpose of the provision – eliminating the adverse effects of 
“disguised” discrimination – is not advanced, but hindered, by requiring the additional proof ...’
196
 
 Thus, Langstaff’s J understanding of the facts and the statutory purpose gave him no reason to 
depart from the statutory wording. Given this and the alarming statistics, it is somewhat ironic for the Court 
of Appeal to demean Langstaff’s J approach as ‘somewhat literal’. 
  
Paragraph (c) - individual ‘particular disadvantage’ 
Section 19(2)(c) demands that the challenged practice also ‘puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage’. On 
this point of individual disadvantage, the Court of Appeal was even more trenchant. Sir Colin Rimer said 
that as ‘many BME and older candidates did pass the test’ there was ‘no logical warrant for an assertion’ 
that those who failed did so because of the group disadvantage asserted under paragraph (b). He noted that 
paragraph (c) alludes to ‘that’ disadvantage in paragraph (b).
197
 (Now it was the Court of Appeal’s turn to 
attempt a literal approach.) Sir Colin Rimer is correct in that paragraph (c) is necessarily linked to the 
finding of group disadvantage under paragraph (b). The logical consequence is that the meaning accredited 
to paragraph (c) depends on the interpretation of paragraph (b). Nevertheless, the judge provided two 
arguments seemingly independent of paragraph (b) in support of the reason why theory. The first was 
precedent, and the second was possibility of coat-tailers. 
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Precedent 
First, Sir Colin Rimer considered that ‘The present case is no different in principle from other types of 
indirect discrimination claim.’
198
 In support he cited
199
 four cases where the reason why an individual was 
disadvantaged was (or was not) proven. These were Home Office v Holmes (refusal of flexible working and 
childcare); Homer (see above); McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs (magistrates’ obligation 
to place children with same sex couples and ‘Christian doubts’); and Eweida v BA (dress code and Christian 
belief in displaying crucifix).
200
 The problem with this rather selective list is that they belong to a type of 
case where the reason is, or would be, obvious. The latter two failed because of a failure to prove a 
‘known’.
201
 Many cases brought on statistics involve an ‘unknown’ cause. Authority (Enderby, Seymour-
Smith or indeed Griggs, Bushey and Bridgeport Guardians) shows that it is not necessary to prove an 
individual reason why. At the root of this selective citation is the technical shortcoming of a failure to 
recognise the distinction between the ‘obvious’ and ‘unknown’ cases. 
  
The ‘Coat-tailers’ 
A principal trigger for the reason why theory for group disadvantage was that some of the claimant’s group 
were successful, in the sense they fell into advantaged group. The obverse concern here (for individual 
disadvantage), is that some of the unsuccessful candidates failed tests for reasons unconnected with race, 
or age, as the case may be (e.g. late attendance resulting in an incomplete test). As claimants, such 
candidates were dubbed ‘coat-tailers’, and became a personal predilection of Sir Colin Rimer, who asked, 
‘But why should a coat-tailer, if he can be identified as such, be entitled to succeed? He has, ex hypothesi, 
not satisfied the section 19(2)(c) requirement...’
202
 The ideology here seems to be that the meritorious will 
always get a ‘fair chance’, which itself relies on a blind faith that employers, given the liberty of choice, 
will act prudently. 
 In more practical terms, Sir Colin Rimer’s judgment here seems to envisage (to take an extreme 
example), a ne’er-do-well worker standing before court demanding compensation and a court order for 
promotion because he failed out of idleness a test that happens statistically to disadvantage people of his 
protected characteristic: a freeloader, or coat-tailer.  
 This overlooks several things. First, the coat-tailer argument was a purely hypothetical one, put by 
the employer,
203
 yet the existence of one (or more) seemed to be basis for this decision. This is rather odd 
in a particularly fact-sensitive part of the formula, and so should have played no part in the actual decision. 
Second, given the link between paragraphs (c) and (b), a consideration of the ramifications of his coat-
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tailer argument should have signalled that something was wrong with his interpretation of paragraph (b) 
and the reason why theory. Putting such an onus on each individual in the group would render such claims 
practically impossible, undermining the efficacy of the indirect discrimination provisions. It is one thing to 
isolate a non-discriminatory reason for failing, such as late attendance. Aside from the absurd theory that 
BME and older candidates have a propensity for such self-inflicted failure, it is quite another to demand 
that each proves the reason why they failed. Depending on quite what the Court expects as proof, this could 
involve a huge amount of research beyond the reach of most claimants, encompassing, for instance, cultural, 
sociological, socio-economic, and educational factors. It could also produce a morass of absurd arguments. 
What for instance, would be the evidential value of a (white or young) latecomer having passed the test? 
How would a claimant prove that she was diligent? Are there records of candidates’ attendance times?  
 Moreover, the theory bears no consideration of the potential remedies (another technical flaw). 
One must consider what fear lay behind Sir Colin Rimer’s demand to identify coat-tailers. Take the extreme 
example of a freeloader bringing a claim. The most likely outcome should the claim succeed (i.e. the Home 
Office fails to objectively justify the test) would be the adoption of a more refined test that better predicted 
job performance and had the minimal discriminatory impact.
204
 Thus, the coat-tailer’s only benefit would 
be the opportunity to sit a test which was better tailored to job performance. Now, the freeloader again fails, 
but this time the meritorious pass. An award of damages would be most unlikely as he could show no 
tangible or non-pecuniary loss caused by the flawed tests. Thus, even in an extreme case of coat-tailing, 
there are only beneficial effects with no unfair advantage to the freeloader. 
 Third, of course, the selective use of precedent overlooks that there could be ‘coat-tailers’ in many 
a statistical group that is held to have suffered an adverse impact, including Enderby, Seymour-Smith,
205
 
Griggs, Bushey, and Bridgeport Guardians. In none of those cases was it suggested that the claimants had 
to prove that they were not coat-tailers. This is another consequence of the technical error noted above
206
 
of supposing that the principal mischief of indirect discrimination law is group exclusion. 
 Thus, while it is true that paragraph (c) is somewhat dependent on paragraph (b), that itself is 
reliant on a correct application of paragraph (b). The ramifications of Sir Colin Rimer’s interpretation of 
paragraph (c), and the relevant precedents, ought to have alerted him that his view of paragraph (b) was 
wrong. None of this is to say that paragraph (c) is otiose: individual disadvantage still depends on a finding 
of group disadvantage. Further, paragraph (c) serves the purpose of its predecessors
207
 of excluding those 
with no interest at all in the case. 
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Mixed messages 
Despite the general tenor of a conservative judgment, Sir Colin Rimer’s speech included some mixed 
messages. At one point, he suggested that placing ‘too high a burden’ on the claimants would result in the 
continuation of unlawful discrimination: ‘a social evil which must be stopped.’
208
 Elsewhere though, he 
suggested that Langstaff’s J decision gave the claimants ‘an automatic ride to victory’ (subject to objective 
justification).
209
 Then, in a rather strange twist at the end of the judgment, Sir Colin Rimer wrote: ‘I would 
accept that a statistical report ... is in principle capable of being relied on by the claimants to prove the 
group disadvantage caused by the PCP ...’
210
 He repeated this for individual disadvantage.
211
 At this point, 
it is worth noting section 136(2) and the claimant’s evidential burden: ‘If there are facts from which the 
court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation’, it ‘must hold that the contravention occurred’ 
(emphasis supplied). In the unlikely scenario it could be read to do so, this makes clear that the legislation 
does not permit a court to offer an optional range of evidential standards and burdens. The case was remitted 
to an employment tribunal to decide. One is left wondering quite what the statistics can show the second 
time around that they failed to show before this Court of Appeal. Of course, the Supreme Court’s reversal 
saved the tribunal (and many others no doubt) from the torturous task of interpreting and applying this 
judgment.  
  
Summary 
With the startling test results and resulting workplace stratification, and a fixed pool for comparison, this 
archetypal scenario presented yet another easy case to decide. If the Court of Appeal was unsure of this, 
there was to hand plenty of consistent House of Lords/Supreme Court, ECJ, Strasbourg, and antecedent 
American case law for guidance, all reflected in the Code of Practice. But rather than absorb this 
jurisprudence, it quoted selectively and designed its own isolated definition of indirect discrimination law. 
The Act’s stated ambition ‘to increase equality of opportunity’ (Long Title) and ‘strengthen the law to 
support progress on equality’ (Explanatory Note 10) found no place in this judgment, nor its thinking. 
Instead, the Court read words into the statute that had no place, conceptually, purposively, and certainly not 
literally. The judgment made technical errors regarding the standard of proof, group exclusion, obvious and 
‘unknown’ causes, and the remedial consequences for the coat-tailer. If this were not enough, the decision 
was also unhelpfully ambivalent on the evidential burdens. Rather like Perera three decades earlier, it was 
merely a narrow, isolated, and ultimately doomed, interpretation. 
 The Court of Appeal’s unreceptive attitude to the claim was perhaps summed up by its 
preoccupation with the hypothetical coat-tailers. Given the workforce profile, the test results, and a Home 
Office in denial, it was ironic, of course, that the Court made no mention of the more likely coat-tailers, 
who would be those white or younger workers over-promoted on the back of a seemingly flawed test. 
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2. Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice
212
 
Just a few months after its decision in Essop, the Court of Appeal built on its reason why theory to take the 
law even further away from its purpose, origins, and statutory wording; and in doing so erected another 
barrier to claimants. Apparently, it was not enough to know the reason why; that reason had to be 
‘inherently’ discriminatory. Once again, this left the law in a state of confusion until eventually overruled 
by the Supreme Court, some fifteen months later.
213
 
 The case is also notable for its (mis)use of precedent as an aid to statutory interpretation in place 
of the standard tools of literal reading and statutory purpose. The panel included one judge from Essop, 
Lewison LJ. He was accompanied by the Master of Rolls, Lord Dyson, and Underhill LJ (who wrote the 
leading judgment). 
 In Naeem, Muslim prison chaplains were paid less than Christian ones. There were two standout 
reasons for this: first, a length of service pay criterion, and second, no Muslim chaplains were employed 
before 2002, there being no need, it seemed. Hence, Muslim chaplains tended to have a shorter length of 
service and registered lower on the pay scale.
214
 Upon these bare facts, a Muslim chaplain made a claim of 
indirect (religious) discrimination, defined, of course, by section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. This case 
differed from Essop because the cause of the disadvantage was ‘obvious’: it could be traced precisely to 
the pay criterion, the challenged practice. 
  
The case up to the Court of Appeal 
The employment tribunal, the EAT and Court of Appeal each rejected his claim, albeit for different reasons. 
At first instance, the tribunal adopted counsel’s submission, that ‘the claimant need not show why the PCP 
put him at a disadvantage, but whether it does’.
215
 Thus, the bare facts were enough to establish the prima 
facie case. But the claim failed because tribunal found the disparity was objectively justified. In the EAT 
and the Court of Appeal, the case fell at the prima facie stage, but for different reasons. For the EAT, the 
case foundered on the comparison. A ‘like-for-like’ comparison could not include chaplains employed 
before 2002, as that would be a ‘material difference’ between the groups.
216
 The Court of Appeal found 
that this ‘was not the best route to the right result’.
217
 For Underhill LJ, the case centred on another element 
of indirect discrimination, the cause of the disparity, or in the words of section 19(2), whether the criterion 
‘puts’ the claimant and his group at a particular disadvantage. And for this, Underhill LJ presented a two-
pronged ‘inherent’ theory, which is not easy to follow. First, the cause must be ‘the legally relevant’ one, 
and second, claimant’s group should be already disadvantaged by social circumstances.  
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 In a short concurring judgment, Lewison LJ came to the same result via the Act’s burden of proof 
provisions. It will be recalled that EA 2010, section 136(2) provides:  
 
If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that 
a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention 
occurred. 
 
Subsection (3) states that this does not apply if ‘if A shows that A did not contravene the provision’. Relying 
on Sir Colin Rimer’s speech in Essop, Lewison LJ held that this meant that once the claimant had presented 
the statistical disparity, ‘section 136 then shifts the burden to the employer to prove that the “reason why” 
was not the impugned PCP’.
218
 
  
Burdens of proof and section 136 
It is better to address Lewison’s LJ reasoning first, as this can remove one complication from the central 
‘causation’, or reason why, issue of the case. The effect of his statement is two-fold. First, that the defendant 
can play a role in the establishment (or not) of the prima facie case. This is a normal process of civil 
litigation and uncontroversial. For instance, the defendant may produce evidence discrediting the claimant’s 
statistical model.
219
 Second, more worryingly, given his agreement with Underhill’s LJ reasoning,
220
 
Lewison’s LJ statement implies that section 136 permits the defendant to destroy the prima facie case by 
producing a non-discriminatory cause of the disparity. 
 The second effect takes the evidential rules into matters of substantive law. This is not itself 
controversial, especially in the context of indirect discrimination, where section 19 and its progenitor, 
Griggs v Duke Power, integrate law and proof by making it clear that once the claimant has proven the 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the disparity.
221
 But the difficulty with 
Lewison’s LJ reasoning is that it assumes that a rule of evidence dictates the substantive law; the tail is 
wagging the dog. Given that section 19 itself provides for the shifting burden, section 136 plays only a 
complementary role, at best. Its predecessors were introduced by European law
222
 and applicable to both 
direct and indirect discrimination, but only because the accompanying definition of indirect discrimination 
did not allocate burdens.
223
 It was not surprising then, that in the UK its principal impact was made on direct 
discrimination, producing an elaborate and lengthy body of case law.
224
 There was no concern at the time 
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that indirect discrimination had any issues with shifting burdens, as this was integrated into the formula 
from the earliest days of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
225
 Moreover, the burden of proof rules were 
introduced (by the EU) to make it easier to prove a case.
226
 Thus, section 136 can do little to affect section 
19 apart from reinforce it. It cannot be used to hold that section 19 permits the defendant to destroy the 
prima facie case established on significant statistics by pointing to a non-discriminatory cause or alternative 
reason why. That removes one pillar of the Naeem judgment and its requirement for the discriminatory 
reason why. The matter of shifting burdens per se is considered further below, after a consideration of 
Underhill’s LJ cited authorities. The first taken here is Essop, followed by a tranche of equal pay cases.  
  
The relevance of Essop v Home Office 
Given that his ‘inherent’ theory was rooted in the reason why, it is no surprise that Underhill LJ cited Essop 
in support. At first sight, this might seem rather strange. The Court of Appeal in Essop wanted to know the 
precise cause of the disparity, the reason why. One might suppose in a case where the precise reason was 
known, such as the length of service criterion, Essop would have no application. But for Underhill LJ, 
Essop established that ‘it is permissible to consider the reason for the disparity complained of, in the sense 
of the factors which caused it to occur’;
227
 this tallied with section 19’s requirement that the challenged 
practice ‘puts’ the claimant’s group at a disadvantage:  
 
The concept of ‘putting’ persons at a disadvantage is causal, and, as in any legal analysis of 
causation, it is necessary to distinguish the legally relevant cause or causes from other factors in 
the situation.
228
 
 
Thus, it was open to the employer ‘to go behind the bare fact that Muslim and Christian chaplains have 
different lengths of service and seek to establish the reason why that was so’.
229
 Upon this logic, Underhill 
LJ concluded, ‘In my view the only material cause of the disparity in remuneration relied on by the claimant 
is the (on average) more recent start-dates of the Muslim chaplains.’
230
 
  Note that, for Underhill LJ, this was the ‘only material cause of the disparity’.
231
 It had nothing to 
do with the length of service criterion. This is rather perplexing. It brazenly re-writes the claimant’s 
pleadings, and as such fails to address the actual claim. It also carries problems of substantive law. First, 
                                                          
225
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and most obviously, it overcomplicates the straightforward statutory requirement that the challenged 
practice ‘puts’ the claimant’s group at a disadvantage. As noted above in the review of Essop,
232
 there is 
nothing in the statute, nor the jurisprudence, suggesting the incorporation of the reason why theory. Second, 
although at times it refers to ‘causes’ (plural), Underhill’s LJ judgment gravitates to a single cause. Not 
only is it unrealistic to suppose that all events have a single cause, it is paradoxical, given that the ‘inherent’ 
theory also demands discriminatory social circumstances (discussed below), which can only be an 
additional contributory, or ‘causal’ factor to the disadvantage. 
 This being a case of ‘obvious’ indirect discrimination, there was no requirement to follow Essop. 
Yet the Court of Appeal chose, without any reluctance, to build upon its already flawed logic, with a 
predictable result.  
  
The Equal Pay precedents 
The bulk of authority for Underhill’s LJ judgment was drawn from the law of equal pay. There is of course 
an obvious parallel with this case, being a discriminatory pay case. But that was not the apparent reason for 
invoking this body of law nor the focus Underhill’s LJ particular citations, which can be understood to 
serve three purposes. The first pair of cases (Cadman and Wilson) was used in support of the ‘social 
circumstances’ prong of the ‘inherent’ theory. The second (Marshall and Wallace), was used to show that 
there was no onus of objective justification where the disparity arose otherwise than by discrimination. The 
third batch of cases (the ‘Armstrong line’), was used to show that this ‘Marshall defence’ applied to indirect 
discrimination. These were not perhaps set out in the most comprehensible order, with the ‘Marshall 
defence’ presumably cited in support of the ‘legally relevant cause’, the ‘first-prong’ of the inherent theory.  
  
The Equal Pay precedents - Cadman and Wilson 
These related cases each challenged different increments of the same employer’s pay scales. They bore the 
closest resemblance to Naeem, as the challenged factor was a length of service pay criterion. The cases 
were Wilson v Health and Safety Executive
233
 and its forerunner, Cadman v Health and Safety Executive,
234
 
and cited principally in support of the Underhill’s LJ ‘inherent’ theory, and the particular meaning he 
attached to it; this was that a prima facie case required that the claimant’s group was already disadvantaged 
by discriminatory social circumstances. 
 The first point to make here is that these cases centred on the precise requirements of the objective 
justification test. The prima facie case was never at issue. The closest anything in the judgments came to 
this matter was when the Court of Appeal noted in Wilson:‘...it is common ground that women are often 
disadvantaged by the use of such a criterion in pay schemes.’
235
 That followed a similar line expressed in 
Cadman, by Judge Burke QC, speaking for the EAT: 
 
                                                          
232
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234
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It was ... common ground before the tribunal that the factor which created the differentials 
complained of ... i.e. length of service, had a disproportionate impact as between male and female 
band 2 employees and was, therefore, indirectly discriminatory. This feature occurred because, 
overall, women in band 2 had shorter service than men. Whether it arose because women joined 
the service of the employers later, took career breaks or were promoted later, or a combination of 
those factors, does not matter; the fact of disproportionate impact was not in dispute.
236
 
 
 Notable here is the presumption that the challenged factor (the pay scales) caused a (gender) 
disparity. One might think that this supports Naeem’s case. But for Underhill LJ, the precedential value of 
these cases was in the facts presumed to fulfil the prima facie case; these facts were distinguishable because 
a length of service criterion ‘had an inherent tendency to put women at a disadvantage because women are 
liable to start their careers later than men and/or to take career breaks because of family and childcare 
responsibilities’.
237
 It would have been different, the judge opined, that as a result of a change in social 
attitudes the proportion of women recruited in recent years increased. ‘Indeed,’ he noted,  
 
...if it were otherwise an employer who made positive efforts to increase the diversity of his 
workforce...would be making a rod for his own back, at least if length of service were a criterion 
in his pay system.
238
 
 
 Thus, for liability under this ‘inherent’ theory, there must be some pre-existing social circumstance 
that is itself (inherently) discriminatory. This theory can be further explored with some similar projections 
of a change of circumstances. Numerous examples could be made, but three will suffice. 
 In the first scenario, an employer had on his books 100 machine fitters, all doing equal work. There 
were 20 women and 80 men, and 5 (25 per cent) of the women and 60 (75 per cent) of the men were at the 
top of the pay scale, which was based entirely on length of service. Now suppose, as Underhill LJ envisaged, 
the ratio changes, so that in time, there were 50 women and 50 men, and that 10 women and 25 men were 
at the top of the scale.
239
 Now, 20 per cent of the women and 50 per cent of the men are at the top of the 
scale. The difference may have closed (from 50 to 30 points), but there remains a significant pay gap. For 
Underhill LJ, these women would no longer have a prima facie case, because the pay scale no longer has 
an ‘inherent tendency’ to put women at a disadvantage. Instead, as with Naeem, the cause is the ‘more 
recent start-dates’.
240
 Such a conclusion may surprise some, not least, Judge Burke QC who noted (above) 
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that the cause could well be late recruitment, but ‘the fact of disproportionate impact’ is what mattered. 
Moreover, the disparity has roots in historical sex discrimination
241
 and/or ‘social attitudes’. Without this, 
the preponderance of more recent (lower paid) recruits would not be female. Thus, this employer would be 
‘making a rod for his own back’ not by recruiting more women, but only if he persisted with a pay scale 
that was not objectively justifiable. 
 Underhill’s LJ theory is more exposed if applied to an equal value scenario. Suppose a car factory 
where seamstresses (predominantly female) are paid less than fitters (predominantly male). Both jobs are 
of equal value. Presumably, at one time in the past, the theory would label the policy ‘inherently’ 
discriminatory because sewing was considered a ‘mere’ domestic routine chore of housewives. In modern 
times, girls are not taught sewing, and women are not expected to mend the clothes. The discriminatory 
social attitudes have subsided, and because of this the pay gap is now untouchable by equal pay law, because 
the pay policy is no longer ‘inherently’ discriminatory.  
 Those two scenarios are distinguishable from Underhill’s LJ example because historical 
discriminatory social circumstances may have been a cause of the current disparities.
242
 But should that 
matter? The third projection involves indirect discrimination, but this time, in recruitment, and without any 
contemporary or historical discriminatory social circumstances. This represents in some senses an obverse 
scenario, where seemingly innocent practices remain benign for years or even decades until  social 
circumstances change. Suppose at some time in the past, that a local authority decided that recruits should 
have resided locally for 5 years, in an attempt to create greater empathy with the public (although there is 
no evidential basis behind this). The requirement was benign because there were no immigrants in the 
area.
243
 Decades later, a wave of Bangladeshi immigration changes the racial profile of the area, and the 
local authority’s formerly benign recruitment policy puts these immigrants at a disadvantage. As 
Underhill’s LJ reason why theory would have it, the cause is not the council’s policy, but the ‘more recent 
arrival-dates’ by the recent immigrants. Such an approach would leave the equality legislation impotent 
whilst for years to come an all-white local authority presided over its mixed-race residents. Yet according 
the Underhill’s LJ reasoning, there is no prima facie case of indirect discrimination to justify because the 
length of residence criterion is not ‘inherently’ discriminatory. In this sense, this example and Naeem are 
on all fours, in that both the social circumstances were benign.  
 These three projections of Underhill’s LJ ‘inherent’ theory suggest that his interpretation would 
leave equality law inadequate to address all but a few select classes of cases. At the least, the application 
of the theory in the first two scenarios would be a blatant dissent from the avowed statutory purpose of 
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closing the gender pay gap.
 244
 This alone should have alerted him that his interpretation of Wilson and 
Cadman was erroneous and that this theory was flawed. But none of this occurred to the Court, as Underhill 
LJ continued with his selective citation of equal pay cases.  
  
The Equal Pay precedents - Marshall and Wallace  
The second body of equal pay case law relied on in Naeem centred on two ‘fair pay’ cases and the 
succeeding judicial commentary. Here, it is said, where there is no sex discrimination, the employer no 
need to be put to the trouble of proving objective justification. The two ‘fair pay’ cases were Strathclyde 
Regional Council v Wallace
245
 and Glasgow CC v Marshall.
246
 Underhill LJ cited a well-known speech of 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson from Wallace: 
  
[T]he only circumstances in which questions of ‘justification’ can arise are those in which 
the employer is relying on a factor which is sexually discriminatory. There is no question of 
the employer having to ‘justify’ … all disparities of pay. Provided that there is no element 
of sexual discrimination, the employer establishes a ... defence by identifying the factors 
which he alleges have caused the disparity, proving that those factors are genuine and 
proving further that they were causally relevant to the disparity in pay complained of.
247
 
 
In line with this, Underhill LJ also cited Lord Nicholls from Marshall: ‘if the employer proves the absence 
of sex discrimination he is not obliged to justify the pay disparity’.
248
 These quotes are intended to 
demonstrate that Naeem’s employer can defeat his prima facie case by pointing to a non-discriminatory 
cause of the pay disparity, presumably, the more recent recruitment. On the face of these extracts, this 
appears correct. But put into context, they tell a somewhat different story and provide a more limited 
authority. 
 In Marshall the claim was by special-school instructors who, for less pay, were doing work equal 
to that of the teachers. Seven female instructors compared themselves with a male teacher. At the same 
time, a male instructor compared himself with a female teacher. However, there was no sex disparity 
between the two groups (females made up about 96 per cent instructors and 97 per cent teachers).
249
 This 
was a ‘fair pay’ claim, and not one for (sex) discrimination law to address.
250
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 Wallace is less clear. Here, a national pay structure recognised the post of a principal teacher. 
However, various national policies stymied the ability of local authorities to promote teachers to this post. 
As a result, many unpromoted teachers, out of a sense of duty,
251
 were doing the work of principal teachers, 
but of course, on less pay. These teachers brought equal pay claims, each identifying a male principal 
teacher as a comparator. The claim eventually failed in the House of Lords, the reasoning provided by the 
single speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson: 
 
The disparity in pay between the (female) claimants and principal teachers has nothing to do with 
gender. Of the 134 unpromoted teachers who claimed to be carrying out the duties of principal 
teachers, 81 were men and 53 women. The selection by the appellants in this case of male principal 
teachers as comparators was purely the result of a tactical selection by these appellants: there are 
male and female principal teachers employed by the respondents without discrimination. 
Therefore the objective sought by the appellants is to achieve equal pay for like work regardless 
of sex, not to eliminate any inequalities due to sex discrimination.
252
 
 
It appeared as if the claimant women had hand-picked male comparators without showing any sex 
discrimination. The difficulty with the case is that no full statistics were reported. With respect to 
Underhill LJ, these cases cannot be said to support a reason why theory of any sort for indirect 
discrimination. In the context of the equal pay legislative regime at the time,
253
 where the definitions of 
direct and indirect discrimination were not explicit, the cases held that a single-comparator, or ‘direct 
discrimination’, claim can be defeated by showing that the lower pay was not because of sex. The evidence 
for this was the group statistics. The claims were not expressed as indirect discrimination. If they had been, 
they would have failed in Marshall for want of a disparity and in Wallace for the want of complete 
statistics.
254
 Marshall and Wallace were effectively (failed) cases of direct discrimination; all they can 
demonstrate for the purposes of indirect discrimination is that there must be a gender disparity, a somewhat 
obvious proposition. Nonetheless, broader propositions have been drawn from these cases and Underhill 
LJ was keen to exploit them. He characterised them as the ‘Armstrong line of cases’.
255
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The Equal Pay precedents - the ‘Armstrong line of cases’ 
Underhill LJ began with Armstrong v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Hospital Trust.
256
 Here, Buxton LJ said:  
Once disparate adverse impact has been established, the burden passes to the employer in respect 
of two issues. First, that the difference between the man’s and the woman’s contract is not 
discriminatory, in the sense of being attributable to a difference of gender. Second, if the employer 
cannot show that the difference in treatment was not attributable to a difference of gender he must 
then demonstrate that there was nonetheless an objective justification for the difference...
257
 
 
 The introduction ‘disparate adverse impact’, suggests, of course, that the ‘Marshall defence’ 
applied to indirect discrimination as well. But the phrase ‘attributable to a difference in gender’ is key here, 
and rather ambiguous. It could be doing no more than permitting the employer to produce evidence 
undermining the claimant’s statistical model,
258
 showing that in fact, there is no (gender) disparity. This is 
the narrow view. As noted above, this is a normal process of civil litigation and uncontroversial. As the 
ECJ stated in Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority: 
 
It is for the national court to assess whether it may take into account those statistics, that is to say, 
whether they cover enough individuals, whether they illustrate purely fortuitous or short-term 
phenomena, and whether, in general, they appear to be significant.
259
 
 
 That of course, concerns the effect of the challenged practice. On the other hand, the phrase 
‘attributable to a difference in gender’ may be permitting employers to point to a non-discriminatory cause 
of the (gender) disparity (the wide view),
260
 thus destroying the prima facie case. At the centre of the debate 
are equal pay claims based solely on statistics showing, say, one occupation (predominantly female) being 
paid less than another (predominantly or exclusively male), where the jobs are of equal value. Here, the 
employer points to an ‘innocent’ cause of the disparity, and is then freed from having to objectively justify 
it. Such a case arose in Enderby,
261
 where the employer paid pharmacists (63 per cent female) 40 per cent 
more than speech therapists (98 per cent female). An industrial tribunal found that the respective collective 
bargaining agreements that had led to the different pay structures for these occupations were in no way sex-
tainted and rejected the claim.
262
 However, the ECJ held that the statistics alone were enough to oblige the 
employer to objectively justify the disparity; the ‘innocent’ cause was a matter for objective justification.
263
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The wide view of Armstrong holds that such an employer would not now have to justify such a disparity. 
As such, Armstrong must be wrong. Enderby demonstrates that indirect discrimination, for equal pay at 
least, is concerned with effect rather than cause. Underhill LJ did not discuss Enderby, only noting that, 
elsewhere, the EAT had found Armstrong and Enderby consistent.
264
 
 Instead, Underhill LJ cited further dicta
265
 apparently in support of the wide view, culminating 
with the Court of Appeal case of Gibson v Sheffield CC,
266
 where, he asserted ‘the point was put beyond 
doubt’.
267
 Again, this is drawing a conclusion that is unsupported by the case’s facts, result, and dicta of the 
judges. Of the three judges, only Maurice Kay LJ fully endorsed Armstrong.
268
 Pill LJ dissented on the 
point,
269
 while Smith LJ offered only a limited approval. 
 Smith LJ concluded that Armstrong was correct, as far as it meant that ‘it is always open to an 
employer ... to demonstrate that the particular disadvantage apparently demonstrated is nothing to do with 
gender’.
270
 Further, ‘it is important that tribunals examine such a contention with great care’.
271
 Thus: 
 
Where the disadvantaged group is heavily dominated by women and the group of advantaged 
comparators is heavily dominated by men (as they were in this case), the inference of sex taint will 
readily be drawn and it will be difficult for the employer to prove its absence.
272
 
 
 This tells us two things. First, Smith’s LJ phrase ‘the particular disadvantage ... is nothing to do 
with gender’ suggests the defence is a narrow one: an employer would have to undermine the statistics 
rather than just point to a benign cause. It also suggests that where significant statistics reveal a disparity, 
it would be ‘difficult’ to rebut the ‘readily drawn’ presumption of discrimination. One wonders why 
Underhill LJ did not consider this relevant to the significant statistics presented by Mr Naeem. 
 More telling was the issue at stake in Gibson. Predominantly female carers were paid less than 
predominantly male street cleaners and gardeners, despite doing work of equal value. The difference was 
attributable, first, to a historically agreed productivity bonus system paid to the street cleaners and 
gardeners, even though this no longer served the purpose of improving productivity; and second, to the fact 
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that a similar scheme was inappropriate for carers. Applying (the wide view of) Armstrong, both the 
employment tribunal and the EAT
273
 held that these causes were not tainted by sex, and so the employer 
was not obliged to objectively justify the difference. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that this was a 
misapplication of Armstrong. For Pill LJ (with whom Maurice Kay LJ agreed on this point),
274
 the 
‘compelling’ statistics meant that Armstrong did not apply.
275
 For Smith LJ, the mistake was that in looking 
for a sex-tainted cause, the tribunals below confused indirect with direct discrimination
276
 
 The unanimous decision in Gibson was that Armstrong was not relevant to the facts. That means, 
at the least, Armstrong is not of universal application in cases of indirect discrimination. As with its obiter 
dicta, the decision does nothing to support Underhill’s LJ requirement for an inherently discriminatory 
practice, while Smith’s LJ reversal of the decisions below damns the theory for confusing direct, with 
indirect, discrimination, a fundamental technical error. 
 In Enderby, the ECJ held that significant statistics will produce an irrebuttable presumption of 
discrimination for the employer to objectively justify. Underhill’s LJ use of case law from the equal pay 
regime was not only unconvincing, it was hazardous, given the dominance of Enderby. In his much vaunted 
case, Gibson, the ‘Marshall defence’ was expressly rejected by Pill LJ, and given a lukewarm reception by 
Smith LJ,
277
 leaving just one judge out of three as authority, hardly a precedent to put the matter ‘beyond 
doubt’, as claimed.
278
 
 Overall, the (domestic) equal pay law cited does not support Underhill’s LJ requirement for 
discriminatory social circumstances or an inherently discriminatory cause. It was of course, completely at 
odds with the unexplainably side-lined higher authority of Enderby. 
  
The shifting (or ambivalent) burdens 
Given that so much of Naeem (and Essop) involved the shifting burdens, it is surprising that this matter was 
not actually fully addressed. It will be recalled that the Court of Appeal in Essop gave some mixed messages 
regarding the claimant’s burden.
279
 In Naeem, after quoting Sir Colin Rimer’s reason why dictum from 
Essop,
280
 Underhill LJ concluded ‘it is permissible to consider the reason for the disparity complained of, 
in the sense of the factors which caused it to occur’. The passive ‘it is’ leaves unresolved the matter of who 
has to prove these causal factors. The judgment made it clear that the defendant could disprove them but 
no more than that. The nearest Underhill LJ came to the matter was when he recorded in parenthesis, 
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I should note that the passage [from Essop] quoted might in isolation be taken as suggesting that 
the burden of proving the reason is in all cases on the claimant; but it is clear from the later 
reasoning in his judgment that that was not Sir Colin's view—see in particular paras 63–65 and 
the reference to the provisions of section 136... 
281
 
 
This merely brings forward Essop’s mixed message. It does nothing to clarify the matter. Thus, assuming 
the reason why theory were correct, it leaves two broad possibilities: 
 
1. The claimant must identify a practice of the defendant and consequent disparity (by sex, race, 
religion, etc.). The defendant may produce evidence undermining the claimant’s case by 
identifying an ‘innocent’ cause of the disparity: the reason why. 
  
2. The claimant must identify a practice of the defendant and consequent disparity (by sex, race, 
religion, etc.). In addition, the claimant must prove the reason why the claimant and the claimant’s 
group were disadvantaged by the practice. If the claimant fails to do this, the case fails at that stage 
and the defendant has no burden of any sort. 
 
 If this case (and Essop) means that statistics alone are not enough for a prima facie case, despite 
being significant (in the Enderby sense), it would seem the second interpretation would be the correct one, 
as, in line with EA 2010, section 136, such evidence would not be enough ‘from which the court could 
decide, in the absence of any other explanation,’ that there has been discrimination. But the absence of 
clarification on this basic point merely exacerbates the confusion caused by the decisions and substantive 
law dicta. 
  
The comparison in the EAT 
As noted in the introduction, the EAT also found that the claimant had failed to make out his prima facie 
case, but for a different reason. For the EAT, the case foundered on the comparison. It will be recalled that 
section 23(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that ‘On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 
13, 14, or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.’ 
According to the EAT (dedicating sixteen paragraphs to the issue), a ‘like-for-like’ comparison could not 
include chaplains employed before 2002, as that would be a ‘material difference’ between the groups: 
 
The PCP in question here could only properly be tested as to its effect by limiting the pool to those 
persons employed since 2002, from which point forward Muslim chaplains and Christian 
chaplains had been on a level playing field.
282
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 Rather than reject this approach outright as technically incorrect, Underhill LJ presented a rather 
ambivalent opinion. At one point, he stated, ‘Specifically, I agree that it is necessary to consider the impact 
of the length of service criterion on the actual population to which it is applied.’
283
 This comment was made 
in response to Naeem’s argument, that the pool for comparison comprised all the Christian and Muslim 
chaplains employed. By implication, this rejects the EAT’s comparison. But later, the judge merely found 
that the EAT’s comparison ‘was not the best route to the right result’, even though this route ‘should lead 
to the same result’. The reason given for this (seemingly contrary) view was that use of section 23 was best 
confined to arguments over statistical analysis that were not present here.
284
 Of course, the EAT’s approach 
was fundamentally the wrong route, no matter what the result. The long-established rule (maintained by the 
Court of Appeal) is that any ‘pool’ for the comparison should not be dictated by the challenged factor, as 
such a pool could not properly test the impact the of that factor.
285
 It is of concern that this basic technicality 
of indirect discrimination law was not clearly identified and reversed by the Court of Appeal.
286
 
  
Statutory interpretation 
This case centred on the statutory phrase ‘puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic 
at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it’. For Underhill 
LJ, the key here was the verb ‘puts’. A plain reading of this does not require a reason why, a search for 
alternative causes, a sole cause,
287
 nor a prerequisite of discriminatory social circumstances. It simply 
requires that the challenged practice ‘puts’ the claimant’s group at a disadvantage. One of the easiest 
scenarios to evaluate is where there is a fixed pool (the relevant workforce) and a tangible practice of the 
employer (a length of service criterion). Such a literal reading of the statute accords with the statutory 
purpose, as the ample body of jurisprudence demonstrates, notably Enderby. As with Essop, this was largely 
ignored.  
 Moreover, unlike the Court in Essop, the Naeem Court had the benefit of the Court of Justice’s 
decision in Chez.
288
 Here, an electricity supplier placed its meters in a predominantly Roma district higher 
than in other districts, apparently to prevent tampering. This made it harder for consumers to monitor their 
use. A central feature of this case is that the complainant was not Roma. Nonetheless, the court found, 
having been inconvenienced by the (discriminatory) practice, she was entitled to complain of indirect or 
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direct discrimination.
289
 Underhill LJ dismissed the case as irrelevant because, ‘the issues there considered 
seem to me to have no application to the circumstances of the present case’.
290
 
 Again, this was a rather brazen reaction to a decision from a Court that does not operate a strict 
doctrine of precedent,
291
 but whose broader statements are law. There were two aspects to Chez which were 
highly relevant to Naeem. First, the spirit of the decision denoted a liberal interpretation of the legislation, 
in that case, the Race Directive.
292
 Hence, the Grand Chamber was ‘clear’ that the Directive ‘cannot, in the 
light of its objective and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, be defined restrictively...’
293
 
Second, it followed that it ‘is sufficient that, although using neutral criteria not based on the protected 
characteristic, it has the effect of placing particularly persons possessing that characteristic at a 
disadvantage’.
294
 The key word here is ‘sufficient’. Nothing was added to the sentence to qualify or 
somehow restrict it, such as demanding an additional reason why. Quite why the Court of Appeal came to 
give the legislation a restrictive interpretation in the face of this is inexplicable. The same could be said of 
its dismissal of Chez as irrelevant, save it did not accord with the common law’s binary notion of wrongdoer 
and victim, with the claimant not belonging to a protected group. Of course, these two aspects say little new 
about the approach of the Court of Justice. But as Fredman (no doubt among others) suggested, Chez 
confirms that the Court of Appeal decided Naeem and Essop contrary to (binding) EU law.
295
 
 The only possible statutory word on which Underhill LJ could hang the ‘inherent’ theory (he did 
not try) was the adjective ‘particular’ attached to ‘disadvantage’. This possibility was discredited above, in 
the context of Essop.
296
 The only difference is that the Chez
297
 opinion on the matter was available to the 
Naeem Court. As noted above, this is authoritative in negating any suggestion that the additional word 
‘particular’ is intended to require a reason why, and with it, any of the other subsidiary demands of 
Underhill’s LJ speech.  
  
Summary 
The Court of Appeal missed the opportunity to clarify the law of discriminatory pay beyond the heavily 
litigated statutory regime of (gender) equal pay. Instead, it handed down a convoluted judgment laced with 
spurious logic and some basic errors. Whilst side-lining relevant EU cases, such as Enderby and Chez, the 
Court cited barely relevant authorities, which, if anything, undermined its conclusions. The judgment 
produced a technically flawed definition of indirect discrimination in that it confused cause and effect, 
inherence and social attitudes, and direct with indirect discrimination; it could not conceive of multiple 
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causes of a disparity, failed clearly to condemn the EAT’s fundamentally incorrect comparison, and failed 
to clarify a central issue, the shifting burden of proof. This mass of confusion was in the face of the clear, 
succinct, and correct conclusion at first instance that ‘the claimant need not show why the PCP put him at 
a disadvantage, but whether it does’.
298
  
 This was yet another easy case to resolve. A literal interpretation would have served the purpose 
of the legislation. Naeem presented what appeared to be significant statistics to satisfy and prima facie case, 
notably by the standard of Enderby. Section 19 does not require any more than that. Section 136 does not 
add any substantive law to section 19, and so could not be used to justify the reason why theory. At first 
instance, despite losing the on the prima facie case, the employer successfully justified the practice. Some 
five years later, the Supreme Court restored both parts of that judgment. That the case then spent so long in 
limbo was down to the convoluted and erroneous judgments of the EAT and a seemingly zealous Court of 
Appeal, for whom, once again, an easy case produced bad law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In these cases, senior judges struggled with the effects-based and group-based nature, as well as the 
technical complexities, of indirect discrimination law. This law, perhaps more than others, exposed the 
judicial shortcomings. With the Perera problem, the Court of Appeal could not marry the legislative text 
with its purpose. In Essop and Naeem, the Court of Appeal seemed ignorant of the law’s effect-based nature, 
the judges instead going off instead on a folly of their own. With a blinkered deference to the literal rule, 
the Court of Appeal in Mandla interpreted the statutory words ‘can comply’ to confine the statutory reach 
to mutable characteristics, despite the absurd potential. And when given some latitude by the text, in the 
same case, the court ignored long-standing political policy and legal authority embodied in English and US 
case law, and instead resorted to a dictionary to define ‘race’. All of that, it seemed, was driven by the 
court’s self-declared ill-defined notion of multiculturalism (which was in a fact a form mono-culturalism). 
The latitude afforded by the ‘comparison’ was too much for majority of the House of Lords in Rutherford, 
which produced a precedent which would readily doom most claims, and a misconceived broader formula. 
 The cases considered in this chapter continue familiar themes of prolixity, poor statutory 
interpretation and a lack of a full appreciation of the basic tenets of discrimination law. Most of the Court 
of Appeal cases (Perera, Meer, Mandla, Essop, and Naeem) continue the underlying theme that this law’s 
purpose is confined to providing remedies to individual victims against wrongdoers, which is rooted in the 
common law’s binary approach of resolving disputes between two individuals. The Court of Appeal (Meer 
and Mandla) even found room to suggest that a discriminatory, or hostile, motive was required for liability, 
presaging a theme later associated with the importunate dissenters.
299
 
  A particular feature of these cases is that they ranged from 1983 to 2015. Despite the reversals of 
the earlier narrow decisions, such as Perera and Mandla in favour of more liberal definitions, Essop and 
Naeem demonstrate that the Court of Appeal in particular, has failed to appreciate that by principle, purpose, 
                                                          
298
 Cited [2016] ICR 289 (CA) [31]. 
299
 See p 87 above. 
  6 Problems with Indirect Discrimination 
 
174 
 
precedent, and binding EU law, it is obliged to eschew restrictive interpretations of this legislation. 
    7 Disability Discrimination 
 
175 
 
7 DISABILITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATION 
  
The cases explored so far have centred on the ‘traditional’ concepts of direct and indirect discrimination, 
as well as victimisation, which date back to the 1970s. A rather newer concept arrived on the British statute 
book in 1995: disability-related discrimination.
1
 Rather than the disability itself, this definition focussed on 
the manifestation of a disability, such as a guide dog, an eating disorder, absence from work, poor decision-
making, a slow typing speed, and so on. In order to establish a prima facie case, a comparison was made 
with a person without the manifestation in question, i.e. a person without a dog, eating disorder, 
absenteeism, poor decision-making, or slow typing speed. Various defences were provided, depending on 
whether the activity engaged was employment, housing, or the provision of services, etc. For employment, 
there was a general justification defence. Other defences were more specific. In a pattern reminiscent to the 
handling of the comparison required for indirect discrimination,
2
 the courts in general dealt with this 
competently, until the matter came to the House of Lords in Lewisham London Borough Council v 
Malcolm.
3
 
  
1. The case of Malcolm 
Although it centred on the housing or ‘premises’ provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
(DDA 1995), this judgment, overruling the long-established Clark v Novacold,
4
 was of great significance 
to the Act’s coverage of employment and the provision of goods, facilities and services. Under the DDA 
1995, the functional equivalent of direct and indirect discrimination was disability-related discrimination,
5
 
which was defined as less favourable treatment for a reason related to a person’s disability, which cannot 
be justified. The House of Lords undermined two major and established principles of disability-related 
discrimination. First, for the challenged treatment to be ‘related’ to the claimant’s disability, the defendant 
must have known, or ought to have known, of the disability at the time of the treatment. Second (Baroness 
Hale dissenting), when identifying if the treatment was ‘less favourable’, the correct comparator was a 
person in the same circumstances save for the disability. Hence, where a restaurant had a ‘no dogs’ rule, 
the correct comparator was a sighted customer with a dog, or where an employer dismissed a worker who 
was long-term absent because of his disability, the comparator was a worker without a disability who was 
long-term absent.  
 The facts were as follows. Courtney Malcolm was diagnosed with schizophrenia. In 2002, he 
exercised his right to buy his flat from Lewisham Council, but completion was delayed for some time. In 
May 2004, he lost his job and in June 2004, in contravention of his tenancy agreement, he sub-let the flat 
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and moved out. Just after that, he informed the council he wished to complete the transfer on 26 July. It 
seems his plan was to sub-let after the purchase (which was permissible), but he ‘jumped the gun’, either 
because he was unemployed and needed the money, or because his judgment was impaired by his 
schizophrenia. On 6 July, the council discovered the sub-letting, and gave him notice to quit, in accordance 
with the tenancy agreement and the Housing Act 1985, section 93, which allowed the council no discretion. 
Subsequently, both Malcolm’s psychiatrist and social worker wrote to the council asking for a reprieve as 
they feared it would cause him another breakdown. Nonetheless, the council persisted and issued 
proceedings for possession. Malcolm claimed his eviction amounted to disability-related discrimination. 
 At first instance, the County Court trial judge found for the council, holding that Malcolm did not 
have a disability for the purposes of the Act, and that in any case the reason he sub-let early was to raise 
money whilst unemployed. It was not a mistake caused by his illness. Thus, the eviction did not relate to 
his disability. The Court of Appeal reversed,
6
 finding that Malcolm’s schizophrenia amounted to a disability 
and that as he had sub-let the flat when his judgment was impaired by his disability, the possession order 
was related to his disability. Accordingly, he was treated less favourably than a person who did not have 
schizophrenia and who had not sub-let his council flat. The House of Lords restored the County Court 
decision, holding (by a majority) that Malcolm did have a disability, but (Baroness Hale dissenting) he was 
not treated less favourably because the correct the comparator was a person without schizophrenia who had 
also sub-let his council flat (overruling Clark v Novacold), and in any case (unanimously) the possession 
order was not related to his disability. 
 Before going further, it is worth putting the definition disability-related discrimination into 
context. The Act was designed to cover both indirect as well as direct discrimination;
7
 these definitions 
were not employed in the original Act. The conventional model of indirect discrimination - an unjustifiable 
facially neutral practice that adversely affects a protected group - was not employed in the DDA 1995. This 
is because, in contrast to other protected groups such as race or sex, it is unlikely that any facially neutral 
practice would adversely affect persons with a disability as a whole group; the assortment of disabilities is 
too varied for the conventional model.
8
 Instead, in combination with a duty to make reasonable adjustments 
(which was not in force for the premises provisions in time for this case), the Act outlawed ‘disability-
related discrimination.’ This reflected the position under the long-standing disability law in the United 
States, where, in addition to direct discrimination and a duty to make ‘reasonable accommodation’, the 
courts recognised ‘discrimination by proxy’, which is treatment ‘directed at an effect or manifestation of a 
handicap’
9
 such as a wheelchair or service dog ban. The US courts treated the proxy as a pretext for direct 
discrimination, although this carried a justification defence.
10
 Alternatively, where the evidence showed no 
pretext, the courts adapted their indirect discrimination model to confine the impact to only those with the 
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same disability. Thus, an ‘armlifting’ test for postal workers adversely affected those with a similar shoulder 
injury to the claimant.
11
 
 The definition of disability-related discrimination was broad enough to encapsulate instances of 
both direct and indirect discrimination, and in doing so provided a justification defence for either. The 
definition of the prima facie case was substantially the same for the parts of the Act covering premises, 
employment, and the provision of goods, facilities, and services.
12
 For ‘premises’, section 24(1) provided: 
 
[A] person . . . discriminates against a disabled person if (a) for a reason which relates to the 
disabled person's disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to 
whom that reason does not or would not apply; and (b) he cannot show that the treatment in 
question is justified. 
  
Paragraph (a) provided the prima facie case. Section 24 differed from the other parts of the Act, as section 
24(3) provided an exhaustive list of justification reasons, specific to premises. However, this did not include 
sub-letting (or non-payment of rent). For a prima facie case under (a), there are two elements: the treatment 
must be for a reason ‘related to’ the victim’s disability, and that treatment must be less favourable.  
 Until Malcolm, the established meaning of these elements was set out by the Court of Appeal in 
Clark v Novacold.
13
 Writing the judgment of the court, Mummery LJ first of all noted that the DDA 1995, 
unlike the SDA 1975 and RRA 1976, contained no requirement that in a comparison the relevant 
circumstances must be the same, or not materially different.
14
 This showed that the 1995 Act adopted ‘a 
significantly different approach’,
15
 and that the reason for the less favourable treatment need only be related 
to the disability. This should have been enough to settle to matter. But Mummery LJ suggested that 
definition was ‘linguistically... ambiguous’
16
 and cited Pepper v Hart
17
 to quote the Minister responsible 
for the Bill: 
 
The Bill is drafted in such a way that indirect as well as direct discrimination can be dealt with …. 
A situation where dogs were not admitted to a cafe, with the effect that blind people would be 
unable to enter it, would be a prima facie case of indirect discrimination against blind people and 
would be unlawful.
18
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In a similar way, a disabled customer who is told to leave the restaurant because she has difficulty eating 
as a result of her disability, is so treated for a reason related to her disability.
19
 Accordingly, the choice of 
comparator differs from that under direct discrimination. In these examples the comparator is a person 
without the ‘reason’, i.e. without a dog, or without an eating difficulty. If it were otherwise, and the 
comparator were a sighted man with a dog, or a person who had difficulty eating for a reason unrelated to 
a disability (say a coughing fit, or because the food tasted bad), the scope of disability-related discrimination 
would be drastically reduced, effectively to direct discrimination. It follows that the comparison cannot be 
made until the reason for the treatment is identified, and the comparator is a person without that reason. 
 In Clark v Novacold, Mr Clark suffered a back injury at work causing soft tissue injuries around 
the spine. He appeared to be unable to work for at least twelve months, and after four months absence, he 
was dismissed. In response to Mr Clark’s claim for disability-related discrimination, Novacold argued that 
it would have dismissed any person unable to work for that long. The Court of Appeal held that that 
argument used the wrong comparator. First, the reason for Clark’s dismissal was his inability to work, 
which was the ‘reason’ related to his disability. Therefore, the correct comparator should be a worker with 
neither the disability nor the ‘reason’, that is a worker without his disability and able to work. Mummery 
LJ observed that this approach would avoid the problems encountered by the courts in their ‘futile attempts’ 
to identify a hypothetical non-pregnant male comparator for a pregnant woman in sex discrimination cases 
before the ECJ decision Dekker, which ruled bluntly, that pregnancy discrimination amounted to direct sex 
discrimination.
20
 It was also consistent with the availability of the general justification defence in this 
employment case (not generally available for direct discrimination). 
 The definition of disability-related discrimination was taken a stage further in Heinz v Kendrick
21
 
where Lindsay J suggested that there was no need for the defendant to have had knowledge of the disability. 
He used two vivid examples to illustrate this point. First, a postman with a concealed artificial leg may be 
dismissed for being too slow. Second, a secretary with undeclared dyslexia may be dismissed for ‘typing 
hopelessly misspelt letters’.
22
 The subsequent Code of Practice supported this view, giving an example of 
a woman dismissed for persistent absenteeism (as any worker would be) where the employer was unaware 
that the reason for her absence was her multiple sclerosis.
23
 In all these examples, the employer’s act 
amounted to treatment related to the worker’s disability (which may or may not be justified). 
 The House of Lords in Malcolm disapproved of these principles. Instead, to identify if the 
treatment was ‘less favourable’ the correct comparator was a person in the same circumstances save for the 
disability. Hence, in the examples above, the correct comparator is a sighted customer with a dog, a person 
without a disability but with eating difficulties, or a worker without a disability who was long-term absent. 
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This overruled Novacold.
24
 Baroness Hale dissented on this point.
25
 Further, for the treatment to be 
‘related’ to the claimant’s disability, a unanimous House held that the defendant must have known, or ought 
to have known, of the disability at the time of the treatment.
26
 Lords Scott and Neuberger, carrying the torch 
of the importunate dissenters, appeared to go a step further, holding that the defendant must have been 
‘motivated’ by the disability.
27
 
 Malcolm’s case actually turned on the finding of fact by the trial judge that the sub-letting was not 
a result of Malcolm’s illness. However, the Law Lords’ wider remarks on disability-related discrimination 
deserve attention because they overruled the long-established Novacold interpretation, and applied not only 
to the housing provisions of the DDA 1995, but also those covering employment, and the provision of 
goods, facilities and services.
28
 
  
2. The Correct Comparator 
It was common ground that the device used to identify if the treatment was less favourable was a 
comparison. Technically speaking, the problem was whether the ‘reason’ (for the treatment) at the 
beginning section 24 was the same reason at the end (‘others to whom that reason .... would not apply’). 
The ‘wide’, or in this case, literal (Novacold), interpretation supposes that the comparator is not endowed 
with the ‘reason’ for the treatment. 
 In addition to the reasons provided by the Court of Appeal in Novacold, a plain reading of the 
provision most obviously points to ‘that’ reason being the aforementioned (and only) reason in the 
provision, which is the reason for the treatment. And if the comparator is not endowed with that reason, he 
does not have a guide dog, nor an eating disorder, nor long term absence from work. The Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning merely found no basis to deviate from this plain reading of the statute, although it endorsed this 
using Hansard. Thus, any dissent from this view ought to be couched in powerful terms, under say, the 
golden, mischief, or purposive rule, in order to depart from the plain meaning of the text. 
  In the House of Lords, the majority’s argument was that the ‘wide’ interpretation would mean that 
Malcolm’s treatment would be compared with a tenant who had not sub-let. It would also mean that a 
worker off sick for a long period because of a disability would be compared to a non-disabled worker not 
off sick. Of course, the council would not evict this tenant nor would the employer dismiss this worker. As 
such, this test ‘would always be met’
29
 and is therefore ‘pointless’.
30
 Lord Scott concluded: ‘Parliament 
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must surely have intended the comparison .... to be a meaningful comparison in order to distinguish between 
treatment that was discriminatory and treatment that was not’.
31
 
 This logic enabled the Lords to attack the examples given in Novacold. Lord Bingham said that, 
‘A more natural comparison ... would fall to be made ... with a person who had a dog but no disability or a 
diner who was a very untidy eater but had no disability-related reason for eating in that way.’
32
 Lords Scott 
and Neuberger agreed that a blind person with a dog should be compared to a sighted person with a dog,
33
 
with Lord Scott labelling this the ‘common sense’ answer.
34
 
 This reasoning bypasses the literal rule, and without saying as much, is suggesting that a plain 
reading of the provision would lead to the absurdity of a pointless comparison. But the conclusion that the 
test would always be met lacks imagination and misunderstands the concept of disability-related 
discrimination as the functional equivalent of direct and indirect discrimination. 
 On the first point, for example, using the ‘wide’ interpretation, the comparator could be a tenant 
who is being evicted, along with the claimant, because the council wish to refurbish their block of flats, or 
perhaps demolish it because it has been condemned unsafe. An ‘eviction’ could be part of re-housing 
programme. Similarly, the comparator worker may be dismissed, not because of his long-term absence, but 
because the whole workforce (or a section of it), including the claimant, is being made redundant. In either 
case, this comparison reveals the treatment was not related to the claimant’s disability. As such, this wider 
comparison will not ‘always be met’ and is not pointless. 
 Secondly, as disability-related discrimination was the functional equivalent of indirect 
discrimination, applying the majority’s logic to a classic case of indirect discrimination exposes the 
inadequacy of the narrow comparator. Suppose entrance exams were challenged as disfavouring black 
applicants. The ‘reason’ for their non-selection was the failure of the exam. The correct comparator group 
would be the white applicants, without that reason, in other words all the white applicants.
35
 (The respective 
success rates of white and black applicants can then be identified.) If the ‘narrow comparator’ theory were 
applied here, the comparator group would be exactly the same as the claimant group, save for race. In other 
words, it would include the ‘reason’ and so consist only of whites who did not pass the exam. Of course, 
no adverse impact would be revealed. This would be a ‘pointless’ comparison as it would reveal nothing 
about any discriminatory impact of the exam on black applicants. For disability-related discrimination, the 
narrow comparison is equally pointless, as it would reveal nothing about any discriminatory impact of the 
employer’s conduct on the person with a disability. 
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 Of course, the difference for disability-related discrimination was that the claimant’s group 
consists only of one person, and this may have led to the mistake. Where the claimant’s group contains all 
of those who took the exam, it will comprise, normally, some who failed and some who passed. The 
‘natural’ or ‘common sense’ (and correct) comparator group of white candidates will contain also some 
who failed and some who passed. For disability-related discrimination, the claimant’s ‘group’ will comprise 
one person, and so 100 per cent of this ‘group’ is disadvantaged by the practice. Thus, it is tempting to 
project the claimant’s identity minus only his disability onto the comparator’s ‘group’ (of one), which in 
Malcolm, would be a person who also sub-let. This is the mistake. In the rare conventional indirect 
discrimination cases where 100 per cent of the claimant’s group are disadvantaged by the practice, the 
comparator’s group still discards the ‘reason’. In Greencroft Social Club v Mullen,
36
 only members were 
entitled to a disciplinary hearing. Women were not entitled to membership, so the proportion of women 
(either guests or workers) not entitled to the disciplinary hearing was 100 per cent. Nonetheless, the EAT 
found that a prima facie case had been established. If the Malcolm logic were projected onto this case, the 
comparator group would be men who were not members (the ‘reason’), an absurd and pointless comparison. 
 A third reason why the majority were mistaken reverts attention somewhat closer to the statutory 
wording. As Baroness Hale explained in her dissent on this issue,
37
 the legislative history supports the wider 
interpretation. When introduced, the Disability Discrimination Bill provided that the comparison should be 
with ‘others who do not have that disability’ (clause 4(1)(a)). The drafter then replaced this with the words 
‘to whom that reason does not or would not apply’ in what became section 5(1)(a) (employment) and section 
20(1)(a) (services), and ‘others to whom that reason does not or would not apply’ in what became section 
24(1)(a) (premises). When introducing these amendments, the Government explained it now meant that a 
rejected job applicant who could not type because of arthritis should now be compared with a job applicant 
who could type, rather than an applicant without a disability who could not type. Such a case should not 
turn on the comparison, but on justification,
38
 for instance if typing was necessary for the job. 
 Baroness Hale then pointed to subsequent amendments made to the employment provisions (to 
implement the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC), on the basis that Novacold was correct. Parliament 
introduced a specific definition of direct discrimination which was not justifiable to run alongside disability-
related discrimination, which was justifiable.
39
 As the narrow construction reduced disability-related 
discrimination to direct discrimination,
40
 it must be incorrect, otherwise Parliament would have simply 
repealed its justification proviso, rather than introduce another section.
41
 She might have added that reading 
                                                          
36
 [1985] ICR 796 (EAT). 
37
 [2008] 1 AC 1399, [78]-[81].  
38
 Minister of State, Department for Education and Employment, Lord Henley, HL Deb 18 July 1995, vol 
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39
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Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1673. 
40
 Acknowledged by Lord Brown, [2008] 1 AC 1399, [114]. Lord Neuberger acknowledged that the narrow 
construction was ‘unattractively restrictive’ (ibid [119]) and ‘very limited’ (ibid [141]). 
41
 ibid [81]. 
    7 Disability Discrimination 
 
182 
 
down a section to render it otiose offended a ‘cardinal rule’ of statutory interpretation,
42
 and that such a 
construction, being conceptually incoherent, destroyed the provision’s integrity and efficacy. 
 The only criticism one could make of Baroness Hale’s otherwise meticulous judgment on this 
issue was that she had to invoke Pepper v Hart
43
 in order recite Hansard. In doing so, she had to 
acknowledge that the statutory definition was ambiguous and could lead to ‘inconveniences’,
44
 which, as 
demonstrated above, was not the case. Of course, as with Mummery LJ in Novacold, this may have been a 
mere pragmatic move to bolster her judgment, and in this case perhaps, persuade her colleagues of their 
error. 
  
3. Knowledge of the Disability 
The second point decided by the House (unanimously) was that to be liable the defendant, when acting, 
must have knowledge of the claimant’s disability. Once again, this is at odds with the concept of indirect 
discrimination, which is centred on the impact of facially neutral conduct, rather than the state of mind of 
the defendant. It is well established that a person can discriminate without being aware of the victim’s 
personal characteristic. Most typically, as noted above, entrance exams can disadvantage particular 
protected groups.
45
 
 While the ‘narrow’ interpretation of the comparator reduced disability-related discrimination to 
the equivalent of direct discrimination (but in some cases, with a justification defence), an additional 
requirement of knowledge reduced the reach of disability-related discrimination to less than that provided 
by direct discrimination, where it is possible for an employer to directly discriminate without knowledge 
of the victim’s disability. This reinforces the redundancy of the provision under consideration. This 
(technical) consequence alone ought to have alerted the House that they were astray on the point. If that 
were not enough, a Code of Practice available at the time offered a supporting example: an employer may 
advertise internally for a promotion, stating that the post is not suitable for anyone with a history of mental 
illness, and exclude, unknowingly, a member of staff with a history of schizophrenia.
46
 Neither this 
example, nor the Code, was mentioned. The principle holds at EU level, where public statements by a 
director that he would not employ immigrants was held to amount to direct racial discrimination, even 
though there were no immigrant applicants.
47
 For the ECJ, and the Equality Act 2010,
48
 the deterrent effect 
alone is enough to warrant liability.  
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 Although these examples show that it is possible to directly discriminate without knowledge of 
the victim’s protected characteristic, they differ from cases like Malcolm because the conduct is facially 
discriminatory. But, it has been suggested it is possible for a person to directly discriminate by acting on 
discriminatory factors of which he is unaware. In Williams v YKK, Elias J suggested, obiter, that an 
unprejudiced manager’s decision may be affected, or tainted, by a report made by a prejudiced supervisor.
49
 
So for instance, a manager who is unaware that a worker’s absenteeism was due to her disability may be 
influenced to dismiss her by unfavourable opinions delivered by prejudiced colleagues who were aware of 
her disability. A similarly innocent landlord may refuse to let to a person with a disability because he has 
been misinformed by his estate manager that he knows the person to be an unreliable tenant, when in truth, 
the manager is acting on his prejudice towards the person’s disability. This could amount to direct 
discrimination because the reason for the treatment is the victim’s disability: the basis of the prejudiced 
opinions was disability, rather than absenteeism. This is established in the United States, and known as 
‘Cat’s Paw’ theory.
50
 The feature of this theory is that the prejudiced subordinate has influence over the 
decision-maker and so ‘poisons the well’
51
 from which that decision-maker draws his knowledge. More 
recently in Reynolds v CLFIS,
52
 the Court of Appeal controversially rejected such a notion (without 
considering the American jurisprudence). But neither Cat’s Paw theory nor Williams was considered by the 
House in Malcolm, which in a case of public importance involving the defendant’s lack of knowledge of a 
protected characteristic, was remiss. 
 Aside from principle, the demand for knowledge is undermined by considering the provision in 
context.
53
 At the time of the House of Lords’ judgment, the DDA 1995 expressly stated on no less than 
eight occasions elsewhere, that knowledge is required for certain liabilities, one of these even being 
disability related discrimination.
54 
Thus, the absence of such a rider for the provision in question was a 
concrete indicator that knowledge was not required.
55
 
 In summary, the decision on this point conflicted with the concept of indirect discrimination, 
reduced disability-related discrimination to less than direct discrimination (the technical flaws), was out of 
step with other provisions of the statue, and failed to address Cat’s Paw theory. 
 The reasoning behind this part of the decision varied. Lord Bingham and Baroness Hale considered 
that as disability-related discrimination carries a justification defence, knowledge must be an element, 
otherwise the defendant would be in no position to justify the challenged treatment.
56
 Once again, this 
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overlooks the basic technicalities of indirect discrimination law. In many examples of indirect 
discrimination, it is perfectly possible that the employer had a justifiable reason for its challenged practice 
without being aware of the identity of any particular protected group adversely affected. In the context of 
housing, a landlord without knowledge of her tenants’ mental illness could justify evicting them for causing 
a nuisance to their neighbours, even though their behaviour was caused by the mental illness.
57
 
 Lord Bingham
58
 joined with Lords Scott and Neuberger in relating this decision to the availability 
of damages. For instance, Lord Neuberger observed: 
 
[I]t would require very clear words before a statute could render a person liable for damages for 
discrimination against a disabled person, owing to an act which was not inherently discriminatory 
carried out at a time when the person had no reason to know of the disability which could render 
the act discriminatory.
59
 
 
Lord Scott was equally convinced: 
 
But could it really have been intended by Parliament that all employers vis-à-vis their employees, 
all providers of goods, facilities and services vis-à-vis their customers and all managers of 
premises vis-à-vis the occupiers of the premises were to be subjected to the risk of becoming 
statutory tortfeasors and liable to substantial damages claims on account of normal actions taken 
in understandable pursuit of their respective interests against persons of whose disabilities they 
were totally unaware? I find it very difficult to accept that that could have been intended by 
Parliament.
60
 
 
 Again, some context is required here, this time a little broader than just the statute in question. A 
brief perusal of the history of Britain’s discrimination legislation would have pointed these judges to a 
different conclusion. Both the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976 originally 
provided that for indirect discrimination no damages shall be awarded where it was unintentional.
61
 
However, it became clear that this restriction did not comply with EU law, with the ECJ holding that a 
member state may not make an award of compensation in a sex discrimination case dependent on showing 
fault on the part of the employer.
62
 Consequently, the restriction was dropped and could not apply to any 
case falling under the equality Directives.
63
 The DDA 1995, section 17A(2), provided, like the other 
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equality statutes, that damages may be awarded when a court or tribunal considered it ‘just and equitable’.
64
 
It made no distinction between employment (falling within the Directive) and other matters and so 
apparently had the same meaning for all activities covered by the Act. As such, it should have been read to 
comply with the Framework Directive, and this meant that damages could not be dependent upon fault (or 
its absence). The legislative history, ECJ jurisprudence, and the text and structure of the statute, should 
have made it plain to these three Law Lords that indeed, the Act provided very clear words rendering a 
person liable in damages for no-fault discrimination. It is quite worrying, to say the least, that none of those 
three opinions using the damages remedy in support of their decisions actually referred to this history, or 
even the specific provisions of the statute before them.  
  
4. Discriminatory intent 
As noted above, in addition to the requirement that the defendant should have been aware of the claimant’s 
disability, two Law Lords took this a step further and suggested that the defendant should have been 
motivated by the disability.
65
 Lord Scott’s reasoning was rooted in the consequences should it be otherwise. 
A landlord should be able to evict for non-payment of rent, for instance, without being liable for disability 
discrimination. Hence: 
 
[I]f the ... disability has played no motivating part in the decision of the alleged discriminator to 
inflict on the disabled person the treatment complained of, the alleged discriminator's reason for 
that treatment cannot, for section 24(1)(a) purposes, relate to the disability.
66
 
 
 Of course, it might be so that a landlord should be able to evict for non-payment of rent. But the 
solution to that problem is not a (technical) distortion of the statutory definition of disability discrimination, 
especially as it would affect other activities covered by the Act, such as the more frequently invoked 
employment provisions. Moreover, given that this case was heard just a few years after the Macpherson 
Report,
67
 and its identification of ‘unwitting’ and ‘unconscious’ discrimination, and after many decades of 
jurisprudence establishing that discrimination law was not solely fault-based,
68
 to use Lord Scott’s own 
words, ‘could it really have been intended by Parliament’
69
 to confine disability discrimination to fault-
based liability? Lord Neuberger’s reasoning requires quoting at length, 
 
                                                          
64
 DDA 1995, s 17A(2) inserted by SI 2003/1673, Pt 2reg 9 (in force October 1, 2004). Nowadays, for unintentional indirect 
discrimination, damages are awardable only after the court or tribunal has ‘considered’ other remedies, such as an injunction, or for 
employment, a declaration or recommendation: EA 2010, ss 119(6) 124(5). 
65
 [2008] 1 AC 1399, [29] (Lord Scott), [166] (Lord Neuberger). 
66
 [2008] 1 AC 1399, [29]. 
67
 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson, advised by Tom Cook, 
The Right Reverend Dr John Sentamu, Dr Richard Stone. February 1999. Presented to Parliament by the 
Home Secretary (Cm 4262-I, 1999) at paras 6.1 - 6.34. See further, p 51. 
68
 Starting with Griggs v Duke Power (1971) 401 US 424. See in particular, ‘Direct Discrimination and Motive’, p 79. 
69
 [2008] 1 AC 1399, [28], above p 178. 
    7 Disability Discrimination 
 
186 
 
In my view, it is plain that the ‘reason’ in section 24(1)(a) cannot be confined to the legal 
ground, because a prospective landlord, under section 22(1) has a legal right to refuse to let as, 
and on the terms, he chooses. Also, if a landlord voluntarily agreed with all but one of his 
tenants in a block of flats to vary the user covenants in their leases in some beneficial way, but 
did not accord that privilege to a tenant because he was disabled, it would be absurd if that was 
not a ‘reason’ within section 24(1)(a). Additionally, the fact that knowledge of the disability 
(including what should be known) is required, supports the argument that one is normally 
primarily concerned with the state of mind of the alleged discriminator. Crucially, this is also 
supported by the language of section 22(1): the reference to the ‘reason’ for the treatment 
supports the notion that one is concerned with the alleged discriminator's subjective motivation, 
rather than with the objective legal ground.
70
 
 
This is a rather denser piece of reasoning. Lord Neuberger is arguing that the ‘reason’ cannot be confined, 
for example, to the right to evict brought about by sub-letting (the ‘legal ground’), and must therefore 
include a subjective element. He gives three explanations in support. The first (in the second part of the 
first sentence), makes little sense. Section 22, DDA 1995, stipulated that landlords could not discriminate 
in the letting of premises.
71
 Thus, a landlord could not refuse to let, or choose to let on (discriminatory) 
terms of his choice.  
 In the second sentence, he argues that otherwise, section 24 could not apply where there was 
blatant or ‘inherent’ discrimination, such as singling out the sole person with a disability for unfavourable 
treatment. From here, Lord Neuberger concludes that that section 24 must include subjective motivation. 
The third, ‘crucial support’, for this assumes the ‘fact’ that knowledge of the disability is required. Even if 
section 24 required this, it would be law, not fact. Labelling an interpretation of a statute a ‘fact’ gives the 
proposition an air of truth it cannot merit, as though it were some virtuous principle around which the statute 
must bend. One must assume that the reference to section 22(1) alludes to the first reason, as section 22 
neither mentions nor hints at the ‘reason’. It merely states that landlords may not discriminate; 
discrimination is defined elsewhere in the statute. As such, the logic of the third reason is as opaque as it 
was for the first. 
 This leaves the second reason as the only one reasonably open to scrutiny. It boils down to saying 
‘if section 24 were objective, it would narrow its scope’. It seems the judge feared a landlord alluding to 
one ‘objective’ reason to exclusion of all others. Thus, if the landlord shows that his ‘policy was to obtain 
possession of any property in his portfolio whenever he had a legal ground for doing so’, he could always 
escape liability.
72
 This overlooks the fact that persons can act for more than one reason, and the long-
established law that a defendant acting for a number of reasons can be liable if just one was discriminatory.
73
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 Lord Neuberger considered this conclusion a ‘comparatively generous approach’.
74
 This would 
only be the case if expectations were lowered to the ridiculous proposition that the only reasons included 
in disability-related discrimination were non-discriminatory ones. This was Lord Neuberger’s starting point 
(his ‘legal ground’). Moreover, to interpret a discrimination statute not to cover hostile or ‘inherent’ 
discrimination would be more than ungenerous; it would be absurd. But to focus on Lord Neuberger’s 
apparent generosity is to distract from his conclusion, which was anything but a generous interpretation, 
requiring both knowledge of the disability and a discriminatory intent. Thus, this technical excursion was 
flawed from start to finish. To quote the judge’s own reasoning, it would require ‘very clear words’ to upset 
a fundamental and long-established tenet of discrimination law. It seems that here even clear words were 
not enough to upset the common law mind-set of fault-based liability, nor the spirit of the importunate 
dissenters. 
  
5. Alternative interpretations 
Underpinning the speeches was concern for the limited housing stock and waiting lists,
75
 and the difficult 
position of Lewisham Council, who might well have faced judicial review had it not evicted a tenant who 
was sub-letting.
76
 Moreover, there was concern for the position of landlords, public or private, who may 
never be able to evict a disabled tenant, who, for instance, permanently sub-let, or never paid rent.
77
 This 
of course, may interfere with a landlord’s property rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
78
 Clearly, the majority were afraid, as Lord Neuberger put it, of giving disability-related 
discrimination ‘extraordinarily far-reaching scope’.
79
  
 Although these concerns touch on the true problem, save for Baroness Hale’s, none of the 
speeches addressed it. In the field of premises, justification of disability-related discrimination was 
limited to an exhaustive list of specific conditions, such as to avoid endangering the health or safety of 
any person, or that the person with a disability was incapable of entering into an enforceable agreement.
80
 
None of these conditions covered sub-letting or non-payment of rent. Thus, if for a reason related to his 
disability a tenant permanently sub-let, or failed to pay any rent, he could never be evicted. This contrasts 
with the employment field, which provided a general justification defence, amenable to any 
circumstances.
81
 As Baroness Hale explained, ‘It may well be that Parliament had not understood that 
the narrow scope for justification in relation to services and premises would give rise to the problems 
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we face in this case.’
82
 For Baroness Hale, the ‘simplest solution’ would be regulations expanding the 
list, as permitted by section 24(5).
83
 But this falls short of a judicial solution, the task before the House. 
 There were a number of solutions available in this case, and the House of Lords took the worst. It 
could have resolved the instant case much more simply, either by sending it back to a court to decide if the 
eviction was related to Malcolm’s disability, this time on the basis that Malcolm had a disability, or more 
simply, on the trial judge’s finding that the premature sub-letting was not a result of Malcolm’s illness. But 
the case was in the Lords as a matter of public importance, and so an interpretation of section 24, at the 
least, was required. To do this it had ample interpretive tools to hand, and, save for Baroness Hale, the 
House chose none of them.  
 The starting point, the literal rule (as noted above), points to ‘that’ reason in section 24 being the 
aforementioned (and only reason) in the provision, which is the reason for the treatment, and not necessarily 
the disability itself. This envisages typically, treatment because of a manifestation of a disability, such as 
slow typing or walking, absenteeism, or the accompaniment of a guide dog. As well as being obvious from 
the text and structure of the Act, this is supported by the legislative history (as Baroness Hale highlighted) 
suggesting it represented the intent of Parliament, save for the limited justifications for landlords. The 
benefit of such a decision would be the signal that an urgent amendment was required. Given the potential 
interference with property rights
84
 by such a literal reading, the signal could have been amplified somewhat 
if such a decision were accompanied by a declaration of incompatibility.
85
 Appropriate amendments could 
have been made virtually overnight by statutory instrument (under s 24(5)), and so there was no need even 
to engage the fast-track procedure provided by the Human Rights Act 1998.
86
 
 The immediate effect of the interpretation for landlords could have been ameliorated by returning 
the case to the trial judge (as suggested above), effectively reducing this interpretation to an obiter dictum, 
although given that it would have been from the House the Lords, this may be a little fanciful. As even this 
interpretation could have had some unsatisfactory, or perhaps ‘absurd’,
87
 consequences for landlords, a 
solution beyond the literal one was desirable. 
 First, the House could have considered the rule that ‘[W]ords, and particularly general words, 
cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content are derived from their context.’
88
 The context here was 
the attachment to section 24 of the exhaustive list of specific defences. This distinguished the premises 
provisions from the others, notably the employment provisions. Thus, the House could have signalled that 
its narrow interpretation of section 24 was confined the ‘premises’ provisions of the Act. This would have 
avoided the extensive damage done to the more frequently litigated employment provisions.  
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 That of course would leave two similar formulas with markedly different meanings. A better 
approach would be to focus on the drafting oversight itself. This leads to the remaining solutions, the second 
of which involves the golden rule.
89
 Given the absurdity (or in Baroness Hale’s view, the ‘inconvenience’
90
) 
produced by a literal reading, it was open to the courts not to apply section 24 in certain circumstances, 
notably against the principle of a landlord’s essential property rights regarding sub-letting or non-paying 
tenants. It might be argued that the majority in substance, if not words, applied the golden rule, by avoiding 
the absurd consequences for landlords. This would be disingenuous for three reasons. First, the majority 
overruled Clark v Novacold and the employment cases. Second, they went far beyond ‘disapplying’ the 
statute to the particular absurdity identified. Third, they produced a far greater counter-mischief, especially 
to the employment provisions.
91
 
 A third option would be to shape this absurdity in the context of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
section 3(1), and the landlord’s Convention property rights. Given the dramatic consequences of a literal 
reading of section 24, the risk of judicial review, and the Convention Right, it seems obvious this is a 
drafting error. And given the dramatic effect of narrowing the comparison required by disability-related 
discrimination, it seems equally obvious that the error lies not there, but in the limited justification defences. 
Instead of a literal interpretation accompanied with a declaration of incompatibility, the Ghaidan approach 
could be considered.
92
 Here, it will be recalled, that an Act can be interpreted liberally; the precise words 
used are less important than their substantive effect
93
 as long as the interpretation would ‘go with the grain 
of the legislation’.
94
 Thus, Convention compliance could have been achieved by supplementing the list of 
defences under section 24(3), with something to the effect of: ‘To enforce a term of the letting agreement’. 
As it stood, each of the reasons in section 24(3) could be invoked only if it were ‘reasonable in the 
circumstances’ for the defendant to hold that opinion,
95
 which is broad enough to import a degree of 
proportionality into the defence, as required by Strasbourg jurisprudence. Alternatively, the supplement 
could read, ‘The reason for the treatment is a genuine one, and appropriate and necessary to enforce a term 
of the letting agreement.’ As the drafting oversight, and the necessary remedy, were ‘abundantly clear’, a 
fourth solution exists: much the same the same result could have been achieved using the Inco Europe 
doctrine.
96
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6. Conclusion 
In Malcolm, the House of Lords had at its disposal the interpretive tools of the literal and golden rules, 
Pepper v Hart, context, the Ghaidan approach, Inco Europe, and a declaration of incompatibility. The 
majority failed even to consider any of them, with Lord Scott, it seemed, exchanging all formalities of 
statutory interpretation for ‘common sense’.
97
 Instead, the House produced a distorted and inefficacious 
interpretation, save for Baroness Hale, who, for one of the elements, opted for a less damaging literal one 
(with the aid of Pepper v Hart). Just as worrying was the flirtation with fault-based liability. It managed 
this ‘non-achievement’ with five speeches and some 177 paragraphs of sometimes complex, technically 
flawed, and opaque reasoning. It seems that the notion that this was a case of public importance (being in 
the House of Lords) was lost on the majority, at least, whose speeches did nothing to clarify the law and 
everything to distort and damage it, and must have left interested parties, as well as Lord Diplock’s ‘citizen’,
 
98
 quite baffled.  
 Parliament rescued this situation when enacting the Equality Act 2010 some two years later. It did 
this by abolishing the comparative element altogether, and adopting a general justification defence. This 
single definition provided by EA 2010, section 15 (‘discrimination arising from a disability’) applied to all 
activities, such as employment and premises. Section 15 also codified the ‘no knowledge’ aspect of 
Malcolm. But the significance of this was marginalised by the introduction of a definition of indirect 
discrimination specific to disability.
99
 In line with general principle, this does not require knowledge of the 
disability nor a discriminatory intent. Thus, the Equality Act 2010 effectively restored the law to the pre-
Malcolm position. 
  
 
                                                          
97
 [2008] 1 AC 1399, [30] & [31]. A McColgan (Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart 2014) 166) 
excused this as ‘judges not intimately acquainted with the statutory discrimination provisions.’ 
98
 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591 (HL) 638 
(Lord Diplock). See p 25, text to n 85. 
99
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292 (5th Cir 1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
  
In the context of statutory interpretation and equality law, Lord Steyn’s observation that ‘social welfare 
legislation and tax statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently’
1
 is highly appropriate. 
 At first sight, it would seem from the cases explored here, that the judges prefer to treat 
discrimination law as they would a tax statute, lacking any societal ambition. In some,
2
 there is a noticeable 
absence of the ‘sympathetic and imaginative discovery’ of purpose urged by Learned Hand J some 70 years 
ago, and adopted by the House of Lords
3
 as a rubric of the purposive approach. But this absence does not 
tally with the trends in the development of the ‘rules’ of statutory interpretation. The cases scrutinised in 
this work range from 1983 to 2015,
4
 a period coinciding with the rise of the purposive approach, and the 
ever-increasing willingness of the courts to tamper with statutory wording, often, but not always, under the 
shelter of EU law or the Human Rights Act 1998. Neither is there any apparent relationship between the 
discrimination cases and the constitutional arrangements of the day, which saw the courts, bolstered by the 
European Communities Act 1972 and the Human Rights Act 1998, increasingly willing to challenge the 
executive, and indeed Parliament. Any bravado here failed to infect most of the judgments found in the 
domestic cases within this work. Less surprisingly perhaps, the establishment of the Supreme Court made 
no difference to the approach in these cases. From a more political perspective, with no apparent variation, 
these cases straddled the governments of the free-market Conservatives, the overtly liberal New Labour, 
and the ‘austerity’ Coalition.  
 As these factors cannot explain the poor judgments, an explanation must lie elsewhere. The 
analysis of these cases reveals that the interpretations are more inexpert than merely literal. One does not 
need to be an authority on discrimination law or statutory interpretation to realise this; the prolixity of many 
of the judgments are enough for a confident layperson to suspect that something is awry.  
 It has been demonstrated that the cases in this study were all relatively easy to solve. Assuming 
this, and that our senior judges are exceedingly good lawyers, one must ask why these judgments are so 
technically flawed and prolix. The obvious place to start is the apparent absence of expertise within the 
reasoning. The first thing to note is that the judiciary cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the purposive 
approach and its antecedent mischief rule, which has been around for centuries. From time to time in the 
20th century, notably in the Privy Council, senior judges have shown themselves to be perfectly at ease with 
                                                          
1
 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 (HL) [21]. See p 22. 
2
 Notably, Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 428 (CA); Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] 
IRLR 399 (CA); Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA); Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399. 
For imaginative but unsympathetic ‘discoveries’, see, Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA); Naeem 
v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 289 (CA); Cornelius v University College of Swansea [1987] 
IRLR 141 (CA); Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] UKHL 48.  
3
 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 (HL) [21], citing Cabell v Markham 148 
F 2d 737 (2nd Cir 1945) 739 (Learned Hand J). See further, p 22. 
4
 Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 428 (CA) and Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice 
[2016] ICR 289 (CA). 
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a liberal purposive approach.
5
 First apparent in 1930, this has occurred long before EEC membership was 
on the horizon, under which, of course, courts are obligated to take that approach.
6
 
 Of course, familiarity with the purposive rule is no use without familiarity with the purpose of 
discrimination law. The history shows that the common law has been unwilling and/or unable to apply its 
vaunted moralistic credentials to matters of discrimination, with attitudes ranging from indifference to 
outright hostility.
7
 The matter is not helped by the paucity of education on discrimination law. To this day, 
English lawyers receive no compulsory detailed education in discrimination law at their training stages. In 
English law degrees, the basic definitions may be taught as part of a Foundation subject, either EU Law, or 
Public Law (in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998). Otherwise, discrimination law commonly remains 
an optional subject, or part of an option, typically Employment Law. By contrast, speak to any lawyer of 
the United States and you will find them steeped in the parallel definitions of disparate treatment, disparate 
impact, and retaliation, as the Civil Rights Act 1964 is essential to their legal training. 
 Given these circumstances, one might have presumed that when the first comprehensive 
discrimination statutes arrived in the 1970s, with their novel societal purpose and concepts, a programme 
of judicial training would accompany them. But there is little evidence of judicial training in this area, with 
only one-day seminars dedicated to the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998; encompassing the 
whole of the European Convention on Human Rights (as well as the workings of the Act), it is not even 
known if these got as far as Article 14.
8
 The extensive Equal Treatment Bench Book
9
 provides some basic 
explanations of the key definitions, but goes nowhere near an explanation of the purpose, societal or 
otherwise, of the Equality Act 2010.
10
 On the other hand, there is a wealth of jurisprudence (notably under 
the progenitor US Civil Rights Act 1964), academic literature, and even extensive guidance,
11
 on which to 
draw. But, as the cases in this study show, these sources were rarely explored. 
 Hence, on the whole, English judges come to this legislation with little or no expertise in the 
technicalities or purpose of the legislation. In a range of relatively easy cases, the host of technical 
shortcomings is evidence of that. Within this, six particular themes can be detected. These relate to technical 
shortcomings, basic interpretive tools, prolixity, ideological predilections, binary and fault-based liability, 
and evolution. 
  
                                                          
5
 See p 21. 
6
 See e.g. R v Henn and Darby [1981] 1 AC 850 (HL) 904 (Lord Diplock). See pp 37. 
7
 See p 69 et al. 
8
 An attendee, Sedley LJ, reflected, ‘You cannot teach anyone, even a judge, very much in a day.’ (M Hill 
(ed) Religious Liberty and Human Rights (University of Wales Press, 2002) Preface, pp ix-x. 
9
 2013, amended 2015, Part 1. < https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/equal-treatment-bench-book/ > 
accessed 1 May 2017. 
10
 Beyond stating that the purpose of the Act was to ‘replace a mass of disparate mass of legislation’. ibid 1-1. 
11
 For instance, the EHRC Codes of Practice, published for each activity covered by the EA 2010. See < 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/equality-act-codes-practice > accessed 2 
June 2016. The Equality Act 2010 also carries Explanatory Notes. 
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Technical shortcomings 
The poor judgments comprise inexpert and technically flawed thinking, undermining the efficacy and 
integrity of key definitions.. With the aid of a dictionary, the Court of Appeal decided that ‘ethnic origins’ 
could be defined only by biological origins.
12
 Much later, the Supreme Court in JFS occupied 65 paragraphs 
contemplating whether or not a Masorti Jew could be defined as belonging to a racial group by his ethnic 
origins,
13
 in a case in which all that mattered was that the claimant was not an Orthodox Jew. 
 For direct discrimination, Lord Goff’s but for test and Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s rebuttal were 
both misstated and flawed.
14
 Elsewhere judges have assumed that the symmetrical model of direct 
discrimination facilitated positive action, which was contrary to the all jurisprudence on the matter, the 
statutory wording and context, and rendered (unknowingly it seems) other parts of the statute otiose.
15
 
 In the context of indirect discrimination, there was the inclusion of the challenged factor into the 
pool for comparison;
16
 misplaced literal interpretations of the phrases ‘requirement or condition’
17
 and ‘can 
comply’
18
 which would lead to absurd consequences and render other parts of the statute otiose;
19
 and an 
overly liberal justification defence.
20
 And as if these lessons were impossible to learn, as recently as 2015 
the Court of Appeal embarked upon another error-strewn and doomed theory.
21
 In the heavily litigated field 
of employment and disability discrimination, the House of Lords needlessly redefined a statutory cause of 
action to the point of invisibility in order to save landlords from penury. Perhaps the most eccentric 
approach arose in the victimisation cases, where the House of Lords rewrote a precedent in the most clumsy 
manner, in order to preserve an ‘honest and reasonable defence’ by giving it a different ticket.
22
 
 This summary suggests that the cases were a result of wild and unstructured thinking. To a degree 
this is true, and it may be ironic even to gather such a random collection of reasoning under a single heading. 
But some more tangible underlying themes are detectable. 
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 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA), reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). See p 134. 
13
 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC). See p 90 et al. 
14
 James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL). See p 81 et al. 
15
 See e.g. Lord Griffiths in James v Eastleigh BC [1990] 2 AC 751, 767, 768; and Lord Brown in JFS 
[2010] 2 AC 728 (HL) [247]. See above, respectively, p 84, and p 99. 
16
 Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No. 2) [2006] ICR 785 (HL); Rolls Royce v Unite 
[2010] ICR 1 (CA) [142] (Aikens LJ); Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] ICR 472 (EAT) 
doubted [2016] ICR 289 (CA) only conclusively overruled [2017] UKSC 27. 
17
 See e.g. Perera v Civil Service Commission (No. 2) [1983] ICR 428 (CA); Meer v Tower Hamlets LB 
[1988] IRLR 399 (CA). See p 122 et al. 
18
 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA), reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). See p 134 et al. 
19
 See e.g. Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399 (CA). See p 123; and Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 
QB 1 (CA), 9-10 (Lord Denning MR) 14-15 (Oliver LJ) 21-22 (Kerr LJ) reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
See p 134 et al. 
20
 Hampson v Department of Education [1989] ICR 179 (CA) 196. See p 35-36. 
21
 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 and Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 289, above 
p 144 et al. 
22
 See above, “The ‘honest and reasonable defence’”, p 109. 
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Absence of basic interpretive tools 
This work does not presume that the statutory definitions were flawless. It would be surprising if they were, 
given the relative infancy of discrimination law and its novel and challenging concepts for many areas of 
civil life. The cases reviewed highlighted drafting problems
23
 and the propensity for unpredicted 
scenarios.
24
 Nonetheless, these cases were in the hands of the bench’s best legal brains, and identifying and 
resolving the issues should have been relatively straightforward matters. Instead, they produced unwieldy, 
unsatisfactory, and in many cases, unduly narrow judgments. It is perhaps ironic, that resort to the 
legislative text and established tools of statutory interpretation would have avoided this, as very often, the 
statutory purpose would have been achieved with a simple literal approach. For instance, of the eleven
25
 
cases singled out for particular attention in this work, judges in eight departed from the literal meaning to 
produce a narrow interpretation.
26
 In four of these, judges departed from the literal rule in order to 
accommodate a benign motive defence,
27
 and in two others to produce a novel and unfounded model of 
indirect discrimination.
28
 In another, the Court of Appeal chose the narrow of two literal possibilities, 
ignored a House of Lords dictum, and breached the ‘otiose’ rule,
29
 when providing an ultimately doomed 
‘scientific’ definition of ‘ethnic origins’, again, seemingly under the influence of the defendant’s benign 
motive.
30
 With a little imagination, or interpretive skill, three other cases could have avoided unduly narrow 
results and been resolved purposively without departing from the literal rule.
31
 
 
  
Prolixity 
A feature in addition to these technical shortcomings is the prolixity of the judgments. These are unlikely 
to achieve one particular aim of the literal rule (as well as the rule of law), that citizens should be able to 
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 See e.g. Case C-185/97 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1999] ICR 100 (ECJ); Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey 
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St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (HL); Rutherford v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (No. 2) [2006] ICR 785 
(HL); Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA) reversed [2017] UKSC 27; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 289 
(CA) overruled [2017] UKSC 27; Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL); Perera v Civil Service Commission (no. 2) 
[1983] ICR 428 (CA); Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399 (CA); Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA), reversed [1983] 
2 AC 548 (HL). 
26
 James v Eastleigh (minority, 3-2); JFS (minority, 5-4); Khan (unanimous); Derbyshire (majority 4-1); 
Rutherford (majority 3-2); Essop (unanimous); Naeem (unanimous); and Malcolm (majority, 4-1). All ibid. 
27
 James v Eastleigh, JFS, Khan, and Derbyshire, all ibid. 
28
 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA); Naeem v Secretary of state for Justice [2016] ICR 289 (CA) 
both overruled [2017] UKSC 27. 
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 See e.g. Hill v William Hill (Park Lane) Ltd [1949] AC 530 (HL). See further p 23. 
30
 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1, reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
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 Perera v Civil Service Commission (no. 2) [1983] ICR 428 (CA); Meer v London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets [1988] IRLR 399 (CA); Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1 (CA) (on the ‘racial group’ issue) 
reversed [1983] 2 AC 548 (HL). 
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understand the law.
32
 The point was made more recently in an extra-judicial speech by Lord Neuberger: 
‘[I]f justice is seen to be done it must be understandable’.
33
 Thus (with a coincidental relevance to this 
project) he pronounced, ‘Indeed, the increasing complexity of the law imposes a greater obligation than 
ever on judges to make themselves clear.’
34
 
 Most notable here is the JFS case, where no less than nine Justices of the Supreme Court provided 
eight separate speeches, occupying 259 paragraphs, in a case of relatively little complexity and importance. 
In Meer, Staughton LJ went off on a whim of his own, exploring irrelevant matters such as discriminatory 
intent and the potential (misplaced) capriciousness of the law.
35
 Taking Khan
36
 and Derbyshire
37
 together, 
the House of Lords alone produced some 160 paragraphs, comprising eight unanimous speeches,
38
 none of 
which faced up to the real problem, which was that the statutory formula for victimisation did not provide 
any sort of defence, notably for those defending litigation. In Malcolm, the majority managed their effective 
destruction of a statutory cause of action with 113 paragraphs bypassing the main issue and any 
conventional tools of statutory interpretation. The Court of Appeal in Essop expended some 70 paragraphs 
on an unfounded and thoroughly incorrect definition of just the prima facie elements of indirect 
discrimination.
39
 In Naeem, the Court managed much the same in just 40 paragraphs, but in doing so failed 
to identify and properly overrule the EAT’s erroneous comparison, which itself occupied some sixteen 
paragraphs.
40
 
 None of this is inevitable; the analysis in this work has illustrated that the cases were much easier 
to resolve that their judgments suggest. There is evidence of this in the some of the speeches. In Derbyshire, 
for instance, Baroness Hale’s speech stood out as the only one to repudiate the ‘honest and reasonable 
defence’. Moreover, she managed this in just eleven paragraphs, somewhat below the average of 20. And 
even with a superfluous discussion on the claimant’s ethnic identity, her speech in JFS was the most 
germane, clear, and concise, coming in at eighteen paragraphs, against the average of 29. Similarly, in a 
single speech of the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale managed to overrule both Essop and Naeem and restore 
the law to it proper position, in just 48 crisp paragraphs. Although these are rare and isolated examples, 
they demonstrate that such judgments are possible in discrimination cases. 
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 See e.g. Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591 (HL) 
638 (Lord Diplock). See further, p 25, text to n 85. 
33
 Lord Neuberger MR ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture 2011, 16 March 
2011, para 5 < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131202164909/http://judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2011
> accessed 1 May 2017. 
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 ibid, para 7. 
35
 Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399 (CA). See p 122, especially 123 et al. 
36
 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKHL 48. Discussed p 107 et al. 
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 St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (SC). Discussed p 107 et al. 
38
 In St Helens MBC v Derbyshire ibid [35]-[36], Baroness Hale dissented on one point (the ‘honest and 
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39
 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA). Reversed [2017] UKSC 27. 
40
 [2016] ICR 289 (CA); [2014] ICR 472 (EAT) [15]-[31] (Mr Recorder Luba QC) overruled [2017] UKSC 
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Ideological predilections 
Whatever their expertise or experience in the area of discrimination law, many of the judges seem 
enthusiastic to bring to a case ideological predilections at odds with the widely accepted goals of 
discrimination law. Clues can be found within the cases, suggesting that the judgments are driven by 
opinions more personal than legalistic. In many cases, the interpretation of the discrimination legislation is 
being treated as a ‘free for all’, or as a secondary matter in the process. The most obvious examples here 
are two pairs of Court of Appeal cases which ventured to rewrite the theory of indirect discrimination 
without reference to any relevant authority or statutory purpose.
41
 But consider these comments, which 
flavour many of the speeches in this work: 
 
 ‘If persons wish to insist on wearing bathing suits they cannot reasonably insist on admission to a 
nudist colony...’
42
  
 ‘But why should a coat-tailer... be entitled to succeed?’
43
  
 This would be ‘an automatic ride to victory’.
44
  
 ‘[O]ne can’t help feeling that something has gone wrong.’
45
  
 ‘[A] brilliant man whose personal qualities made him suitable as a legal assistant might well have 
been sent forward...’
46
  
 Requirements ‘adopted at the whim of the employer’ should not attract liability.
47
  
 Otherwise, discrimination law would have ‘an extraordinary wide and capricious effect’.
48
  
 
Given that they lack legal merit, these comments amount to no more than personal opinions, or ideological 
predilections. Their flavour could be best summarised perhaps, by Lord Diplock’s lament over the Race 
Relations Act 1968, restricting as he saw it ‘the liberty which the citizen has previously enjoyed...’.
49
 Other 
statements suppose more overtly to reflect the views of the ‘man on the street’. The first was made without 
a hint of irony: 
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 Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 428 (CA) and Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 
399; Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA) and Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 
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 Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] QB 1, 21C (Kerr LJ). See p 134 et al. 
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 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA) [37] (Sir Colin Rimer). See p 145, especially p 151. 
44
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 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] 2 AC 728 (SC) [226] (Lord Rodger) (see p 90). See also ibid [188] (Lord Hope). Both 
dissenting. 
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 Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 428 (CA) 437-438 (Stephenson LJ). See p 122. 
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 ibid. 
49
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 ‘I do not believe that the man in the street would apply the word “ethnic” to a characteristic which 
the propositus[
50
] could assume or reject as a matter of choice.’
51
  
 ‘To regard a person as acting unlawfully when he had not been motivated ... by any discriminatory 
motive is hardly likely to assist the objective of promoting harmonious racial relations.’
52
  
 ‘To introduce something akin to strict liability... is unlikely to recommend the legislation to the public 
as being fair and proper protection for the minorities that they are seeking to protect.’
53
  
 The Objective Justification test should be ‘something... acceptable to right-thinking people as 
sound and tolerable.’
54
 
 
 These judges have decided what they suppose the ‘man on the street’ thinks the law should be, or 
at least chosen to invoke him in support of their own ideological predilections. This, of course, is turning 
on its head the matter of statutory interpretation (indeed the whole business of declaring the law). The need 
to explain in plain English what the law actually is becomes especially important with a technical law with 
a novel purpose of societal advancement. Bringing personal, or even populist, opinions to the bench merely 
adds to the problem inconsistency, or randomness, already a feature of these flawed and complex 
judgments. Moreover, these statements betray a generally negative, even hostile approach to the group-
based societal purpose of this law, an approach redolent of the common law history in these matters. Thus, 
whether they should be for the benefit of Lord Diplock’s ‘citizen’,
55
 the litigants, other interested parties, 
or the body of case law, these statements fail to convey anything but misdirection as to the meaning of the 
law.  
  
At-fault defendants and individual victims 
The negativity towards the group-based societal purpose is also apparent in more formal statements, as well 
as some decisions, which tend to gravitate to the common law tradition of binary litigation supposing the 
existence of an ‘at-fault’ defendant corresponding to an individual victim. The theme can be found lurking 
in direct discrimination cases. Importunate dissenters continue to champion a benign motive defence
56
 
(which could also be explained as a manifestation of an ideological predilection of individual liberty), 
despite a House of Lords’ majority emphatically ruling it out as early as 1990.
57
 These were not mere polite 
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character references for otherwise liable defendants, or even apologies for reluctantly having to ‘apply the 
letter of the law’;
58
 they are driving factors in exonerating speeches. More recently, the Court of Appeal 
unanimously rejected the Cat’s Paw theory, again suggesting that the defendant must be a ‘wrongdoer’ 
before he can be liable for direct discrimination.
59
  
 In the field of indirect discrimination, a concept rooted in the notion of no-fault liability, such 
opinions can be found in unanimous decisions favouring the defendant. In Meer, one member of the Court 
of Appeal suggested that there could be no liability without discriminatory intent.
60
 That was back in 1983, 
and remained unchallenged by the judiciary. Indeed, the notion resurfaced as recently as 2016, when in 
Naeem,
61
 the Court of Appeal held that any challenged practice had to be ‘inherently’ discriminatory. 
 Similarly, for disability discrimination, a House of Lords majority drove the proverbial coach and 
horses through the statutory wording in favour of its concern for ‘innocent’ property owners. In the same 
case, a unanimous House also demanded for liability that defendants had knowledge of a claimant’s 
disability, while two Law Lords suggested a discriminatory motive was required. In any case, both aspects 
of the case reinforced the notion of fault-based liability.
62
 
 For victimisation, there has been an artificial distinction between the bringing and existence of 
proceedings
63
 and a baseless ‘honest and reasonable defence’,
64
 with the subsequent excruciating attempt 
to reconcile it with the legislation and precedent.
65
 These notions, developed in the face of the plain words 
of the legislation, centred on the ‘innocence’ or ‘reasonableness’ of the defendant. 
 On the other side of the equation, the problem arises with the group-based aspect of the definition 
of indirect discrimination. In the early days, the Court of Appeal dismissed claims because ‘brilliant’ 
individuals from the protected group would be unharmed by the challenged practice.
66
 More recently, it 
held significant statistical evidence to be insufficient to prove a prima facie case; in addition the Court 
demanded the reason why the group was disadvantaged by employment skills tests, and further, the reason 
why each claimant had failed, save any ‘coat-tailers’ were to benefit from the action.
67
 In other words 
indirect discrimination law served only proven individual victims. As well as being in denial of this law’s 
progenitor, Griggs,
68
 the Court appeared utterly indifferent to the age and racial profiles of the workforce 
and the most obvious solution; it was instead pre-occupied with any particular wrong done to any particular 
individual. Moreover, the Court seemed oblivious of the notion of institutional racism articulated in the 
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 See e.g. Khan v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2000] ICR 1169 (CA) [14] (Lord Woolf MR) noted 
above, p 87. 
59
 Reynolds v CLFIS [2015] ICR 1010 (CA). See p 177. 
60
 Meer v Tower Hamlets LB [1988] IRLR 399, [20] (Staughton LJ). 
61
 Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] ICR 289 (CA) overruled [2017] UKSC 27. 
62
 Lewisham LBC v Malcolm [2008] 1 AC 1399 (HL). Baroness Hale dissented on the ‘comparator’ issue. 
63
 Cornelius v University College of Swansea [1987] IRLR 141 (CA) 145-146; Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] UKHL 
48 [30] (Lord Nicholls), [46] (Lord Mackay), [59] Lord Hoffman, [78]-[80] (Lord Scott); Derbyshire v St Helens MBC [2007] ICR 
841, [9] (Lord Bingham), [21] & [23] (Lord Hope). 
64
 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] UKHL 48 [31] (Lord Nicholls). 
65
 St Helens MBC v Derbyshire [2007] ICR 841 (SC). Discussed p 107 et al. 
66
 Perera v Civil Service Commission [1983] ICR 428 (CA), 437-438. 
67
 Essop v Home Office [2015] ICR 1063 (CA) reversed [2017] UKSC 27. 
68
 Griggs v Duke Power (1971) 401 US 424. See p118. 
 Conclusion 
 
199 
 
MacPherson Report. Even the supposedly liberal (majority) decision in James v Eastleigh
69
 enabled an 
individual (and atypical) ‘victim’ to trump group-based benefits. The individualistic aspect of this binary 
approach is also noticeable in the victimisation cases, which ignored any wider (chilling or deterrent) effect 
beyond the individual claimant.
70
 
 
Evolution, stagnation, and regression 
It has been noted that the cases analysed here span a period of some 33 years (February 1983 to December 
2015), while the relevant precedents (starting with Griggs) date from 1971.
71
 Although statutory anti-
discrimination law is a relatively recent concept, one reasonably could expect a degree of evolutionary 
progress. But none is present in the cases reviewed here. Indeed, they represent regression or at best, 
stagnation, on the meaning of these key definitions. This was most startlingly evidenced with the baseless 
logic deployed by the Court of Appeal in Essop and Naeem in its doomed attempt to launch an 
unprecedented and regressive theory of indirect discrimination.
72
 Similarly, back in 1983, the Court of 
Appeal in Perera regressed from seemingly settled (and correct) EAT pronouncements on indirect 
discrimination, themselves rooted in the American progenitor, Griggs.
73
 The House of Lords in Lewisham 
v Malcolm expressly regressed established and correct orthodoxy,
74
 while in Rutherford it effectively did 
the same when unknowingly (it seemed), it threw another orthodoxy into uncertainty.
75
 In 1982, the Court 
of Appeal in Mandla ignored House of Lords precedent dating from 1972
76
 to narrow the scope of the law 
to immutable characteristics. In the meantime, eight successive House of Lords/Supreme Court judgments 
dating from James v Eastleigh (1990) to JFS (2010) merely provided squabbles over the existence of a 
benign motive defence, with enough importunate dissenters to maintain the argument throughout for direct 
discrimination (albeit unsuccessfully) and for victimisation (successfully thus far).
77
  
 Although this does not represent a definitive mini-history of the judiciary and discrimination law, 
it is consistent with the thesis that the judgments were made without recourse the standard tools of statutory 
interpretation or a full understanding of the key statutory key definitions. 
 
   
PROPOSALS 
The thesis has been that many interpretations of the discrimination legislation are technically flawed, 
overlong, and overcomplicated. The purpose of this project has been to declutter the judgments of their 
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flaws and prolixity, to show that with a reasonable understanding of discrimination law and the rules of 
statutory interpretation, such cases are relatively easy to decide, and with concise, clear, and technically 
sound judgments. As such, nothing more need be done to produce a consistent, technically correct, and 
accessible, body of equality case law. Nonetheless, the conclusions point to some fairly obvious, but 
limited, proposals, which could encourage such good practice.  
 The first is that the concepts, principles, and theories of equality law should be made a compulsory 
part of any qualifying law degree, so that all lawyers are familiar with legal aspects of equality, which can 
arise in any sphere of practice. Notions of equality have a growing influence in Public Law,
78
 while a 
specific rubric is incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, even if Parliament fails to ‘convert’ 
all EU rights into domestic law following secession (as promised), the role of equality law is unlikely to 
diminish in the UK for the foreseeable future. As such, all practitioners of the future should be able to raise 
and articulate equality issues whilst in the longer term some will go on to form the judiciary. This of course, 
is long-term, and does not guarantee that future judges will ignore their personal views in deference to a 
proper interpretation, but it would be overly pessimistic to assume it would have no effect.  
 In relation to the first proposal, the second is judicial training in matters of equality law. One could 
hope that this would detach entirely the modern bench from the negative historical attitudes, any 
incompatible ideological predilections and the ‘binary’ mind-set. Again, there must be a degree of 
scepticism about the outcome. As seen throughout this work, a supposed knowledge of the standard rules 
of statutory interpretation was not enough to compel judges to prioritise even the legislative language, let 
alone purpose, above their own ideological predilections. But it is likely to produce, to some degree at least, 
more expert judgments, and given the wider dissemination of expertise, it might provoke the practice, 
unachievable directly by legislation perhaps, of decisions based on more concurring, or even singular, 
judgments.
79
 
 More generally, there have been some embryonic steps eschewing prolixity. After complaining of 
needlessly complex and overlong judgments, Lord Neuberger suggested, extra-judicially, that judges 
should be given training in the ‘skill of judgment writing’.
80
 There is no evidence that this has been taken 
up,
81
 but at least the matter has been aired at the highest judicial level. It may be that Lord Neuberger’s plea 
was connected to two other developments. The Supreme Court nowadays issues ‘judgment summaries’,
82
 
while judges of the Court of Appeal have been ‘encouraged’
83
 to produce ‘short form judgments’ where no 
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point of law is at stake. Of course, these developments fall short in one way or another of the goals of clarity 
and (appropriate) brevity in all judgments, but they are steps in the right direction. In the meantime, the 
hand penning the summary or short form judgment may well absorb the habit when drafting the full or 
substantive speeches. 
 The third proposal is more concrete: an amendment to all equality legislation, along the lines of 
that suggested in the Law Commissions’ Report for all legislation, compelling judges to take a purposive 
approach to the interpretation of equality law. Again, while this would no doubt improve matters, the 
equality legislation would remain vulnerable to unduly narrow interpretations. A judge could adopt as the 
statutory purpose his or her ideological predilections, for instance, by using the ‘man on the street’ (above) 
as the reference point. As such, it would be prudent to add ‘liberal’, or ‘broad’ to the any legislative 
command.
84
 This would reduce the vulnerability to narrow intepretations. 
  Indeed, the ‘conversion’ of the acquis into domestic law following secession makes such a 
command imperative, assuming that the UK is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
and its binding interpretations. Although this would help avoid a divergence between this proposed shared 
arrangement of laws and principles, it might not be able to prevent some divergence. Much of this debate 
will be had after the details of secession are agreed. But assuming that the UK is sufficiently detached from 
the EU not to be bound by its treaty objectives, it is difficult to contemplate an interpretive command to 
English judges in terms that they must fulfil the objectives of a large foreign neighbour or trading partner. 
Thus, a legislative command to interpret discrimination law purposively and liberally is about as close as 
one safely could get to the politically unthinkable direction to adopt the Court of Justice’s teleological 
doctrine with its principal goal of treaty objectives.
85
 The second and third proposals could have a near-
immediate effect, while the first would take time to feed through. Nonetheless, in isolation, or combined, 
they ought to underpin good practice. 
  
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
This project, concerned with discrimination legislation, was prompted by the mystery of why so many easy 
cases produced so much bad law. Aside from the novel purpose of this law and an absence of technical 
mastery of the subject, the answer lies, it seems, in much judicial excellence being displaced by a gravitation 
to the common law’s traditional binary approach to litigation and the apparent ability of equality law to 
provoke ardent personal opinions on what the law should be. These are not the best tools for the task of 
statutory interpretation, especially with a law designed to challenge historical individual, societal, and 
institutional, assumptions, and their consequent patterns in society. All of this is against a historical (and 
indeed quite recent) backdrop of judicial indifference and/or hostility to matters of equality, which seems 
to have permeated many of the modern cases reviewed here.  
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 On the whole, these were easy cases to decide. Of course, a basic understanding of the wider 
jurisprudence, technicalities, and societal purpose would help. But this is not asking too much of a judge in 
the great courts of the land. The primary purpose of this work has not been to promote this or that theory 
or concept of discrimination law. In any case, there is a loose consensus around the statutory purpose.
86
 
Indeed, many of the problematic speeches were either in the minority, reversed on appeal, or resolved by 
subsequent legislation, with mainstream definitions prevailing. The central purpose has been to declutter 
the case law of the inexpert, prolix, and personal, judgments, to show that the implementation of any 
definition expressed in legislation must start with the basics of statutory interpretation combined with a 
basic understanding of the statutory definitions and purpose. This is all that was needed to have avoided so 
much of the bad law produced in these cases. 
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THE CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
The unique contribution of this work is the demonstration that the application of the basic tools of statutory 
interpretation can expose the technical failings (and prolixity) of the leading judgments on the key 
definitions of discrimination. It thus shows that the interpretation of this legislation is not a judicial free-
for-all. Rather, the proper interpretation (as set out) is obligatory. These points can be appreciated in the 
context of leading scholarship
87
 on the key definitions: the but for test, indirect discrimination and 
disability-related discrimination.  
 
 
James, JFS and the but for test 
The prominent commentary on James was predictably divided, given the obvious scope for sympathy 
towards the purpose of helping pensioners to keep fit. Strongly in favour was Geoffrey Mead, who asserted 
that Lord Goff’s comments on intention were ‘wise’,
88
 and that the but for test was welcome because it 
made direct discrimination easier to establish: the test ‘both simplifies the law and clearly brings within the 
scope of direct discrimination instances of the use of gender-based criteria’; hence, it removed a ‘major 
obstacle to successful claims’.
89
 
Hugh Collins is less certain. In his advocacy for a policy of social inclusion, he comments more 
briefly on James. Although he does not engage with the but for test, he advocates that the equal treatment 
principle should not apply where social inclusion, here helping pensioners, is the goal of the treatment.
90
 If 
not undermining its credibility, such a policy certainly side-lines the test, and does so in deference to policy. 
Robert Wintemute and Bob Watt engaged with more conceptual aspects of the test, with both 
affording it little enthusiasm. Whilst Wintemute considered that the but for test was ‘generally an excellent 
indicator of the presence of direct sex discrimination’, he argued that, ‘its ability to connect consequences, 
however remote, with an original causative characteristic may have to be limited in certain situations’.
91
 
This argument was made principally in support of his broader contention that many cases of pregnancy 
discrimination should be approached as indirect discrimination, thus providing employers with an objective 
justification defence. An example given was Dekker,
92
 where the refusal to hire a pregnant woman was 
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made in deference to the employer’s insurance conditions, which did not cover it for the costs of maternity 
leave. That said, Wintemute favours the but for test, because as a concept, it requires a comparison, which 
is,  
 
... an essential feature of any claim of direct or indirect discrimination because ‘[equality] is a 
comparative concept, the condition of which may only be attained or discerned by comparison 
with the condition of others’. When an individual claims direct discrimination, they compare their 
treatment with that (actually or hypothetically) received by another person and argue that the 
difference in treatment would not have occurred ‘but for’ a particular difference between them and 
the other person which is a prohibited ground (e.g. sex).
93
 
 
Hence, for Wintemute, ‘Claims of discrimination without comparison are impossible.’
94
 Yet, he parts 
company with the test when it captures the exercise of ‘a unique physical capacity’ for example, women 
choosing to become pregnant, or men choosing to grow a beard.
95
 Thus, pregnancy discrimination cases 
are ‘difficult to explain’
96
 as direct sex discrimination, and would ‘make more sense’ if treated as indirect 
discrimination.
97
  
Watt
98
 goes further, having no tolerance of the but for test. But his objection is based on largely 
concurring reasons. Watt traces approvingly the demise of the but for test up to 1998 (the time of his 
writing) and Strathclyde Regional Council v Wallace.
99
 He agrees with Wintemute that the but for test is 
too far-reaching, and should not apply where alternative motives inform the treatment, citing James as well 
as Dekker, as examples. Cast as direct discrimination, these are ‘problem’
100
 cases, this time, because the 
symmetrical nature of direct discrimination will always damn the person affording a benefit to just one 
group. The defendant in each would risk a sex discrimination claim whichever decision it made. An 
employer providing insurance for maternity leave would risk being sued by a male employee for not 
providing equivalent cover. Meanwhile, a council offering free swimming for those over 60 would risk a 
‘cantankerous’ claim that women have to wait for their pension while men get free swimming whilst still 
in work.
101
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Wintemute and Watt provide thoughtful and constructive conceptual observations, which are 
inextricably bound with policy, which probably lies behind their rejection (for pregnancy at least), not only 
by the ECJ, but also Parliament, which has since designated ‘pregnancy’
102
 as a protected characteristic, 
easing the conceptual objections, if not the policy ones. In a separate development, this time with an eye 
on the Strasbourg Court, Parliament provided travel concessions for those over 60,
103
 thus neutralising 
somewhat this particular concession from an equality challenge, although Watt’s cantankerous swimmer 
might disagree. 
While these observations have merit in attacking the technical difficulties of the ECJ’s assimilation 
of pregnancy with sex discrimination, their wider implications are based on a simple misconception of the 
but for test, which was failing to understand that it was improperly expressed by Lord Goff (a failing 
characterising Lord Lowry’s dissent in James).
104
 This was apparent also in John Finnis’s later commentary 
on JFS
105
 which attacked the but for test for (mis)leading the majority into side-lining the defendant’s 
religious motive. But he did so by focussing on causation, rather than the treatment. For Finnis, Lord Goff’s 
but for test,  
 
eliminates the statutorily mandated enquiry into the defendant’s grounds, practical reasoning and 
deliberation, and intentionality, in favour of an enquiry (without statutory mandate) into the 
causation of the complainant’s outcome.
106
 
 
Watt set out Lord Goff’s but for test in balder terms, assuming it to ask two questions: 
 
Was the complainant subjected to unfavourable treatment? 
 
Was the complainant a member of a group defined by that which the law declares to be a forbidden 
ground.
107
 
 
This oversimplifies even Lord Goff’s version, as it omits entirely any connection between the treatment 
and the protected characteristic. But it resembles Lord Goff’s improperly expressed test in that it cannot 
distinguish direct from indirect discrimination. And that is why Wintemute’s ‘choices’ cases should come 
into his reckoning. As noted in Chapter 4,
108
 properly expressed, the but for test need not be any different 
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from a but why test. The real flaw in the test, properly expressed, is that it is unsuitable in mixed ground 
cases,
109
 again, a matter untouched in these commentaries.
110
 
 The commentaries also fail to identify James (or the like) as an ‘Incorporated’ case (where a 
facially neutral practice incorporates a facially discriminatory one),
111
 which explains in an interpretive 
sense why the statutory definitions of direct and indirect discrimination became difficult to apply. This is 
more understandable in Wintemute’s case, as his focus is on pregnancy discrimination. Nonetheless, he 
identifies ‘Needs-Based’ discrimination as straddling the categories of direct and indirect discrimination, 
for pregnancy or any other ground, and explains it thus: 
 
Where a need is found exclusively among members of a particular group, a failure to accommodate 
the need is arguably ‘neutral treatment’, but has an ‘exclusive impact’ on that group and makes 
the discrimination appear direct.
112
 
 
The solution for both Watt and Wintemute is to distinguish the cases with a ‘necessary connection’ test. 
Hence, discrimination against a person because they have a penis or vagina makes a necessary connection 
between the ground and the person’s sex.
113
 By contrast, Watt notes, alluding to James, there is no necessary 
connection between sex and pensionable age, something dictated by Government policy.
114
 For Wintemute, 
the solution is to distinguish between these inherent characteristics of sex, and the ‘choices’, for example, 
becoming pregnant or growing a beard. (Such distinctions break down, for instance, in cases of 
(respectively) rape or religious obligation; and of course, individuals have little choice over the state 
pension age.) 
 The emphasis of these analyses is on the condition of the victim, whereas the ‘Incorporated’ 
feature of James is quite different, with its focus on the treatment. Finnis comes closer to this ‘treatment’ 
aspect when aligning James and JFS as ‘structurally’ distinctive, but only for the purpose of advocating a 
benign motive defence, rather than identifying the true nature of the case.
115
  
Apart from Finnis, there is a surprising paucity of comment on JFS. In his ‘constitutionalism’ 
analysis of JFS, Christopher McCrudden
116
 dedicates several pages to reporting the tortured debate over 
the meaning of  ethnicity, but, like Finnis, fails to identify the simplicity of the issue (what mattered is what 
the claimant was not).
117
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There is also little commentary on the victimisation cases, despite the ‘benign motive’ issue 
visiting the House of Lords on three occasions for this cause of action alone. Lizzie Barmes meticulously 
traced the demise of the but for test via the victimisation cases for the (policy) purpose of examining 
whether its demise, and consequent but why test, could facilitate positive action.
118
 Arguing for stronger 
protection against poor or denied job references, Sam Middlemiss laments any appearance of a benign 
motive defence in victimisation cases as this ‘may act as a deterrent to some claimants particularly when a 
case is not strong’.
119
 In relation to this, he notes cases where the unsuccessful claimant has been landed an 
enormous costs order as a further deterrent.
120
 
Although all of these commentaries allude to concept and/or policy, they do not engage with the 
statutory wording
121
 and what flows from it. By engaging with the statutory language and the conventional 
process of its interpretation, this thesis offers a distinctive contribution. It identifies with more acuity that 
Lord Goff’s but for test cannot distinguish direct from indirect discrimination. Moreover, it recognises that 
the but for test merely was improperly expressed (something also yet to be recognised even by the 
judiciary
122
), and when properly expressed, its actual shortcomings lie elsewhere, with mixed ground 
cases.
123
 It identifies the actual issues in James and JFS, and reinforces these findings by tracing the 
wayward steps of statutory interpretation taken by both majority and minority judgments. 
In the context of victimisation, it concludes that as a matter of statutory interpretation, a benign 
motive defence is insupportable, and moreover why this is so. The analysis of Khan and the untangling of 
the clumsy attempt in Derbyshire to shift the ‘defence’ from one element to another added clarity to this 
point. This illustrated that neither the causative nor the ‘detriment’ elements of the statutory definitions 
could support such an interpretation. It also showed how the revised definition provided in the Equality Act 
2010 could be equally (but wrongly) vulnerable to such an interpretation, and, again why, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, this should not be so.
124
 
 
 
Indirect Discrimination 
Given that, as far back as 2005, a judge complained that the case law of indirect discrimination was in a 
‘lamentable state of complexity and obfuscation’,
125
 it is, perhaps, even more surprising that this definition 
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has attracted relatively little academic comment. As such, this work provides a near unique appraisal of the 
‘Perera problem’.
126
 It shows how its doctrine (and inherent loophole) was out of step with concept, as well 
as the jurisprudence of Australia, Canada, the United States, and the EU. Moreover, it demonstrated how 
this apparently literal interpretation was in fact no such thing, and that an assiduous reading of the 
legislation would have produced a literal interpretation harmonious with concept and existing 
jurisprudence.
127
 As well as identifying these technical shortcomings, it highlighted the underlying theme 
of the common law’s at-fault tortfeasor and victim mind-set. 
Aside from this study, the most damning commentary of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mandla 
v Dowell Lee came from the House of Lords’ reversal. The reasoning of which centred on the Court of 
Appeal’s flirtation with a biological definition of race, which, as observed by the House, was contrary to 
precedent and statutory purpose.
128
 This work shows more fundamentally that it was contrary to the basic 
principles of statutory interpretation, namely the literal and ‘otiose’ doctrines. It also identifies an 
underlying theme, manifested with misunderstandings of multiculturalism and expressions of sympathy for 
the defendant,
129
 exposing again a gravitation to the common law’s at-fault tortfeasor and victim mind-set. 
On the Rutherford ‘choice of pool’ issue, in an article advocating a third concept of ‘quasi-direct 
discrimination’, Simon Forshaw and Marcus Pilgerstorfer conclude that the real problem in Rutherford was 
that it was impossible to assess the impact of the rule on a group that ought to include those under 65 
wishing to work beyond 65, as no statistics were available.
130
 This conclusion is based on the premise that 
the pool should be a fluid one, rather than a snapshot of the impact at any one time. As such, unlike this 
work, the analysis does not seek to address the fundamental flaw in the majority’s chosen pool. 
Meanwhile, Catherine Barnard observed that the Rutherford majority’s choice of pool was 
‘showing signs of some confusion between direct and indirect discrimination’ and that ‘had they clearly 
identified the “rule” ...(e.g. being under 65) they might have found disparate impact against men’.
131
 Hence, 
‘some might argue the majority’s approach is more problematic’.
132
 These observations are quite correct, 
but only hint at the fundamental flaw with the Rutherford pool, which was including the challenged factor 
(the ‘rule’) to define the pool. 
 Finally on indirect discrimination, there is the Court of Appeal’s reason why theory, launched in 
Essop and Naeem.
133
 Sandra Fredman makes a detailed and logical analysis of the flaws in the theory, 
largely by reference to the ‘level playing field’ concept of indirect discrimination propounded by Baroness 
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Hale in Homer.
134
 In doing so, Fredman highlights the Court’s ‘blurring’ of the lines between direct and 
indirect discrimination,
135
 and its misunderstanding of the remedial options.
136
 Also commenting on Essop, 
Tarunabh Khaitan neatly engages with the statutory formula to conclude that the reason why - or in his 
words, the explanatory requirement - ‘is nowhere to be found in the language of s 19(2)(b) [of the Equality 
Act 2010]’.
137
 He thus adopted, although not expressly, a literal approach. He further suggests that under 
this ruling, a case such as Griggs (arguably involving ‘well-disguised prejudice’) would be ‘rather difficult 
to establish’.
138
 
This thesis generally agrees with those conclusions, but adds more. It examines the legal reasoning 
in more depth and detail. It does this, of course, with express reference to common tools of statutory 
interpretation. For Essop, in addition to the statutory ‘key’ definitions, the analysis involves the 2010 
Equality Act’s remedial and evidential provisions, as well as its Long Title, Explanatory Notes, and a Code 
of Practice. The findings are reinforced by reference to case law of the House of Lords, Supreme Court, 
ECJ, and Strasbourg, as well as the antecedent American precedents. The technical errors identified 
concerned the standard of proof, group exclusion, obvious and ‘unknown’ causes, and the remedial 
consequences for the (hypothetical) coat-tailers. It adds perhaps the sharpest observation of all, that the 
challenged practice was in fact creating real coat-tailers, but this time they are predominately white and 
young. 
This more detailed and comprehensive approach exposed and substantiated the judgments’ 
technical flaws in Naeem. These were: (1) confusing cause and effect, inherence and social attitudes, and 
direct with indirect discrimination; (2) failing to address properly the EAT’s fundamentally flawed 
comparison, clarify the shifting burden of proof, or appreciate multiple causes of a disparity; and (3) 
misunderstanding the precedents deployed whilst wrongly side-lining the relevant (EU) ones. 
 In addition to showing how easy these cases were to solve, the ‘mini-history’ context in which this 
appraisal of Essop and Naeem was made, best demonstrated the regressive feature of some of these cases: 
after some 45 years of jurisprudence on the subject (beginning with Griggs in 1971), and some 30 years 
since the Court of Appeal last attempted a flawed and doomed rewriting (in Perera),  two benches of the 
Court of Appeal preferred to embark upon a frolic of their own, rather than follow, or show an 
understanding of, the well-established principles. This is an additional contribution. 
 
Disability-related discrimination and Lewisham v Malcolm 
In a commentary largely uncritical of the reasoning on both elements in Malcolm, Rachel Horton notes that 
the decision, as far as it affected employment, may not be compatible with EU law. She also presents, with 
a critical eye, the practical consequences of the decision, which included the consequent relationship with 
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other causes of action (direct discrimination and the failure to make reasonable adjustments), and how 
claims could be pleaded in the wake of this.
139
 
Pauline Roberts provides an overview of Malcolm and the ECJ decision in Coleman v Attridge 
Law,
140
 while contemplating the consequences for the disability employment rights of carers.
141
 In doing 
so, she notes, but with no detail, the respective ‘narrow’ and purposive interpretations. She argued, again 
with reference to EU employment law, that it would be better if the decision were confined to the ‘premises’ 
section of the legislation. 
 While both of these engage with the statutory definitions and EU law, this work goes further and 
critically engages with the House of Lords’ legal reasoning and process of interpretation by reference to 
the rules of statutory interpretation and identified the now-familiar predilection requiring a discriminatory 
intent for liability. The appraisal provided a further contribution by providing relatively straightforward 
interpretative solutions that would have given the legislation its full efficacy, and did so without generating 
any of the concerns raised by the House (or indeed by these commentaries). It thus illustrated why the 
interpretations were flawed, and again, why this was a relatively easy case to resolve. 
 
 
This work also records some regression during the modern legislation’s short history, and the common 
law’s longer historical indifference/hostility to equality matters, suggesting that it lingers in these themes. 
And although the work presents established and well known tools of statutory interpretation, it brings to 
the fore the radical and little-used Ghaidan approach.
142
 
  As noted above, the unique contribution of this work is demonstrating that the application of the 
basic tools of statutory interpretation, with a level of expertise in the matter, can expose technical failings 
in the senior courts’ interpretations of the central concepts of discrimination law. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that their application can provide technically sound judgments, affording the statutory definitions efficacy 
and integrity. It also shows how much simpler the cases were to resolve. In doing so, this approach exposed 
unnecessary prolixity and identified underlying themes of a gravitation to the common law’s traditional 
binary approach to litigation and the apparent ability of equality law to provoke ardent personal opinions 
on what the law should be. The approach outlined here can not only provide much improved decisions, it 
should avoid the upsets, reversals, and repeated litigation that has beset this law.
                                                          
139
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